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only read access to the databases “DB” and
can query the oracles “oracles”
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Introduction
(The english version is below)
Plusieurs e´tudes, telles que par exemple celles effectue´es par International Data Corpo-
ration (IDC), montrent que le marche´ des appareils mobiles ne cesse de se de´velopper
et que le nombre d’applications te´le´charge´es augmente de manie`re exponentielle. L’IDC
pre´voit que 1,5 milliards de smartphones seront vendus d’ici la fin de 2017 [3] et que les
te´le´chargements d’applications atteindront 178 milliards en 2017 [4].
De meˆme, la multiplicite´ des services pour les utilisateurs mobiles augmente de fac¸on
spectaculaire. Presque tout peut eˆtre fait via des applications mobiles. On peut distinguer
deux types majeurs d’applications mobiles: les applications d’entreprise et les appli-
cations personnelles. Les applications d’entreprise permettent a` un utilisateur d’avoir
acce`s aux services de l’entreprise comme l’acce`s a` des documents confidentiels de cette
entreprise. Quant aux applications personnelles, elles offrent divers services quotidiens
a` l’utilisateur.
Parmi les applications personnelles les plus re´pandues, on trouve celles de´die´es au diver-
tissement. Un utilisateur peut te´le´charger une application mobile pour jouer a` un jeu,
e´couter de la musique, regarder des vide´os et ainsi de suite. Il peut e´galement utiliser
une application mobile comme un moyen de communication, que ce soit en voix, vide´o
ou a` travers les re´seaux sociaux. Outre ces applications, il existe aussi des applica-
tions bancaires. Ces dernie`res sont te´le´charge´es par l’utilisateur soit pour surveiller son
compte bancaire en temps re´el soit pour effectuer des transactions de paiement en util-
isant son smartphone. Dans ce cas, ces applications peuvent interagir avec un serveur
distant et manipuler les informations bancaires de l’utilisateur, son identite´ ainsi que
de nombreuses autres donne´es prive´es comme les journaux de transactions effectue´es.
Parmi les applications mobiles e´mergentes, on compte aussi les applications de´die´es
au transport. En utilisant la possibilite´ d’effectuer des transactions sans contact des
smartphones actuels, elles permettent a` l’utilisateur d’acheter et de valider un titre de
transport de´mate´rialise´, comme un carnet de billets ou un abonnement. Comme les ap-
plications bancaires, les applications de transport public manipulent des donne´es prive´es
de l’utilisateur telles que son identite´, des attributs associe´s a` son aˆge, sa situation, par
exemple, un e´tudiant ou une personne handicape´e, le type de son titre de transport etc.
La croissance rapide de l’utilisation des applications et services mobiles ainsi que l’aspect
sensible et prive´ des donne´es manipule´es par ces applications, produisent une situation
attrayante pour les attaquants. Un attaquant peut eˆtre un utilisateur frauduleux, une en-
tite´ externe, ou bien un fournisseur de service ou d’application malveillant. Les attaques
qui peuvent eˆtre effectue´es par ces attaquants sont soit contre le service, soit contre
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l’utilisateur. Ci-apre`s, nous de´taillons les proble´matiques lie´es a` chaque type d’attaques
et nous donnons un aperc¸u de nos objectifs et nos contributions.
Les attaques contre l’utilisateur sont principalement lie´es aux proble´matiques de respect
de la vie prive´e. Un attaquant externe peut essayer de capturer des donne´es prive´es et
des secrets de l’utilisateur. De meˆme, un fournisseur de services peut essayer de traquer
les utilisateurs dans leur vie quotidienne en fonction de leur utilisation du service. Par
exemple, dans les transports publics, des violations contre la vie prive´e sont fre´quemment
souleve´es. En 2012, le transporteur belge STIB a rec¸u le prix Big Brother pour sa
carte sans contact (MoBIB) [5]. En effet, ce prix met en avant les entreprises et les
gouvernements qui portent atteinte a` la vie prive´e. Un autre exemple marquant illustre ce
proble`me: certains avocats spe´cialise´s dans le divorce ont utilise´ les registres de paiement
de l’E-ZPass et Fast Lane afin de poursuivre les maris de leurs clientes et prouver qu’ils
ont triche´ sur leurs localisations a` un moment et une date donne´s [6].
E´tant donne´ que plusieurs solutions industrielles de´ploye´es pour les infrastructures de
transport public pre´sentent d’importants proble`mes lie´s au respect de la vie prive´e, les
scientifiques se sont penche´s sur cette question. Beaucoup de solutions cryptographiques
ont e´te´ propose´es afin d’assurer la protection de la vie prive´e, principalement pour garan-
tir l’intrac¸abilite´ des voyages de l’utilisateur. Cependant, ces solutions ont ge´ne´ralement
ne´glige´ les exigences fonctionnelles du service. En effet, la validation du titre de transport
(billet ou abonnement e´lectronique) doit eˆtre re´alise´e en moins de 300 ms [7]. Cette con-
trainte de temps devient difficile a` respecter sur des plateformes d’imple´mentation tre`s
se´curise´es ayant des ressources limite´es a` l’instar des cartes SIM.
Dans ces circonstances, nous avons choisi de construire un service de transport re´aliste,
respectant la vie prive´e, et se basant sur de nouveaux outils cryptographiques ame´liore´s.
Dans cette the`se, nous commenc¸ons par montrer les obstacles pour construire des proto-
coles qui respectent la vie prive´e. Nous e´tudions les travaux lie´s au service de transport
public en normalisation, dans les solutions industrielles et dans la litte´rature. En par-
ticulier, nous de´taillons une vulne´rabilite´ que nous avons de´couverte dans le protocole
de Rupp et al. qui a e´te´ publie´ a` la confe´rence FC 2013 [2]. Ensuite, nous pre´sentons
l’architecture du mobile ainsi que les hypothe`ses de se´curite´ associe´es a` chaque com-
posant. Ensuite, nous distinguons deux cas d’usage dans le service de transport public:
(1) le cas d’usage “m-pass” (abonnement) ou` un utilisateur peut utiliser le syste`me de
transport d’une manie`re illimite´e, mais pendant une pe´riode de temps donne´e, et (2)
le cas d’usage “m-ticketing” (billetterie) ou` un utilisateur a un acce`s limite´ au re´seau
de transport en fonction du nombre de ses m-tickets (billets e´lectroniques sur mobile).
Nous commenc¸ons par la formalisation des exigences en termes de se´curite´ et de respect
de la vie prive´e du cas d’usage “m-pass”, et nous de´finissons aussi ses exigences fonc-
tionnelles. Plus tard, nous pre´sentons notre solution d’abonnement intrac¸able, base´e
sur les sche´mas de signature de type Camenisch-Lysyanskaya, et prouvons formelle-
ment qu’elle satisfait toutes les exigences de´finies pre´ce´demment. Pareillement, nous
formalisons les exigences en termes de se´curite´ et de respect de la vie prive´e du cas
d’usage “m-ticketing”, et de´finissons ses exigences fonctionnelles. Malgre´ les ressem-
blances que peuvent avoir les exigences du cas d’usage “m-ticketing” avec celles du cas
d’usage “m-pass”, elles doivent eˆtre mises en œuvre diffe´remment puisque le cas d’usage
“m-ticketing” pre´sente plus de contraintes: l’anonymat et l’intrac¸abilite´ des m-tickets
se´pare´ment en plus de l’anonymat et l’intrac¸abilite´ du carnet des m-tickets. Ensuite,
nous pre´sentons notre solution de billetterie intrac¸able base´e sur les sche´mas de signa-
ture Boneh-Boyen et les preuves d’appartenance a` un ensemble. Notre protocole assure
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e´galement le post-paiement. Lorsqu’on active ce mode, la vie prive´e de l’utilisateur ne
doit pas eˆtre remise en cause. En outre, le syste`me doit eˆtre en mesure d’empeˆcher, ou
au moins de de´tecter, toute tricherie de l’utilisateur. Enfin, nous prouvons formellement
que notre solution satisfait toutes les exigences de´finies pre´ce´demment.
Afin d’atteindre nos objectifs dans le cas d’usage “m-ticketing”, nous proposons plusieurs
optimisations cryptographiques aux preuves d’appartenance a` un ensemble. Notre syste`me
permet a` un prouveur de prouver, sans divulgation de donne´es, qu’il de´tient un secret
appartenant a` un ensemble public donne´. Ces preuves sont faites sans ne´cessiter de cal-
culs de couplage, principalement du coˆte´ du prouveur. En effet, dans les constructions
pre´ce´dentes de preuves d’appartenance a` un ensemble, le prouveur a besoin d’effectuer
des calculs de couplage qui sont couˆteux, en particulier pour les dispositifs a` ressources
limite´es comme la carte SIM. Cette contribution est d’un inte´reˆt inde´pendant et peut
eˆtre utilise´e a` d’autres fins lorsqu’une telle preuve est ne´cessaire dans un contexte ou` les
ressources sont limite´es.
En plus de la conception et de la formalisation des protocoles de transport respectant la
vie prive´e, nous proposons une implementation de ces protocoles sur une carte SIM et
montrons qu’ils satisfont les exigences fonctionnelles, notamment la stricte contrainte
de temps.
En ce qui concerne les attaques contre le service, elles visent a` introduire des troubles
dans le service. Un attaquant externe peut essayer de perturber le service ou meˆme le ren-
dre indisponible. Cela peut se produire, par exemple, en controˆlant a` distance l’appareil
de l’utilisateur a` travers un malware. De meˆme, un utilisateur malveillant peut tenter
de compromettre l’application mobile, et donc compromettre la se´curite´ du service, afin
de tricher. Par exemple, dans un service donnant acce`s a` un syste`me de transport, il
peut essayer de modifier le montant d’un voyage ou de de´penser plusieurs fois le meˆme
billet. Les proble`mes de se´curite´ de´crits pre´ce´demment sont re´alisables, car les envi-
ronnements mobiles, he´bergeant les applications mobiles, sont vulne´rables. Diffe´rents
types de failles sont fre´quemment de´tecte´s. En 2013, l’analyse de Kaspersky Security
a indique´ que 148,778 malwares mobiles ont e´te´ de´tecte´s [8]. Dans ces circonstances,
une nouvelle famille d’environnements mobiles, appele´ environnements d’exe´cution de
confiance, est en train d’e´merger afin de fournir une plus grande protection aux appli-
cations, et donc, aux services fournies. Un environnement d’exe´cution de confiance
(Trusted Execution Environment, TEE) est de´fini comme un syste`me d’exploitation
se´curise´ s’exe´cutant paralle`lement au syste`me d’exploitation standard, appele´ e´galement
environnement d’exe´cution riche (Rich Execution Environment, REE), et posse´dant ses
propres CPU et me´moires. Le TEE devrait he´berger des applications de confiance,
comme les applications bancaires ou de transport, qui fournissent des services se´curise´s
a` des applications mobiles fonctionnant au sein du REE.
Dans ce contexte, nous cherchons a` e´tudier et ame´liorer les fonctions de se´curite´ of-
fertes par cette nouvelle famille d’environnements mobiles. Nous avons identifie´ deux
proble`matiques. Tout d’abord, l’architecture du TEE ainsi que celle de son e´cosyste`me
ne sont pas suffisamment spe´cifie´es: le TEE est ge´ne´ralement conside´re´ comme une
boˆıte noire et seuls les API sont de´finies. Deuxie`mement, dans un environnement multi-
appareils (l’utilisateur a plusieurs appareils), l’utilisateur ne peut pas facilement et en
toute se´curite´ migrer ses services d’un TEE a` un autre. Dans cette the`se, nous mon-
trons qu’actuellement, les protocoles de migration de TEE pre´sentent des proble´matiques
de confidentialite´ et de se´curite´. Nous proposons ensuite une nouvelle architecture du
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TEE, organise´e en diffe´rents domaines de se´curite´ avec des droits diffe´rents, et un nou-
vel e´cosyste`me avec de nouveaux roˆles. Avec ce nouvel e´cosyste`me et architecture du
TEE, nous pre´sentons notre protocole de migration qui assure la confidentialite´ des
TEEs transfe´re´s et qui est base´ sur un sche´ma de proxy de rechiffrement. Ensuite,
nous le validons a` l’aide d’un outil de validation automatise´ de protocoles de se´curite´,
AVISPA [9].
Cette the`se est organise´e en neuf chapitres.
Le chapitre 2 fournit une introduction aux services mobiles sans contact. Il de´taille
e´galement le service de transport public et ses exigences. Ensuite, il de´crit l’architecture
d’un mobile actuel ainsi que ses moyens de se´curite´.
Dans le chapitre 3, nous de´taillons les composantes de base et les hypothe`ses cryp-
tographiques que nous utiliserons dans les chapitres suivants.
Nous introduisons au chapitre 4 une nouvelle preuve d’appartenance a` un ensemble.Cette
preuve est plus efficace car elle ne ne´cessite pas de calcul de couplage coˆte´ prouveur.
Dans le chapitre 5, nous donnons plus de de´tails sur les travaux lie´s aux solutions de
transport public et de´crivons l’architecture du mobile qui constitue un cas d’utilisation
dans la suite de la the`se.
Le chapitre 6 introduit une solution d’abonnement mobile respectant la vie prive´e dans
le cadre du service de transport public avec son imple´mentation sur une carte SIM.
Le chapitre 7 introduit une solution de billetterie mobile, efficace et respectant la vie
prive´e, pour les services de transports publics. Ce protocole utilise pleinement les re´sultats
du chapitre 4. Nous montrons aussi comment est assure´ un post-paiement se´curise´. Nous
terminons ce chapitre en pre´sentant les mesures de performance de notre imple´mentation
sur une carte SIM.
Le chapitre 8 de´crit un protocole de migration de TEE, se´curise´ et respectant la vie
prive´e.
Le chapitre 9 pre´sente des conclusions, re´sume nos principales contributions et discute
les perspectives, les de´fis et les futures orientations du travail de cette the`se.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Studies such as International Data Corporation (IDC) ones, show that the market of
mobile devices is continuously increasing along with the number of downloaded applica-
tions. The IDC expects that 1.5 billion smartphones will be sold by the end of 2017 [3]
and that application downloads will reach 178 billion by 2017 [4].
Likewise, the multiplicity of services for mobile users is dramatically increasing. Nearly
everything can be done via mobile applications. Figure 1.1 gives a subset of mobile
services and applications. There are two major types of mobile applications: corporate
applications and personal ones. The corporate applications enable a user to have access
to corporate services like the access to confidential documents of the company in which
he works. Regarding the personal applications, it offers various daily services to the
user.
Some of the most famous personal applications are for entertainment. A user can down-
load a mobile application to play a game, listen to music, watch videos and so forth. He
may also use a mobile application as a mean of communication, either voice and video
or through social networks. Besides these applications, there are banking applications
as well. The latters are downloaded by the user either to monitor his banking account
in real-time or to perform payment transactions using his smartphone. In such a case,
these applications may remotely interact with a back-end server and would handle the
banking information of the user, his identity as well as many other private data like
transactions logs. Other emerging applications are the transport ones. They enable the
user to buy and validate, using a smartphone enabling contactless transactions, a mo-
bile transport product, i.e., tickets or pass. Similar to banking applications, transport
applications handle private user data such as his identity, attributes associated to his
age, situation, e.g., a student or a disabled, the kind of his transport product and so on.
The rapid growth of the mobile applications and services use, along with the critical and
private aspect of the data being handled by these applications, produce an attractive
situation for attackers. An attacker can be a fraudulent user, an external entity, a
malicious service or application provider. The attacks that can be performed by these
attackers are either against the service or against the user. Hereafter, we detail the issues
related to every type of attack as well as an overview of our objectives and contributions
with respect to it.
Attacks against the user include privacy issues. An external attacker may try to capture
the user’s private data and secrets. Likewise, a service provider may try to track users
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Figure 1.1: Mobile Services and Applications
in their daily life based on their use of the service. For instance, in public transport,
privacy violations are frequently raised. In 2012, the Belgium transport operator STIB
has received the Big Brother awards for its contactless card (MoBIB) [5]. Another
example is the divorce lawyers who used the E-ZPass and Fast Lane toll records to track
their clients husbands and prove that they were cheating about their location at a given
time and date [6].
Given the serious privacy problems of the deployed industrial solutions for transport
systems, scientists have looked into this issue. Many cryptographic solutions have been
proposed in order to ensure the privacy requirements, namely the unlinkability of the
user’s trips. However, these solutions have usually overlooked the functional require-
ments of the service. In a nutshell, the validation of the transport product (mobile pass
or mobile ticket) must occur in less than 300 ms [7]. However, the user’s device, in
particular the SIM card, is resource constrained.
In these circumstances, we chose to build a practical and privacy-preserving transport
service based on new and enhanced cryptographic tools. In this thesis, we begin by
showing the barriers to build privacy-preserving protocols. We study the related work
to public transport service in standardization work, industrial solutions and literature.
In addition, we provide details of an attack we discovered against Rupp et al. protocol
which has been published at FC 2013 [2]. Then, we present our mobile architecture and
trust assumptions with respect to the mobile components. Afterwards, we distinguish
two use cases of the public transport service: (1) the mobile pass use case where a user
can use the transport system in a limitless way but for a given period of time, and (2)
the mobile ticketing use case where a user has a limited access to the transport network
according to the number of his m-tickets. We start by formalizing the security and pri-
vacy requirements of the m-pass use case, and define its functional requirements. Later,
we introduce our untraceable mobile pass solution based on Camenisch-Lysyanskaya sig-
nature schemes and formally prove that it satisfies the requirements previously defined.
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Similarly to the mobile pass, we formalize the security and privacy requirements of the
mobile ticketing use case, and define its functional requirements. These requirements,
even though they look similar to the mobile use case, must be set up differently since
the mobile ticketing use case presents more constraints: the privacy of the m-tickets
separately in addition to the privacy of the book of m-tickets. Then, we introduce our
untraceable mobile ticketing solution based on Boneh-Boyen signature schemes and set-
membership proofs. Our protocol also enables post-payment. When enabling this mode,
the user’s privacy must not be questioned. In addition, the system must be able to pre-
vent, or at least detect, any user cheating. Finally, we formally prove that it satisfies
the requirements previously defined.
In order to achieve our objectives regarding the untraceable mobile ticketing use case, we
propose several cryptographic optimizations to the set-membership proofs. Our scheme
enables a prover to prove, in a zero knowledge way, that he holds a secret belonging
to a given public set without requiring pairing computations, mainly at the prover
side. Indeed, in the previous constructions of set-membership proofs, the prover requires
pairing computations which are costly, especially for resource constrained devices like
the SIM card. This contribution is of independent interest and can be used for other
purposes where such a proof is required in a resource constrained environment.
In addition to the design and formalization of the privacy-preserving transport protocols,
we propose an implementation of these protocols on a SIM card and show that it satisfies
the functional requirements, in particular the stringent time constraint.
Regarding the attacks against the service, they aim at introducing troubles into the
service. An external attacker may try to disrupt the service or even make it unavailable.
This can occur, for instance, by remotely controlling the user’s device through a malware
within it. Likewise, a malicious user may try to compromise the mobile application, and
hence compromise the security of the service, in order to cheat. For instance in a service
giving access to a transport system, he may try to change the amount of a journey or
double spend the same ticket. The security issues described previously are achievable
because the mobile environments, hosting the mobile applications, are vulnerable. Dif-
ferent types of deficiencies are frequently detected. In 2013, Kaspersky Security analysis
indicates that 148.778 mobile malware were detected [8]. In these circumstances, a new
family of mobile environments, called Trusted Execution Environments, is emerging in
order to provide more protection to applications, and hence, the services they provide. A
Trusted Execution Environment is defined as a secure Operating System running along-
side the standard Operating System, also called Rich Execution Environment and has its
own CPU and memories. The Trusted Execution Environment should host Trusted Ap-
plications like banking or transport applications that provide secure services to mobile
applications running within the Rich Execution Environment.
In this context, we aim at investigating and improving the security features provided
by this new family of mobile environments. We identified two issues. First, the TEE
architecture and ecosystem are not finely detailed: the TEE is usually considered as a
black box and only APIs are defined. Second, in a multidevice environment (the user
has many devices), the user cannot easily and securely migrate his TEE services from a
device to another one. In this thesis, we show that current TEE migration protocols do
have privacy and security issues. We then propose a new TEE architecture organized
into different security domains with different rights and define a new TEE ecosystem
with new entities roles. With the new TEE ecosystem and architecture, we present
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our TEE migration protocol that ensures the confidentiality of the transferred TEE
and is based on proxy re-encryption scheme. Next, we validate this protocol using the
automated security protocol validation tool, AVISPA.
This thesis is organized into nine chapters.
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to contactless mobile services. It also details the
public transport service and its requirements. Then, it describes the current mobile
architecture along with its security features.
In Chapter 3, we detail the cryptographic assumptions and building blocks that we will
use in the following chapters.
We introduce a new practical set-membership proof that does not require pairing com-
putations at the prover side, as shown in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, we give details on works related to transport solutions and describe the
mobile architecture that we will consider for our proposals.
Chapter 6 introduces a privacy-preserving mobile pass solution in the context of public
transport service together with its implementation on a SIM card.
Chapter 7 introduces a practical and privacy-preserving mobile ticketing solution for
public transport services. This protocol utilizes the new set-membership proof intro-
duced in Chapter 4. We also show how to enable a secure post-payment mode. We end
this chapter by presenting the performance measurements of our SIM card implementa-
tion.
Chapter 8 provides a secure and privacy-preserving TEE migration protocol.
Chapter 9 draws conclusions, summarizes our major contributions and discusses per-
spectives, challenges and future work directions.
Chapter 2
Contactless Mobile Services
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Dans ce chapitre, nous nous inte´ressons aux services mobiles sans contact. Apre`s avoir
donne´ un aperc¸u des diffe´rents services, nous nous concentrons au domaine d’application
des transports publics car ils pre´sentent des contraintes ope´rationnelles fortes, partic-
ulie`rement lorsque l’objectif est d’en e´laborer une version sans contact. Nous de´taillons
les deux cas d’usage spe´cifiques, c’est-a`-dire, l’abonnement et la billetterie e´lectronique.
Sachant que les services mobiles vont eˆtre imple´mente´s sur des te´le´phones, il convient
donc de comprendre l’architecture d’un te´le´phone afin de mieux cerner les enjeux de
se´curite´. Nous de´crivons donc l’architecture d’un te´le´phone mobile. Nous de´taillons,
plus pre´cise´ment, la technologie de communication a` champ proche (Near Field Commu-
nication, NFC), les cartes SIM et les environnements d’exe´cution mobiles, en particulier
les environnements d’exe´cution de confiance (Trusted Execution Environment, TEE).
2.1 Introduction
Since mobile devices are becoming widespread, service providers have adapted their
services in order to maintain their consumers and attract new ones. Many services have
been, and many others will be, made available via the user’s mobile device. That is not
all. Service providers make use of all the available mobile technologies in order to provide
a better user experience, and hence attract more users. Consider, for instance, the Near
Field Communication technology, it has been used in the deployment of contactless
mobile services.
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In this chapter, we aim to shed light on the context of contactless mobile services. We
identify three areas: the contactless technology namely the Near Field Communication
technology, the relevant services and the mobile devices. We begin by describing the
history of the Near Field Communication technology, starting from its ancestors (con-
tactless cards) to its beginnings, while identifying the issues that followed its expansion.
Later, we give further details about the functioning of this technology and its main rel-
evant services. As a user needs a (NFC-enabled) mobile in order to use a NFC service,
we felt that it is important to study the mobile architecture and investigate the current
mobile security features.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we give a brief history about the
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology and an overview of the contactless mobile
services. In Section 2.3, we focus on the mobile public transport service: we detail
its phases, entities and challenges. Finally, we describe the smartphone architecture in
Section 2.4 and conclude the chapter in Section 2.5.
2.2 Contactless Mobile Services
Contactless services first appeared with transit contactless smart cards in Seoul, South
Korea (1995) [10] and in Hong Kong with the Octopus card (1997) [11]. These cards have
the size of a current banking card and contain a chip that communicates with the reader
in proximity through electromagnetic induction. Then, in 2003, Gemplus introduced
the first contactless card, GemCombiXplore, for mobile handsets [12]. This card has
the same format as a SIM card and communicates through a RFID (Radio Frequency
Identification) antenna embedded within the mobile device. GemCombiXplore has been
adopted for e-purse, debit/credit, loyalty and contactless mobile payment applications
for instance in public transport services. This enables users to replace the paper-based
tickets with their mobile devices equipped with the GemCombiXplore card. This card is
among the contactless implementations introduced before 2004 which presented a huge
success. However, these implementations still present a major drawback: compliance
and interoperability issues. Therefore, in 2004, NXP Semiconductors, Sony and Nokia
founded the NFC Forum [13], a non-profit industry association in order to ensure the
interoperability between devices and services by promoting the standardization of the
Near Field Communication technology (NFC for short).
The NFC is a short-range wireless technology [14]. It can be seen as the radio-frequency
identification (RFID) successor by providing a shorter range for security purposes. In-
deed, NFC standards are based on existing RFID standards including ISO/IEC 14443 [15]
and cover communications protocols and data exchange formats [16]. On the market,
the NFC had a relatively slow start. The first NFC enabled mobile was brought to
market in 2006 [17]. It is the Nokia 6131. Four years later, Samsung commercialized
the Samsung Nexus S, the first NFC enabled Andoid smartphone [17]. Afterwards, the
NFC market has dramatically increased to reach 416 million units in 2014 [18].
According to Information Handling Services (IHS) Technology, this trend will continue.
It is estimated that, from 2013 to 2018, NFC-enabled mobiles will rise by 325 percent [18].
In other words, by 2018, two mobiles in three will be NFC-enabled compared to the one
in four at the moment. The IHS study continues by pointing out a major challenge for
the current NFC market: the development of NFC services and applications.
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The main NFC services are presented in Figure 2.1. In all these services, a NFC-enabled
device becomes the way to use the service: a mobile application replaces the credit card,
the identity card, the professional card, the transport pass, the paper-based tickets,
and so forth. We identify three main families of NFC services: mobile commerce (m-
commerce), identification, and corporate services.
Corporate services include physical access control, time attendance, and secure PC log-
on. In these services, a user, using his NFC-enabled device, has access to corporate
resources such as a building, a lab or an internal network. Indeed, at the entrance of the
company building, a lab or when attempting to use the internal network of the company,
the NFC-enabled device, with some credentials, would exchange with a NFC reader in
order to prove the legitimacy of the user. This kind of services has two major security
issues:
1. proving the legitimacy of the user: a malicious user may try to use his credentials
in order to access a resource without authorization,
2. and proving that the user is the owner of the used credentials: a malicious user
may try to forge credentials or use the credentials of another user.
Figure 2.1: Contactless Mobile Services
In identification services, a user may use his NFC-enabled device as an identity authen-
tication tool. Similarly to the corporate services, the user’s NFC-enabled device, with
some credentials, would exchange with a NFC reader. However, in these cases unlike the
corporate services, the device reader exchanges enable to authenticate the identity of
the user. The security issues of the identification services have some kind of similarities
with corporate services issues:
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1. proving that the used identity is not spoofed: the user is the right owner of the
used identity, hence the used credentials,
2. and proving that the used identity, hence the used credentials, is not tampered.
In addition, some identification use cases may bring out privacy issues especially
when the service requires only a part of the user’s identity.
M-Commerce services involve sale and purchase transactions using a NFC-enabled mo-
bile device. We distinguish three main use cases: Mobile payment, Loyalty and coupon-
ing, and Public transport. In all these use cases, like the services described previously in
this section, the user’s NFC-enabled device, with some credentials, would exchange with
a NFC reader. This latter can be within the payment equipment (the mobile payment
use case), within the tradesman device (the loyalty and couponing use case) or within
the turnstile located at the entrance of a public transport station (the public transport
use case). Moreover, the public transport use case is more expanded than the other
use cases and will continuously grow up [19]. Therefore, in this thesis, we give further
attention to the public transport use cases. Hereafter, we give further details about it.
2.3 Mobile Transport Service
A public mobile transport service involves two main entities: a transport operator and
a user. The user benefits from a transport service using his transport product (a mobile
pass (m-pass) or a book of mobile tickets (m-tickets)). The transport operator encom-
passes: the transport back-end server and a validator. The transport back-end registers
the users to the transport service and provides them with the necessary transport prod-
ucts. The validator contains a NFC reader and initiates a control with the smartphone of
the user when he is traveling in the transport system, in order to check the authenticity
and the validity of his transport product.
After downloading the transport application on the user’s mobile device, the user per-
forms three main phases, as described in Figure 2.2.
User registration and application setup. During this phase, a user gives a proof
of his identity (e.g., a student card, an identity card or a passport) to the transport
operator. If this verification succeeds, the transport operator will register the user at
the transport service.
Product provisioning. A user chooses a product (e.g., a monthly transport pass or a
book of 10 m-tickets) and the related personal attributes (e.g., the age of the user) in
order to load the product into his smartphone. Additionally, if such a choice is possible
in the transport system, the user chooses the geographical area of his product and the
associated validity period. The product is then loaded onto the user’s device.
Product validation. The user shows his smartphone at the entrance gate of the trans-
port system in order to validate the product. To achieve this, the validator initiates a
communication with the user’s smartphone. Then, the validator checks the authenticity
of the product and grants or denies access to the user. If a validation conflict occurs
(two products are eligible to be validated), then the user has to be involved in selecting
the adequate product. Finally, the smartphone and the validator record the event.
Chapter 2. Contactless Mobile Services 13
1 
(3) Validator 
authentication 
Application setup 
Validation 
Registration 
NFC 
Transport operator 
(1) User  
authentication 
(2) Product request 
(4) Product 
authentication 
Validator 
Figure 2.2: Public Transport Service Phases
The major security requirements for a public transport service are the correctness, the
unforgeability and the non frameability. In a system which behaves correctly and in a
secure manner, a user, who owns a valid transport product, should be able to access
the transport network. In an unforgeable system, it should be impossible for anyone
to forge fake products. In a non frameable system, no one can spoof the identity of a
honest user and falsely accuse him of having used his transport product.
In addition to the security requirements, privacy requirements are also needed especially
because of the privacy violations described previously in Chapter 1. Considering the
privacy of a user requires that he remains anonymous in his daily use of the transport
system. However, under exceptional circumstances, e.g., a fraud or a murder, it should be
possible to lift his anonymity, thus providing a form of revocable anonymity. Moreover,
a privacy-preserving transport system should also ensure the unlinkability of the user’s
actions. In particular, the transport operator might be tempted to link all the trips
performed by the same user, even if these trips are “anonymous”. If the different actions
of a user can be linked, then there is a high risk of profiling. Some of these actions
combined together might play the role of quasi-identifiers, thus leading to a potential
de-anonymization of the user. For instance, existing technologies such as U-prove may
fail to provide the unlinkability property if the user does not go online regularly to
refresh his pseudonym [20]. This was further confirmed by a study of Vives-Guasch
and co-authors [21], which shows that most of current proposals in the literature use
pseudonyms in order to achieve revocable anonymity but do not prevent the tracking of
these pseudonyms.
Furthermore, the transport service has a stringent functional requirement: the total
transaction time of a product validation should not exceed 300 ms [7].
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Previously in this section, we made abstraction of the transport product which can be a
mobile pass (m-pass) or a book of mobile tickets (m-tickets). This is because whatever
the product is, the entities, the phases and the major security, privacy and functional
requirements are the same. However, ensuring these requirements in the case of the
m-pass is completely different from the m-ticketing case. Moreover, according to the
product, other requirements may arise.
In Table 2.1, we detail the differences between the m-pass and the m-ticketing use cases.
The way of usage and the structure of the transport product vary between the m-pass
and m-ticketing use cases. On the one hand, one m-pass can infinitely be used during a
given period of time. On the other hand, a book of N m-tickets enables a user to have N
trips. The granularity of the m-ticketing use case implies more privacy issues compared
to the m-pass use case. Indeed, a m-ticket is identified by an index n ∈ N and a serial
number. In order to ensure the same privacy level in the m-pass and m-ticketing use
cases, we must ensure the anonymity of a m-ticket index in addition to the unlinkability
of the m-tickets and the user’s anonymity.
M-pass M-ticketing
Type Access control Access control
User’s privacy
1. Anonymity of the user
2. Unlinkability between the different m-
pass usages
1. Anonymity of the user
2. Unlinkability between the serial num-
bers of different m-tickets
3. Anonymity of a m-ticket index
Structure 1 m-pass N m-tickets
Trips ∞ 1 ticket per trip
Table 2.1: Comparison between the M-Pass and M-Ticketing use cases
Whether in the m-pass or m-ticketing use case, we assume that the user has an NFC-
enabled smartphone that will host the transport application. Knowing that current
mobile environments are vulnerable and that an attacker or a malicious user may attempt
to compromise the transport application in order to make the service unavailable or to
cheat, it is important to secure the running code of the transport application. Therefore,
in the following section, we investigate the current available security features that can
be provided by a smartphone.
2.4 Secure Mobile Architecture
Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the current smartphone architecture. Besides to the NFC
component, the UICC (i.e., SIM card) and the mobile environment (Mobile OS), today,
a new family of embedded environments, usually called Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE), has emerged. Further, we give further details about the NFC technology provided
by the NFC component and the security features of the mobile device, i.e., SIM card
and TEE. We then investigate the differences between a TEE and a SIM card in order
to get a feel for the implementation of our transport application in these environments
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2.4.1 Near Field Communication
The Near Field Communication technology enables wireless interactions between devices
within a range less than 4 centimeters with a maximum communication speed of 424
kbps [14]. The NFC technology proposes three communication modes: Reader/Writer
mode, Peer-to-peer mode and Card emulation mode.
Reader/Writer mode [22] enables NFC-enabled devices to read or write information from
or to inexpensive NFC tags. The NFC tag is powered by a magnetic field in order to
answer the request of the mobile device. In the reader mode, the NFC tag turns back
the stored data that usually consists on a URL address or a couponing service. In the
writer mode, the mobile device writes data on the NFC tag. If the tag already contains
any data, it will be overwritten. The NFC tags are usually embedded in smart posters
and displays such as in cinemas in order to get information about a film, or in a museum
to get information about a monument.
Peer-to-peer mode [22] enables two NFC-enabled devices to communicate with each
other in order to exchange information such as business cards or share files like private
photos. This mode can also be used between users in order to transfer money or tickets
between wallets. The two devices communicate over a bidirectional half duplex channel
which enables only one device to transmit information at a given time: when one device
is transmitting, the other one has to listen and can start the transmission after the first
one finishes.
Card emulation [22] mode enables NFC-enabled devices to act like a traditional con-
tactless smart cards. A NFC-enabled device is able to embed multiple smart card ap-
plications: credit card, loyalty card, access card, transit card or tickets. This mode
is advantageous for such use cases in particular for large scale deployment. Indeed,
when using this technology, no renewal of the service infrastructure, such as the pay-
ment equipments, is needed. Currently supported communication interfaces for the card
emulation mode are ISO/IEC 14443 Type A and Type B, and FeliCa.
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2.4.2 Universal Integrated Circuit Card
According to ETSI TR 102 216 [23], a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) is
a smart card that conforms to the specifications written and maintained by the ETSI
Smart Card Platform project. This smart card is used for mobile telecommunications.
GlobalPlatform specified a smartcard architecture [1] which is valid for UICC. According
to the GlobalPlatform Card specification [1], a smart card is organized into isolated areas
called Security Domain (SD) as presented in Figure 2.4. A security domain is defined
as an on-card representative of an off-card entity that provides security services such as
encryption and decryption for the applications of the off-card entity.
Figure 2.4: Smart Card Architecture [1]
Three types of security domains, hence three types of off-card entities, are defined by
the specifications: Issuer Security Domain (ISD) which is the on-card representative of
the Card Administrator, Supplementary Security Domains (SSD) which are the on-card
services / applications providers such as the bank or the transport operator and Con-
trolling Authority Security Domain (CASD) which is a Supplementary Security Domain
with particular rights. CASD has a neutral role in the card and contains the card private
key. It also performs operation for other Security Domains in the card. If it exists, it
would enforce the security of the card and the trust relationship with off-card entities.
Finally, the SIM card (UICC) is considered as a secure element that can resist high
physical attacks as it could be certified Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 4
Augmented (EAL4+) [24]. With this certification, we are assured that a running code
within a SIM card has the highest levels of protection.
In addition to the SIM card, a mobile phone encompasses another secure environment
called Trusted Execution Environment. We give further details about it in the following
section.
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2.4.3 Trusted Execution Environment
A Trusted Execution Environment [25] (TEE for short) is a hardware environment with
a Secure Operating System which is isolated and completely separated from the mobile
platform. This new family offers a complete execution environment; more secure than the
traditional mobile Operating Systems (also called Rich OS, or REE for Rich Execution
Environment), with sufficient memory and storage capabilities. In other words, TEE
is a separate execution environment that runs alongside the REE and provides security
services to this rich environment.
Trusted 
Application
Trusted 
Application
Trusted 
Application
Client 
Application
Client 
Application
Client 
Application
TEE 
Internal API
TEE 
SE API TUI
Trusted PeripheralsPublic Peripherals
TEE Functional API
TEE Client API
Trusted OS Components 
Rich OS Components 
TEEREE
Figure 2.5: TEE Software Architecture
As shown in Figure 2.5, the TEE consists of Hardware Secure Resources, Trusted OS,
Trusted Applications and TEE APIs. There are four classes of hardware secure
resources: (1) Hardware Keys also called Platform Keys, (2) Secure functions such as
secure storage, secure entry and secure display, (3) Cryptographic accelerators and (4)
Interfaces to communicate with tamper resistant components such as Secure Element
or NFC-enabled Secure Element. The Trusted OS is not only a holder of the Trusted
Applications which run on top of it but also a supporting facility provider for application
developers. In order to guarantee the root of trust of the TEE, it is authenticated and
then isolated from the Rich OS during the secure boot process. A Trusted Application
(TA), called also Trustlet [25], is an application running inside the TEE which provides
security services to Client Applications, i.e., applications running in top of the REE.
A Trusted Application may be a DRM application, a payment application, a corporate
application, or a transport application. Regarding the TEE APIs, we distinguish two
classes: public and private. Public APIs, i.e.,TEE Client API and TEE Functional API,
provide a communication interface to Client Application which enables exchanges with
TEE. However, Private APIs, i.e., TEE Internal API, TEE Secure Element API (TEE
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SE API) and Trusted User Interface (TUI), provide communication interfaces to Trusted
Applications enabling exchanges with Secure Element Applications and usage of TEE
resources. Finally, the TEE is about to be certified EAL2.
Additional details about TEEs can be found in [26], [27].
2.4.4 Comparison
Compared to the SIM card, the TEE is worthwhile only with respect to the memory size,
hence, the computing speed. The TEE platform should provide roughly some mega bytes
of memory, unlike the SIM card which cannot exceed a dozen of kilobytes. Indeed, the
TEE would use the smartphone infrastructure which makes it more efficient compared
to the SIM card which is a resource constrained component. Using the smartphone
infrastructure can also be considered as a major drawback: the TEE cannot run when
the smartphone is off or when the battery is flat. On the other hand, a NFC-enabled
SIM card can run (slowly) and exchange with a NFC reader even if the smartphone is off.
This is because it can be powered by the reader. Functioning in any kind of situation is
important in services such as public transport: the user must be able to use his mobile
ticket or pass even if he has no battery. Regarding the security level, the SIM card offers
more security to the software running within it as it is a tamper-resistant secure element
which can be certified EAL4+. This would enable the integrity of the running code
and stored credentials. Finally, another issue of TEE remains in their implementation.
TEE is an emerging environment, hence, its implementations are very unstable and the
developing tools are not always available.
REE TEE
NFC-enabled
SIM Card
Security level - EAL2 EAL4+
Memories ≈ GBs ≈ some MBs ≈ some KBs
Flexibility × × √
Ease of development
√ × √
NFC, if battery off × × √
Table 2.2: Comparison between a REE, a TEE and a NFC-enabled SIM Card
Because the SIM card offers the highest security, can run even when the smartphone
battery if off or down and presents more development easiness, we choose to implement
our transport application within a NFC-enabled SIM card. We would like to emphasize
that even if in the context of this phD, we did our implementations on a SIM card, the
proposed protocols can be easily implemented on a TEE (if available).
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we described the contactless mobile services and their main security
challenges. Then, we focused on the public transport service as it is the most expanded.
We detailed its main phases along with the relevant, security, privacy and functional
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issues. We distinguished two use cases of the public transport service: the m-pass and
m-ticketing which presents more constraints that the m-pass.
In this thesis, we aim to build a secure and privacy-preserving public transport system.
Regardless of the use case, the system must ensure its security and a high privacy
level for users while fulfilling the stringent time constraint (transport product validation
< 300 ms). The security requirements encompass the unforgeability of the transport
product, the correctness and non-frameability of the system. The privacy requirements
consist of the user’s anonymity and the unlikability of a user’s trips. We also choose to
implement our protocols within a NFC-enabled SIM card. This choice is made owing
to the study of the smartphone security feature in the previous section. Indeed, the
SIM card enables a higher protection for its running code and is operational even if the
smartphone battery is down or off (this would enable the use of the transport product
even when the battery is down or off).
Our implementations also comply with a TEE platform. However, unlike the SIM card,
the TEE cannot be physically moved from one smartphone to another one. In such
circumstances, a new problem arises: how can the user securely migrate his credentials,
if the service is implemented within a TEE and he changes his smartphone? We give a
solution to this problem in Chapter 8.
In next chapter, we present the cryptographic building blocks that we will use later in
our constructions in Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8.
Chapter 3
Cryptographic Foundations and
Basic Protocols
Contents
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1 Mathematical Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.2 Basic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.3 Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.1 Computational Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.2 Provable Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Cryptographic Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.1 Pseudo-Random Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.2 Pedersen Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.3 Public Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.4 Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.5 Set-Membership Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Dans ce chapitre, nous pre´sentons quelques outils mathe´matiques de base, a` savoir, les
groupes, les corps, les corps finis, les courbes elliptiques et les applications biline´aires
de type couplages. Nous spe´cifions ensuite quelques fonctions de base utilise´es dans les
sche´mas cryptographiques: les machines de Turing, quelques de´finitions sur la com-
plexite´, les fonctions a` sens unique, les fonctions de hachage, les fonctions pseudo-
ale´atoires et les engagements. En outre, nous de´crivons les hypothe`ses calculatoires que
nous utiliserons dans les chapitres suivants pour prouver la se´curite´ de nos protocoles.
Enfin, nous pre´sentons les sche´mas cryptographiques qui nous seront utiles dans la suite
de la the`se, en particulier, la fonction pseudo ale´atoire introduite par Dodis et Yampol-
skiy, des sche´mas de chiffrement, i.e., chiffrement d’ElGamal, chiffrement de Paillier,
chiffrement a` seuil et proxy de rechiffrement, des sche´mas de signature, i.e., signature
RSA, signature Boneh-Boyen et signature Camenisch-Lysyanskaya, et enfin les preuves
d’appartenance a` un ensemble.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we first provide an introduction to some mathematical and cryptographic
tools that will be used later in this thesis. Then, we announce the computational as-
sumptions on which relies the security of our protocols. Finally, we present the basic
cryptographic schemes, that we will use in our protocols in Chapter 4, Chapter 6, Chap-
ter 7, and Chapter 8. Readers familiar with these topics may skip this chapter.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe some algebraic tools, namely groups, fields, finite fields,
elliptic curves and bilinear maps, that we will use in this thesis.
3.2.1 Mathematical Tools
3.2.1.1 Groups
Definition 1 (Group). A group 〈G, ∗〉 is a nonempty set G along with an operation
“∗” that maps G×G to G. This mapping satisfies the following properties:
• Associativity: ∀(x, y, z) ∈ G3, (x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z).
• Identity element: ∃! e ∈ G / ∀x ∈ G, x ∗ e = e ∗ x = x. e is called identity
element of G.
• Inverse: ∀x ∈ G, ∃! yx ∈ G / x ∗ yx = yx ∗ x = e. yx is called inverse of x.
Moreover, ∗ may be commutative: ∀(x, y) ∈ G2, x ∗ y = y ∗ x. In this case, the group
is called abelian or commutative.
A group G is called finite if |G| is finite. |G| is called the order of 〈G, ∗〉 (or simply of
G).
A group is called cyclic if: ∃g ∈ G such that
∀x ∈ G,∃n ∈ Z / x = g ∗ g ∗ g ∗ ... ∗ g ∗ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
g is called a generator of G. If G is finite and has a prime order, all the elements of the
group except the identity element are generators of G.
There are two possible notations: additive and multiplicative notations. The additive
notation is used only if ∗ is commutative.
In the additive notation, the symbol“∗” is replaced by “+”, the identity element is
denoted by “0”, and the inverse of an element x is denoted by −x.
In the multiplicative notation, the symbol “∗” is replaced by “×” or “.”, the identity
element is denoted by “1”, and the inverse of an element x is denoted by x−1.
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In this thesis, we consider a specific abelian group which is an elliptic curve. We give
further details about this latter in Section 3.2.1.3. In order to finely define the elliptic
curves, we first introduce the concepts of field, finite field and field characteristic.
3.2.1.2 Fields
Definition 2 (Field). A field 〈K, +, .〉 is a nonempty set K along with two operations
“+” (called addition) and “.” (called multiplication) that map K×K to K. This mapping
satisfies the following properties:
• 〈K, +〉 is an abelian group of identity element denoted by “0”.
• 〈K∗, .〉 is a group of identity element denoted by “1” and where K∗ denotes K −
{0}.
• The additive identity element “0” and the multiplicative identity element “1” are
distinct (0 6= 1).
• Distributive multiplication over addition: ∀a, b, c ∈ K, a.(b + c) = (a.b) +
(a.c) and (a+ b).c = (a.c) + (b.c)
Moreover, “.” may be commutative. In this case, the field is called commutative.
A field characteristic is defined as the smallest number n such that 1 + 1 + ... + 1 (n
times) is equal to 0. If this sum never reaches 0, the field is said to have a characteristic
equal to zero.
A field K is called finite if |K| is finite. |K| is called the order of the field.
Any finite field 〈K, +, .〉 satisfies the following properties:
• K is commutative.
• The multiplicative group 〈K∗, .〉 is cyclic.
• The order of K is in the form pn, where p is the characteristic and is prime, and
n is an integer > 1. Conversely, for any prime integer p and any integer n > 1,
there exists one and only one field (up to isomorphism) such that |K| = pn. This
field is denoted by Fpn .
3.2.1.3 Elliptic Curves
The elliptic curves over finite fields have been introduced in cryptography by Miller in
1985 [28] and by Koblitz [29] in 1987. Compared to multiplicative groups of a finite
field, these curves offer the same security level with smaller elements. Moreover, the
implementations based on elliptic curves require less resources which make it suitable
for resource constrained environments like the SIM cards.
It is defined as follows:
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Definition 3 (Elliptic curve over a finite field). Let K be a finite field. The elliptic
curve E(K) over K is the set of couples (x, y) verifying the Weierstrass equation:
E: y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K, together with the “point at infinity” O.
Hence,
E(K)={(x, y) ∈ K2, y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6} ∪ {O}
If K has a characteristic different from 2 or 3, the Weierstrass equation for E may be
expressed in the following short form:
E: y2 = x3 + ax+ b where a, b ∈ K and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0.
As mentioned previously, an elliptic curve has the structure of an abelian group. Indeed,
we can define a point addition law, denoted “+”, and consider the point at infinity O
as the identity element. We can apply the tangent and secant method to geometrically
perform addition of two points on the curve.
In the sequel, we use the short form of Weierstrass equation.
Definition 4 (Addition law - tangent and secant method). For all points P and
Q on the elliptic curve E(K), the addition of P and Q meets the following rules:
• −O = O
• Q = -P implies that Q + P = O
• O + P = P and P + O = P
• P = (x1, y1) 6= O implies that -P = (x1, −y1)
• If P, Q 6= O and Q 6= -P, the tangent and secant method enables to define the
point P+Q as follows:
– If P 6= Q, let R be the unique third intersection point (when accounting for
multiplicity) of the line containing P and Q, and E(K).
– If P = Q, let R be the second intersection point of the tangent line to the
curve at this point and E(K).
then P + Q = -R, as described in Figure 3.1a and Figure 3.1b.
The addition law of (E(K),+) can be described algebraically as well as geometrically.
If K has a characteristic different from 2 or 3, the addition of the points P = (xP , yP )
and Q = (xQ, yQ) is denoted R = (xR, yR) and defined as follows if we consider the
short Weierstrass equation.
xR = λ
2 − xP − xQ
yR = λ(xP − xR)− yP
where λ is defined as follows:
• If P 6= ± Q and P , Q 6= O, λ = yQ−yPxQ−xP .
• If P = Q and P 6= O, λ = 3x2P+a2yP .
For further details about the elliptic curves, we refer to the book of Silverman [30]. This
book also details bilinear maps on elliptic curves that we use in the construction of our
protocols and present below.
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Figure 3.1: Addition Operations on an Elliptic Curve
3.2.1.4 Bilinear Maps
Early in the nineties, bilinear maps have been used as means of attacking cryptosys-
tems [31, 32]. Later in 2000, Joux [33] presented the first cryptographic protocol using
such maps. This protocol is a tripartite variant of the Diffie–Hellman protocol. It en-
ables an efficient key exchange between three participants using only one exchange. Since
then, new cryptographic systems appeared and are now able to provide new properties
that were either unachievable or very costly.
In the following, we give the definition of a bilinear map.
Definition 5 (Bilinear map). Let p be a prime number and G1, G2 and GT be multi-
plicative groups of order p. The map e : G1×G2 → GT is said bilinear if it satisfies the
following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab.
• Non-degeneration: For g1 6= 1G1 and g2 6= 1G2 , e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT .
• Computability: e is efficiently computable. (Efficiency will be defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.2.2.)
In cryptography, there are two pairings that are used for the design of bilinear maps:
the Weil pairing [34] introduced by Andre´ Weil in 1940 for other purposes than the
cryptography and the Tate pairing [35]. This latter is twice as fast as the Weil pairing.
It is also used on more curves than the Weil pairing and even on non elliptic curves. By
misuse of language, the bilinear maps based on pairings are often called pairings.
Usually, the groups are chosen as follows. G1 is a sub-group of an elliptic curve on a
finite field. G2 is a sub-group of the multiplicative group of a finite field.
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We would like to emphasize that, in this thesis, we use the pairing as a “black box”.
Moreover, when designing a cryptographic system using pairings, it is important to check
that the used curves provide the functionalities required by this system.
3.2.2 Basic Functions
In this section, we start by defining the Turing machines that will be used in complexity
definitions. Then, we define some basic functions that we will use later in this thesis.
3.2.2.1 Turing Machines
The Turing machines have been introduced by Turing in 1937 [36]. These machines can
be used to simulate any computer algorithm and are formally defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Turing Machine). A Turing machine is defined by a 7-tuple (Σ, Q, σ,
δ, ∆, q0, F) where:
• Σ is a finite and non empty set of alphabet symbols.
• Q is a finite and non empty set of states.
• σ: Q× Σ→ Σ is the writing function.
• δ: Q× Σ→ Q is the state changing function.
• ∆: Q × Σ → {L,R} is the transition function where L is a left shift and R is a
right shift.
• q0 ∈ is the initial state.
• F ⊂ Q is the set of final states.
On an input I, a Turing machine can have various types of complexity. In this thesis, we
focus on Time Complexity, denoted by TM(I). It is commonly estimated by counting
the number of Turing machine steps from the initial to the final state. In addition, it
is often desirable that a Turing machine runs in polynomial time. In the subsequent
section, we give further details about this complexity time class.
3.2.2.2 Basic complexity definitions
In this section, we give the definitions of polynomial time complexity, negligible function
and, negligible and overwhelming probability.
A Turing machine (or an algorithm) is said to be of polynomial time if its running time is
upper bounded by a polynomial expression in the size, n, of the input for the algorithm.
Formally speaking, a polynomial time complexity is defined as follows:
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Definition 7 (Polynomial Time Complexity). Let M be a Turing machine. We
note TM(n) = sup{TM(I), |I| = n}.
The time complexity of M is called polynomial if
∃n0 ∈ N, ∃c ∈ N∗, ∀n ≥ n0, TM(n) ≤ nc
In literature, polynomial time is often synonym of efficient and a problem is called hard
if there is no known polynomial time algorithm to solve it.
Definition 8 (Negligible Function). A function ν : N→ R+ is called negligible, if
∀c ∈ N∗, ∃kc ∈ N \ ∀k > kc, ν(k) < k−c
We can define the concept of negligible and overwhelming probability using the negligible
functions.
Definition 9 (Negligible and Overwhelming Probability). Let P be a probability
depending on a positive integer k (called security parameter). P is said negligible if it is
a negligible function of k. P is said overwhelming if the probability 1-P is negligible.
3.2.2.3 One-Way Function
One way functions are a fundamental tool for cryptography. Indeed, it is a function that
is easy to compute, but hard to invert. Its definition is based on negligible functions,
i.e., functions that are asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial.
Definition 10 (One-way function). Let f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a function. f is
called a one-way function if it satisfies the following requirements:
• There is an efficient algorithm, that when has x ∈ {0, 1}∗ on input, outputs f(x).
• There is no efficient algorithm that can inverse f . Formally speaking, for any
efficient algorithm A and for all k sufficiently large, the probability
Pr[x← {0, 1}k; y ← f(x); x′ ← A(1k, y) : f(x′) = f(x)]
is negligible.
Among the families of the one-way functions, there are hash functions which are fre-
quently used in cryptography. Therefore, we give further details about then in the
following section.
3.2.2.4 Hash Function
Originally, hash functions were used, in computer science, for data storing. They also
enable to map binary strings of arbitrary finite length to reduce any message into a
particular set, e.g., an elliptic curve, a multiplicative group of a finite field... Informally
speaking, a hash function is defined as follows:
H: {0, 1}∗ → F
where F is a set such that |F | 6 2k with k small enough. For instance, F can be the set
{0, 1}k.
In this thesis, we use a specific kind of hash functions: cryptographically secure hash
functions. These functions ensure some particular security properties.
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Definition 11 (Cryptographically secure hash function). A cryptographically se-
cure hash function H is a hash function which satisfies the following properties:
• One-way: H is a one-way function.
• Weak collision resistant: For a given m ∈ {0, 1}∗, it is hard to find m′ 6= m
such that H(m) = H(m′) [37]. In other words, for a given m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and for
any efficient algorithm A, the probability
Pr[m′ ← A : H(m) = H(m′) ∧m′ 6= m]
is negligible.
• Strong collision resistant: It is hard to find m and m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with m 6= m′
such that H(m) = H(m′) [38]. In other words, for any efficient algorithm A, the
probability
Pr[m,m′ ← A : H(m) = H(m′) ∧m′ 6= m]
is negligible.
Another useful building block in cryptography is the pseudo-random function. We give
its definition in the following section.
3.2.2.5 Pseudo-Random Function
A function is called pseudo-random if there is no efficient algorithm that can distinguish
between an output of this function and a random value.
Definition 12 (Pseudo-random function family). Let m and l be two polynomial
functions, k be a security parameter and Rk be the set of functions:
{0, 1}m(k) → {0, 1}l(k).
Fk = {Fs}s∈{0, 1}k is the set of functions with an index s (Fk ⊆ Rk). Fk is called a
pseudo-random function family if it has the following properties:
• Efficiency: Consider s and x, there is an efficient algorithm that can assess Fs(x)
• Pseudo-random: For any adversary A such that the number of its requests to F
is polynomially limited, for all k, the probability
| Pr
s∈{0,1}
[A(Fs) = 1]− Pr
R∈Rk
[A(R) = 1]|
is negligible.
3.2.2.6 Commitment
A commitment allows a party to commit to a message m (secret) to another party.
Later, the commitment can be opened by having the issuer of the commitment send
additional information to the party to which he has committed to. Formally speaking,
we define a commitment as follows.
Definition 13 (Commitment). A commitment scheme considers the three algorithms:
• Setup: a probabilistic algorithm that generates the parameters and keys. It takes on
input an integer k and outputs the public parameters and key params. (params)←
Setup(1k).
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• Commit: the commitment algorithm that takes on input the public parameters
params, a message m and the public key of the scheme. It outputs the com-
mitment C of the message m and the data about the decommitment r. (r, C) ←
Commit(params)
• Decommit: the decommitment algorithm that takes on input a commitment C, a
message m and the data r. It outputs 1, if C is a commitment of m, otherwise, it
outputs 0.
{0, 1} ← Decommit(C, m, r)
A commitment scheme must satisfy the following security properties:
• Hiding property : the commitment C does not reveal any information on the
secret message m to the other party.
• Binding property : the commitment prevents the committing party from chang-
ing the message, that he has committed, at a later stage.
3.2.3 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we formally define the main cryptographic primitives that we will use
later in this thesis. We also describe and classify the attacks that can occur against these
primitives. The definitions provided in this section only refer to the so called public key
cryptography. We start by the concept of public key encryption and digital signature
that have been introduced by Diffie and Hellman in their paper “New directions in
cryptography” [39]. Then, we present the proof of knowledge.
3.2.3.1 Public Key Encryption
In cryptography, the encryption enables a user A to transform a message such that only
the authorized user B can read it. The key used for encryption, the public key of the
user B, can be published, while the key used for decryption, the secret key of the user
B, must be kept secret.
Any user can send a ciphertext to the user B provided that he knows the public key of
the user B. Only the user B can retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext.
Definition 14 (Public key encryption scheme). A public key encryption scheme is
defined by three algorithms:
• Setup: a probabilistic algorithm that takes on input an integer k and outputs the
public parameters params, a public key pk and its relevant private key sk.
(params, pk, sk)← Setup(1k)
• Enc: this algorithm is often probabilistic. It takes on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a public key pk and outputs a ciphertext c.
c← Enc(params, m, pk)
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• Dec: a deterministic algorithm that takes on input a ciphertext c and a private key
sk and outputs the encrypted message m.
m← Dec(params, c, sk)
Any encryption scheme must satisfy the two following security properties:
• Validity: a message encrypted using a public key pk must be properly decrypted
using the corresponding private key sk.
• Confidentiality: Given a ciphertext, no information can be revealed regarding
the encrypted message without the knowledge of the private key.
In this thesis, we use a particular refinement of encryption called proxy re-encryption.
This notion first appeared in 1998 when Blaze et al [40] introduced the notion of “atomic
proxy cryptography”, in which a semi-trusted proxy computes a function that converts
ciphertexts for Alice (computed under Alice’s public key pkA) into ciphertexts for Bob
(ciphertexts can be opened using the private key of Bob skB) without seeing the under-
lying plaintext. Later, many works such as [41] have been done in order to improve the
security and the performance of this kind of schemes.
Definition 15 (Proxy re-encryption scheme). A proxy re-encryption scheme is
defined by the following algorithms:
• Setup: a probabilistic algorithm that takes on input an integer k and outputs the
public parameters params, a public key pk and its relevant private key sk.
(params, pk, sk)← Setup(1k)
• ReKeyGen: let Di be a set that consists of the public key pki of the user i or the
private key ski of the user i or (pki, ski). This algorithm takes on input the public
parameters params, DSourceA of the user A and D
Target
B of the user B and outputs
the re-encryption key RA→B from A to B.
RA→B ← ReKeyGen(params, DSourceA , DTargetB )
• Enc: this algorithm is often probabilistic. It takes on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a public key pk and outputs a ciphertext cpk for this public key.
cpk ← Enc(params, m, pk)
• Re-enc: this algorithm takes on input the public parameters params, the re-
encryption key RA→B and the ciphertext cpkA of the user A. It outputs a ciphertext
cpkB of the same message (without knowledge of the message content) for the user
B or ⊥ it the ciphertext is not valid (for the re-encryption key).
{cpkB ,⊥} ← Re-enc(params,RA→B, cpkA)
• Dec: a deterministic algorithm that takes on input a ciphertext cpk and a private
key sk and outputs the encrypted message m or ⊥ if the ciphertext is not valid.
{m, ⊥} ← Dec(params, cpk, sk)
A proxy re-encryption scheme has additional security properties which are:
• Non-transitive: The proxy, alone, cannot re-delegate decryption rights. For
example, from RA→B and RB→C , he cannot produce RA→C .
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• Non-transferable: The proxy and a set of colluding delegatees cannot re-delegate
decryption rights. For example, from RA→B, DB, and DC , they cannot produce
RA→C .
The security of an encryption scheme (or any cryptographic scheme) also depends on
the attackers goals and capabilities. An attacker chooses his victim (a user) and gets the
public key of this victim. If the attacker aims to retrieve the plaintext corresponding to
some cirphertext, we can distinguish two types of attacks:
• Total break: given the public key of the victim, the attacker deduces the private
key of the victim. He can then decrypt any ciphertext of this victim.
• Partial break: the attacker retrieves a plaintext corresponding to a given cipher-
text without knowing the private key of the victim. Thus, he may not be able to
decrypt other ciphertext.
Instead of retrieving the plaintext corresponding to a ciphertext, an attacker may just
try to retrieve some information about the plaintext. in such a case, he would attack
the following properties:
• Non-Malleability (NM): an attacker is not able to transform a ciphertext c of
an unknown message m into another ciphertext c′ of a known message m′ such
that m and m′ are bound in a certain way.
• Semantic security: given only a ciphertext, an attacker can not determine any
information on the plaintext.
• Indistinguishability (IND): an attacker can not differentiate two ciphertext of
two different messages.
Attacks may also be classified based on what type of information the attacker has:
• Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA): the attacker can obtain the ciphertexts for
plaintexts that are previously chosen. This is possible as the encryption key is
public.
• Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA1): the attacker has a system that enables
him to retrieve the decryption of chosen ciphertexts under an unknown key. Using
these information, the attacker may try to retrieve the private key used for the
decryption.
• Adaptative Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2): this is an interactive form
of chosen-ciphertext attack. The ciphertexts to be decrypted may change during
the attack.
Usually, a scheme having the security property XX with respect to the attack YY is called
XX-YY. For instance, an indistinguishable encryption scheme against the adaptative
chosen ciphertext attack is IND-CCA2.
Chapter 3. Cryptographic Foundations and Basic Protocols 31
3.2.3.2 Digital Signature
Informally, a digital signature ensures the authenticity and integrity of a message. On
one hand, anyone must be able to verify a signature when given the public key of the
signer and the message. On the other hand, only the signer, i.e., the party that knows
the secret key, must be able to compute a signature.
Definition 16 (Digital signature scheme). A digital signature scheme is defined by
the following algorithms:
• Setup: a probabilistic algorithm that takes on input an integer k and outputs the
public parameters params, a public key pk and its corresponding private key sk.
(params, pk, sk)← Setup(1k).
• Sign: this algorithm is often probabilistic. It takes on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a private key sk, and outputs a signature σ of m.
σ ← Sign(param, m, sk).
• Verify: a deterministic algorithm that takes on input a signature σ, a message m
and a public key pk. It outputs 1 if σ is s signature of m, otherwise it outputs 0.
{0, 1} ← Verify(params, σ, m, pk)
Any type of the signature scheme must satisfy the two following security properties:
• Validity: a signature of a message using a private key sk can be verified by anyone
using the corresponding public key pk.
• Integrity: the signature of a message prevents any change of the message at a
later stage. Indeed, any change of the message after the signature invalidates the
signature.
• Non-repudiation: a signer that has signed a message cannot at a later time deny
having signed it.
In this thesis, we use a particular refinement of signature, called group signature. Using
this type of signature, a member of a group can anonymously sign a message on behalf
of the group. However in case of a dispute, the anonymity of a group signature can be
lifted by one or several designated trusted authorities (called revocation authorities).
This concept has been introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [42] in 1991.
A variant of group signature, called list signature, has been introduced by Canard and
his co-authors [43]. With a list signature scheme, it becomes possible, when specific
conditions are met, to link signatures produced by a member of the group. In particular,
this link becomes possible if the signatures have been produced during a given sequence
of time, i.e., a specific time period. A similar technique has later been used in [44]
and is called Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). The main difference between DAA
and list signatures is that in DAA, the role of the signer is split between a main signer
with limited computational and memory capabilities, e.g., a Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) or a SIM card, and an assistant signer, who is computationally more powerful
but is considered less secure, e.g., a mobile phone containing the SIM card.
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Definition 17 (Group signature scheme). A group signature scheme considers three
type of participants:
• A group manager that registers a user to the group.
• A member of a group who firstly requires registration of the group manager. Once
registered, a member of a group can sign anonymously on behalf of the group.
• A revocation authority that is able to lift the anonymity of a given signature.
A group signature scheme is a signature scheme defined by five algorithms.
• Setup: a probabilistic algorithm that takes on input an integer k and outputs the
public parameters params, the group’s public pkG, a group manager private key
skMG, the revocation authority’s key skRA.
(params, pkG, skMG, skRA)← Setup(1k)
• Join: an interactive protocol between a user and a group manager. At the end of
this protocol, the user becomes a member of the group and gets secret key skU and
a membership certificate to the group.
• Sign: a probabilistic algorithm that takes on input a message m, a membership
certificate to a group and a secret key skU , and outputs a signature σ of m. σ ←
Sign(param, m, skU )
• Verify: a deterministic algorithm that takes on input a message m, a signature
σ and a group’s public key pkG, and outputs 1 if the signature is valid, otherwise,
it outputs 0. {0, 1} ← Verify(params, σ, m, pkG)
• Open: an algorithm that takes on input a message m, a valid signature σ, a group’s
public key pkG and the revocation authority’s key skRA, and outputs the identity
of signer. IDU ← Open(m, σ, pkG, skRA)
A group signature scheme has additional security properties which are:
• Soundness and completeness: this property is a variant of the validity property
mentioned above. A signature generated by a group member can be verified by
anyone using the group public key.
• Anonymity: no one, except the revocation authority, can lift the anonymity of a
signature and retrieve the identity of the signer.
• Unlinkability: given two messages and their corresponding signatures, no one,
except the revocation authority, can decide whether the signatures have been gen-
erated by the same user or not.
• Non-framebility: no one can falsely accuse a group member of signing a message.
• Coalition resistance: any valid signature must be linked to group member.
Like the encryption scheme, the security of a signature scheme depends on the attackers
goals and capabilities. We can distinguish four types of attacks:
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• Total break: like in the encryption scheme, the attacker deduces the private key
from the public key of the victim.
• Universal forgery: the attacker can generate a valid signature σ of any given
message m without knowledge of the private key.
• Existential forgery: the attacker can generate at least one message/signature
pair (m, σ), where σ was not produced by the victim and without knowledge of
the private key.
• Selective forgery: the attacker can generate a message/signature pair (m, σ)
where m has been chosen by the adversary prior to the attack and without knowl-
edge of the private key. m must be fixed before the start of the attack and may be
chosen to have interesting mathematical properties with respect to the signature
algorithm.
Attacks may also be classified based on what type of information the attacker has:
• Attack with no message: the attacker has only the public key of the victim.
• Known Message Attack (KMA): the attacker has the public key of the victim
and a set of message/signature.
• Adaptive Chosen Message Attack (CMA): the attacker has the public key
of the victim and can get the signature of any message of his choice. The messages
are progressively selected.
3.2.3.3 Proofs of Knowledge
In cryptography, a proof of knowledge (POK) is an interactive proof that enables a
prover to prove that he has a given data. In 1986, Fiat and Shamir proposed a heuristic
method to transform a three steps protocol in a non-interactive knowledge signature [45].
Indeed, the challenge sent by the verifier is replaced by the hash of the public parameter
and a commitment. We focus on a variant called Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge In a zero-knowledge proof, a prover convinces
interactively a verifier that he knows a set of secret values (α1, α2, ..., αn) verifying a given
relation < without revealing anything else. Such a proof will be denoted, in the sequel:
ZKPK((α1, α2, ..., αn) : <(α1, α2, ..., αn)).
A ZKPK should satisfy the following properties:
• Complete: a valid prover is accepted with overwhelming probability.
• Sound: a false prover should be rejected with overwhelming probability.
• Zero-knowledge: no information about the secret is revealed.
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These ZKPK can be made non-interactive using the generic transformation introduced
by Fiat and Shamir [45]. The resulting non-interactive proofs, sometimes called sig-
natures of knowledge [46]. Such a signature of knowledge, for the relation <, will be
denoted:
SOK((α1, α2, ..., αn) : <(α1, α2, ..., αn)).
3.3 Security
Proving the security of a cryptographic protocol is a major interest because it is a
requirement to validate the protocol. In public key cryptography, proving the security
of a scheme follows three steps:
• defining the security properties to be ensured.
• defining the computational assumption to be considered.
• presenting a reduction of the scheme security to a hard problem already defined
in a computational assumption.
In this section, we recall the computational assumptions that we use later in this thesis
and present the different models in which an adversary can be placed to conduct attacks.
3.3.1 Computational Assumptions
The security of our protocols, described in the next chapters, relies on the difficulty of
mathematical problems resulting from the Number theory. In the following, we present
the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assump-
tion, the eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption, the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-
SDH) assumption, the q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-DDHI) assumption, the
Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption and the Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sa-
hai and Wolf (LRSW) assumption.
3.3.1.1 Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption
Definition 18 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group
of prime order q, g be a generator of G and y be an element of G, Discrete Logarithm
assumption states that it is hard to find the integer x ∈ Zq such that y = gx holds. The
integer x is called the discrete logarithm of y in the base g and denoted logg(y).
References for the discrete logarithm problem and the existing algorithm for solving
include the survey of Odlyzko [47] and McCurley [48].
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3.3.1.2 Symmetric Discrete Logarithm (SDL) Assumption
The Symmetric Discrete Logarithm (SDL) Assumption has been formalized in [49].
Definition 19 (Symmetric Discrete Logarithm (SDL) Assumption). Let G1
and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order q, G1 be an element of G1, and G2 be an
element of G2, Symmetric Discrete Logarithm Assumption states that it is hard to find
the integer x given a tuple (G1, [x]G1, G2, [x]G2).
3.3.1.3 One-more Discrete Logarithm (OMDL) Assumption
The One-more Discrete Logarithm (OMDL) Assumption has been introduced and for-
malized by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko in [50].
Definition 20 (One-more Discrete Logarithm (OMDL) Assumption). Let G be
a multiplicative group of prime order p, OMDL assumption states that given a random
generator g ∈ G, a challenge oracle that produces a random group element Yi when
queried and a discrete logarithm oracle (with respect to g), it is hard to find, after t
queries to the challenge oracle (where t is chosen by the adversary) and at most t − 1
queries to the discrete logarithm oracle, the discrete logarithms of all t elements Yi.
3.3.1.4 Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption
The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem was first mentioned in [51] where Stephan Brands
presented a oﬄine electronic payment system, even though there are earlier crypto-
graphic systems that implicitly rely on the hardness of this problem (e.g. [52, 53]).
Definition 21 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption). Let G be a cyclic
group of prime order p, DDH assumption states that given a random generator g ∈ G,
two random elements ga, gb in G, and a candidate X ∈ G, it is hard to decide whether
X = gab or not.
3.3.1.5 eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH) Assumption
This assumption was firstly introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham in the long version
of [54] to prove the security of the presented scheme (a group signature scheme).
Definition 22 (eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH) Assumption). Let G1, G2 and
GT be three cyclic groups, and e : G1 × G2 → GT a bilinear map, XDH assumption
states that DDH assumption holds in G1.
3.3.1.6 q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption
This assumption has been introduced by Boneh and Boyen in [55] in order to prove the
security of the presented scheme (a group signature scheme).
Definition 23 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption). Let G1 be a
cyclic group, q-SDH assumption states that it is hard, given (g, gy, gy
2
,...,gy
q
) ∈ Gq+11 ,
to output a pair (x, g1/(y+x)).
Chapter 3. Cryptographic Foundations and Basic Protocols 36
3.3.1.7 q-Strong Diffie-Hellman I (q-SDH-I) Assumption
Definition 24 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman I (q-SDH-I) Assumption). Let G1 be a
multiplicative group of prime order p, q-SDH-I assumption states that given three random
generators (g0, g1, h)∈ G31, a value W ′ = gγ0 , an oracle O that on input a value s ∈ Zp
outputs a pair (r,A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r)) with r ∈ Zp , it is hard to output a new triplet
(r′, s′, A′ = (gs′1 h)1/(γ+r
′)), with (r′, s′) ∈ Z2p such that s′ has never been queried to O.
3.3.1.8 q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-DDHI) Assumption
Definition 25 (q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-DDHI) Assumption).
Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order p, q-DDHI assumption states that, given a
random generator g ∈ G and the values (g, gα, gα2 , ..., gαq) ∈ Gq+1, for a random α ∈ Zp
and a candidate X ∈ G, it is hard to decide whether X = g1/α or not.
3.3.1.9 The Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) Assumption
This assumption has been introduced by Paillier [56] in order to prove the security of
the proposed encryption scheme.
Definition 26 ( Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) Assumption). DCR
assumption states that it is hard to distinguish Znn2 from Z
∗
n2, where Z
n
n2 = {z ∈ Z∗n2 ,
∃y ∈ Z∗n2 : z = ynmodn2}.
3.3.1.10 LRSW Assumption
This assumption has been introduced by Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sahai and Wolf [57] in
order to prove the security of the proposed scheme.
Definition 27 ( LRSW Assumption). Let G be cyclic group of prime order q and g
be a generator of G. the assumption LRSW states that, given X = gx, Y = gy and an
oracle OLRSWX,Y that takes on input a message m ∈ Zq and outputs A = (a, ay, ax+mxy)
such that a is randomly chosen, it is hard to compute A′ = (a′, a′y, a′x+mxy) for another
value a′, if m has not been given as input to the oracle.
After defining our computational assumption, we move to the third step of the process
“proving the security of a scheme” which is “presenting a reduction of the scheme security
to a hard problem”.
3.3.2 Provable Security
In this section, we present the concept of reductionist security and the different security
models that can be used to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme.
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3.3.2.1 Reductionist Security
The main idea of the reductionist security is to formally prove that if an adversary A
breaks a security property of a scheme, he can be used to solve a hard problem like
those we have stated in the previous section. The first precepts of provable security
have been introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [58] in 1984 for encryption. Later
with Rivest, they defined this new concept for signature [59, 60]. Though polynomial,
the proposed reductions had a computational high cost. Later several improvements
occurred. In 1996, Bellare and Rogaway introduced the exact security approach [61]
where the estimate of computational complexities of adversarial tasks is more accurate
than what we would have with polynomial equivalence. Then, Ohta and Okamoto
introduced the concrete security approach [62] enabling more efficiency. More recently,
Pointcheval, in 2001, introduced the concept of practical security [63].
If we consider an adversary A reaching his goal in time t and a reduction that solves the
hard problem in time f(t), we can define three security concepts:
• Asymptotic security, if f is polynomial (bounded by a t polynomial).
• Exact security, if f is explicit.
• Practical security, if f is “small”, e.g., linear.
If the reduction is polynomial, attacking the protocol is said to be hard as solving the
hard problem.
In order to have the best possible reduction, we should precisely define the goals of the
attacker. Therefore, we describe, in the following section, the different security models
that can be used to define the environment where an attacker can perform his attack.
3.3.2.2 Security Models
In this section, we distinguish two security models: the Random Oracle Model and the
standard Model.
Random Oracle Model In cryptography, random oracles can be used as an ideal
replacement for hash functions in schemes where strong randomness assumptions are
needed of the hash function’s output. In such a case, the attacker cannot deduce any
information from the hash values that it has already been obtained and it can not build
hashes for new values. In such a model, the security of the scheme does not depend of
the specified hash functions. A scheme is secure if an attacker solves a hard problem
in order to break it. The concept of random oracles has been introduced by Fiat and
Shamir [45] in 1986 and then modeled by Belleare and Rogaway [64] in 1993.
Standard Model The Random Oracle model has been criticized as very restrictive,
even if it is widely used. Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [65, 66] demonstrated that there
are secure schemes under the random oracle model such that any implementation of the
oracles makes them insecure. Bellare, Boldyreva and Palacio made proposals, in [67],
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that ensure some properties only in the random oracle model. This assumption implies
that the security of the scheme cannot be proven. In order to mitigate such problem, a
new model has been introduced: Standard model. Unlike the random oracle model, the
standard model does not consider any assumption regarding the used hash functions.
3.4 Cryptographic Schemes
In this section, we present cryptographic schemes that we will use in our constructions
of the thesis.
3.4.1 Pseudo-Random Function
In this thesis, we use a pseudo-random function (Definition 12) that has been introduced
by Dodis and Yampolskiy [68, 69]. Their construction works as follows. Let G be a cyclic
group with prime order p, gt a generator of G, s ∈ Zp a private secret. The pseudo-
random function (PRF for short) Fs takes as input a message k ∈ Zp and outputs
Fs(k) = g
1/(s+k+1)
t .
The properties of this construction, given in definition 12, are ensured under the q-DDHI
assumption in G.
3.4.2 Pedersen Commitment
In this thesis, we use a commitment scheme that has been introduced by Pedersen in [70].
This commitment scheme provides perfect hiding and satisfies the binding property
under the DL assumption.
Setup The parameters are:
• G a cyclic group with prime order p.
• g1 and hT are generators of G.
Commit
• Let m be the message to be committed.
• Choose a random value ν ∈ Z∗p
• Compute C = gm1 × hνT
C is a commitment of the message m.
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3.4.3 Public Key Encryption
In this thesis, we use two public key encryption schemes (Definition 14), i.e., the ElGamal
encryption scheme and the Paillier encryption scheme. Actually, we apply the threshold
version of these schemes. We also utilize a proxy re-encryption scheme (Definition 15)
based on ElGamal cryptosystem.
In this section, we detail the ElGamal and Paillier encryption schemes. We give the
definition of a threshold cryptosystem and describe the proxy re-encryption scheme
based on ElGamal cryptosystem.
3.4.3.1 ElGamal
The ElGamal [71] encryption scheme is a public key algorithm based on the Diffie-
hellman [39]. The variant, that we use it in our m-ticketing system, works as follows.
Setup
The parameters are:
• G a cyclic group with prime order p.
• gT a random generator of G.
The private key is formed by x ∈ Z∗p and the corresponding public key consists of the
elements (gT , h = g
x
T )
Enc
The ElGamal ciphertext of a message m ∈ G is computed as follows:
• Choose a random number r ∈ Z∗p.
• Compute C1 = grT and C2 = m× hr
The encryption of m is (C1, C2).
Dec
The decryption of the ciphertext (C1, C2) is obtained through the following computation:
m = C2/C
x
1
The ElGamal cryptosystem is semantically secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption.
3.4.3.2 Paillier
We use the Paillier encryption scheme [56] in our m-ticketing system. It works as follows.
Setup
The parameters are:
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• a and b random primes such that a, b > 2, a 6= b, |a| = |b|
and gcd(ab, (a− 1)(b− 1)) = 1
• n = ab
• Π = lcm(a− 1, b− 1)
• K = Π−1 mod n
• gP = (1 + n)
The public key is pk = (n, gP ) and the corresponding secret key is sk = (a, b).
Enc
To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, a user performs the following operations:
• Choose a random number r ∈ Z∗n
• Compute C = gmP rn mod n2
The encryption of the message m is C.
Dec
The decryption algorithm is as follows:
m = ((CΠKmod n2)− 1)/n mod n2
The Paillier cryptosystem, described above, provides semantic security against chosen-
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) under the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) as-
sumption.
3.4.3.3 Threshold Cryptosystem
In a threshold version, the ElGamal public key and its corresponding private key [72]
(respectively the Paillier public key and its corresponding private key [73]) are coopera-
tively generated by n parties; however, the private key is shared among the parties. In
order to decrypt a ciphertext, a minimal number of t (the threshold) out of n parties is
necessary.
3.4.3.4 Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
We use the proxy re-encryption building block in our TEE migration protocol. Blaze et
al. introduced the notion in [40]. These approach is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem
and it works as follows.
Setup
The parameters are:
• G a cyclic group with prime order q.
• g a generator of G.
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• a and b randomly chosen in Z∗q .
The private and public key of Alice are (a, ga) and the private and public key of Bob
are (b, gb).
ReKeyGen
The re-encryption key is computed as follows: RA→B = b/a = ba−1 mod q
Enc
To encrypt a message m ∈ G that can be decrypted by Alice, a user does the following
operations:
• Choose a random integer r ∈ Z∗q .
• Compute grm.
• Compute gar.
The ciphertext of Alice is CA = (g
rm, gar)
Re-enc
To re-encrypt the ciphertext of Alice (CA), in other words, to convert a ciphertext of
Alice (CA) to a ciphertext of Bob (CB), the proxy re-encryption computes (g
ar)RA→B .
(gar)RA→B = (gar)b/a = gbr
The ciphertext of Bob is CB = (g
rm, gbr).
Dec
Bob can retrieve the plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext CB = (g
rm, gbr) by
computing m = g
rm
(gbr)1/b
.
3.4.4 Digital Signature
In this thesis, we use group signature scheme (Definition 17) namely Boneh-Boyen sig-
nature and Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature. We also utilize the RSA signature.
In this section, we detail these signature schemes.
3.4.4.1 RSA
The RSA signature schemes has been introduced together with the RSA encryption
scheme [74]. It is based on the hash and sign concept and it is secure owing to the Full
Domain Hash [64].
Setup
The parameters are:
• p, q ∈ N two prime integers.
• n = pq.
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• e an integer co-prime with φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1) where φ is Euler’s totient function.
• d = e−1 mod φ(n).
• H : {0, 1}∗ → Zn a hash function.
The private key is d and the public key is (n, e).
Sign
To sign a message m ∈ Zn, a user carries the following operations:
• Compute m′ = H(m).
• Compute σ = m′d mod n
The signature of the message m is σ.
Verify
The signature σ is valid if H(m) = σe mod n.
3.4.4.2 Boneh-Boyen Signature
Based on the scheme proposed by Boneh and Boyen [54, 55, 75], it is possible to prove
knowledge of a signature on a message, without revealing the signature nor the message.
There are two variants of this signature scheme: with and without pairing. We detail
these variants in the sequel.
Boneh-Boyen Signatures with pairings
Setup
The parameters are:
• G a cyclic group with prime order p.
• e a bilinear pairing.
• g1 and g2 two generators of G.
• y ∈ Zp.
The private key is y and the public key is Y = gy2 .
Sign
The signature of a message m ∈ Zp is obtained by computing
σ = g
1/(y+m)
1 .
Verify
A signature σ of m is valid if:
e(σ, Y gm2 ) = e(g1, g2).
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Boneh-Boyen Signature without pairings
Setup
• G is a cyclic group with prime order p.
• e is a bilinear pairing.
• g1 and g2 two generators of G.
• y ∈ Zp.
The private key is y and the public key is Y = gy2 .
Sign
Similarly to Boneh-Boyen signatures with pairings, the signature A of a message m ∈ Zp
is obtained by computing
A = g
1/(y+m)
1 .
This implies that Ay = g1A
−m.
Verify
The signature A of the message m is valid if the proof pi is valid where pi proves that
the discrete logarithm of (g1A
−m) in the base A is equal to the discrete logarithm of Y
in the base g2: ZKPK(y : Y = g
y
2 ∧Ay = g1A−m). Such a proof of equality of discrete
logarithms has been introduced in [76].
Theorem 1. The Boneh-Boyen (BB for short) signature scheme without pairings is
existentially unforgeable under a weak chosen message attack under the q-Strong Diffie-
Hellman (q-SDH) assumption, in the random oracle model.
Proof 1 (sketch). Under the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, it is impossible to
find a message m (which was not given to the signing oracle) and a value A such that
A = g
1/(y+m)
1 , as proved in [55, 75]. Moreover, in the random oracle model, the proof of
knowledge pi is unforgeable [55, 75], which concludes the proof.
3.4.4.3 Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures
The signature schemes, proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [77], are equipped with
protocols providing various properties.
One of these protocols allows a signature to be issued on the messages that are not
known to the signer, but to which the signer only knows a commitment. Informally,
in a protocol for signing a committed value, we have a signer with public key pk, and
the corresponding secret key sk, and a user who queries the signer for a signature.
The common input to the protocol is a commitment C on secret values (m1,m2, . . . ,ml)
known only by the user. At the end of this protocol, the user obtains a valid CL-signature
= Sign(m1,m2, . . . ,ml) and the signer learns nothing about (m1,m2, . . . ,ml).
Setup
The parameters are:
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• G and G are cyclic groups of prime order p.
• g is a generator of G and g is a generator of G.
• e is a bilinear map e : G×G→ G.
• x ∈ Zp.
• y ∈ Zp.
• zi ∈ Zp where 1 6 i 6 l.
• X = gx.
• Y = gy.
• Z = gzi where 1 6 i 6 l where l is the number of user’s secret values.
• Wi = Y zi where 1 6 i 6 l. The values Wi will be used to prove the knowledge of
the signature.
The private key is sk = (x, y, {zi}) where 1 6 i 6 l and the public key is pk =
(p, G, G, g, g, e, X, Y, {Zi}, {Wi}) where 1 6 i 6 l.
Sign
The signature protocol is an interactive protocol between a user U who has on input
(m0, ...,ml) and a signer S who has on input the private key sk = (x, y, {zi}).
1. U computes a commitment M on the messages (m0, ...,ml)
M = gm0Πli=1Z
mi
i .
2. U sends a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the opening of the commitment
POK((µ0, ..., µl) : M = g
µ0Πli=1Z
µi
i ).
3. S computes the signature σ = (a, {Ai}, b, {Bi}, c) where
• α ∈ Zp.
• a = gα.
• Ai = azi such that 1 6 i 6 l.
• b = ay.
• Bi = Ayi such that 1 6 i 6 l.
• c = axMαxy.
4. S sends the signature σ
Verify
To verify a signature σ = (a, {Ai}, b, {Bi}, c) on the messages (m0, ...,ml), the user
checks that
• {Ai} were formed correctly: e(a, Zi) = e(g,Ai).
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• b and {Bi} were formed correctly: e(a, Y ) = e(g, b) and e(Ai, Y ) = e(g,Bi) such
that 1 6 i 6 l.
• c is formed correctly: e(X, a).e(X, b)m0 .Πli=1e(X,Bi)mi = e(g, c).
This protocol is secure under the LRSW assumption.
Another protocol allows to prove knowledge of a signature σ = (a, {Ai}, b, {Bi}, c) on a
tuple of messages (m1,m2, . . . ,ml) without releasing any information on the correspond-
ing signature. Each message can either be revealed to the verifier, sent in a committed
form or he might have no information about it. The prover
1. Computes and sends a blinded version of his signature σ: Choose random r, r0 ∈
Zp, and blind the signature to form σ˜ = (a˜, {A˜i}, b˜, {B˜i}, cˆ, 1 6 i 6 l) such that
• a˜ = ar
• b˜ = br′
• A˜i = Ari where 1 6 i 6 l.
• B˜i = Br′i where 1 6 i 6 l.
• cˆ = crr′
2. let vx, vxy, vs and V(xy,i) such that
vx = e(X, a˜), vxy = e(X, b˜), vs = e(g, cˆ) and V(xy,i) = e(X, B˜i)
3. The prover and verifier compute these values (locally) and then carry out the
following zero-knowledge proof protocol:
POK((µ0, ..., µl), ρ : (vs)
ρ = vx(vxy)
µ0
∏l
i=1)(V(xy,i))
µi
4. The verifier accepts the proof above if:
• {A˜i} were formed correctly: e(a˜, Zi) = e(g, A˜i).
• b˜ and {B˜i} were formed correctly: e(a˜, Y ) = e(g, b˜) and e(a˜, Y ) = e(g, B˜i)
such that 1 6 i 6 l.
• the proof is correct.
Another appealing feature of some of these CL-signature schemes is that the signatures,
they produce, can be randomized. Indeed, given a valid CL-signature σ on a message m,
anyone can compute σ′, another valid signature on m. Moreover, σ and σ′ are unlinkable
under the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption (i.e., given σ and σ′ (but not m),
it is hard to decide whether these two signatures have been issued on the same message).
Finally, CL-signatures have been widely used to design anonymous credentials or DAA-
like schemes.
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3.4.5 Set-Membership Proof
A set-membership proof allows a prover to prove, in a zero-knowledge way, that his
secret lies in a given public set. Such proofs can be used, for instance, in the context of
electronic voting, where the voter needs to prove that his secret vote belongs to the set
of all possible candidates.
Recent propositions of set-membership proofs [78, 79] follow the same idea:
• Let Φ be a public set.
• Let CA be a designated authority that
– owns a pair of signature keys (skCA, pkCA),
– produces public signatures σi = SIGNskCA(i) on each element i of the public
set Φ (and only on these elements).
• Let Σ be the public set of the signatures σi.
• The proof of knowledge of a secret i ∈ Φ consists in proving the knowledge of a
(public) signature on the secret i (which will be only possible if i belongs to the
interval Φ) without revealing i or the used signature.
POK(i, r, σi : C = g
ihr ∧ σi = SIGNskCA(i))
Solutions in [78, 79] require the prover to perform pairing computations. However, these
cryptographic tools are not often convenient for many constrained platforms like Secure
Elements, SIM cards, etc. Indeed, these computations require many resources, hence,
much time.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we began by presenting some mathematical and cryptographic tools that
we need in this thesis. Then, we specified the computational assumptions on which relies
the security of our constructions. Finally, we described some cryptographic schemes like
group signature schemes that are usually used in e-poll and e-ticketing systems in order
to ensure users’ privacy, namely anonymity and unlinkability, when using the service.
In such use cases, usually the user has a resource constrained device, however, privacy-
enhancing cryptographic tools are usually costly. In the next chapters, we introduce
optimizations and adaptations of these cryptographic tools in order to find the right
balance between privacy and efficiency.
At the end of this chapter, we described set-membership proofs. Current implemen-
tations are very costly as it requires pairing computations at the prover side (user’s
device). In the next chapter, we introduce a practical set-membership proof that does
not require pairing computations at the prover side. This implementation will be used
later in our m-ticketing protocol.
Chapter 4
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Dans ce chapitre, nous pre´sentons une partie des re´sultats [80] qui ont e´te´ publie´s dans
la revue “Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs)” de la confe´rence
PETS 2015. Nous introduisons une nouvelle preuve d’appartenance d’un e´le´ment a` un
ensemble. Cette preuve, contrairement aux constructions ante´rieures de´crites dans le
chapitre pre´ce´dent, ne ne´cessite pas de calculs de couplage du coˆte´ du prouveur et dans
certains cas du coˆte´ du ve´rifieur e´galement. Cette nouvelle preuve nous sera utile dans
la construction d’un protocole efficace et respectant la vie prive´e dans le Chapitre 7.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a new set-membership proof protocol. Our set-membership
proof is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge which allows a prover to convince any
verifier that a committed integer k lies in a public discrete set Φ. This zero knowledge
proof of knowledge can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and the
random oracle model [45]. The commitment scheme that we use is the one proposed by
Pedersen [70].
Our set-membership proof bears some similarities with the protocol proposed by Ca-
menisch et al. [81]. Yet, our set-membership proof does not require the prover (a SIM
card and/or a smartphone in our setting) nor the verifier (in a specific scenario) to per-
form pairing computations which are quite costly, in the order of seconds, e.g. for the fol-
lowing microprocessors: 17.9s on an ATmega [82], 2.5s on a Philips HiPerSmartTMMIPS
[83], 1.9s on an MSP430X [84]. Our set-membership proof is also more efficient and con-
ceptually simpler than the recent one proposed by Canard et al. at EuroPKI 2013 [79].
Their scheme which involves several verifiers, who share a decryption key, seems to be
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tailored to specific applications like e-voting where the verifiers (tallying authorities)
own such a key to open ballots. As regards our set-membership proof, we will use it
in the construction of our m-ticketing protocol (Chapter 7) in order to efficiently prove
that a ticket index belongs to the public set of indexes.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we detail the new set-membership
proof. Then, we prove the security of our implementation in Section 4.3. We draw the
conclusion of this chapter in Section 4.4.
4.2 Set-Membership Proof Protocol
The public parameters of our set-membership proof are
• G1, G2, GT : three (multiplicative) bilinear groups of prime order p.
• e: a bilinear map such that e : G1 ×G2 → GT .
• g, g1 and hT : three generators of G1.
• g3: a generator of G2.
• H: a hash function, for instance, SHA-256.
Our protocol considers a designated authority, a verifier and a prover. The designated
authority (which may or may not be the verifier) randomly chooses a value y ∈ Z∗p (its
private key) and publishes the corresponding public key Y = gy3 . After generating its
key, this designated authority can issue BB-signatures on each element of the public set
Φ. Let k denote an element of the set Φ and Ak the BB-signature on the value k, i.e.,
Ak = g
1/(y+k). The set of all message-signature pairs (k,Ak), that we denote by
∑
, is
published by the designated authority.
Φ = {k}, ∑ = {(k,Ak)}k∈Φ = {(k, g1/(y+k))}k∈Φ
In Figure 4.1, we detail our new protocol that enables to prove that a value k committed
by the prover in the commitment Com belongs to the set Φ. This comes down to proving
knowledge of the BB-signature Ak.
Remark 1: Proving knowledge of a valid BB-signature
Ak = g
1/(y+k)
on a value k committed in
Com = gk1h
ν
T ,
without revealing either k or the signature and without using pairings on the prover’s
side can be done as follows.
The prover first randomizes Ak by choosing a random value l ∈ Z∗p and computing
B = Alk. Since Ak = g
1/(y+k) this implies that:
B = Alk = (g
l)1/(y+k)
and then that
By+k = gl.
If we note B1 = B
−1 and D = By, it implies that:
D = Bk1g
l.
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As a result, in order to prove that the value k committed in Com belongs to the set
Φ, the prover just has to send B and D to the verifier and compute the following zero
knowledge proof of knowledge:
Π = POK(k, ν, l : Com = gk1h
ν
T ∧D = Bk1gl).
Prover Verifier
Public input: public parameters, sets Φ and∑ Public Input: public parameters, sets Φ and∑
Private Input: k Private Input: y
Pre-computations
Choose ν ∈ Z∗p
Compute: Com = gk1h
ν
T
Pick the valid BB signature corresponding to
the element k : Ak = g
1/(y+k)
Choose l ∈ Z∗p
Compute(see remark 1): B = Alk;
B1 = B−1; D = Bk1 g
l
Choose k1, l1, r1 ∈ Z∗p
Compute: Com1 = g
k1
1 h
r1
T ; D1 = B
k1
1 g
l1
Real time computations
Compute:
ch−−−−−−− Choose ch ∈ Z∗p (A random challenge)
c = H(Com,B,D,Com1, D1, ch);
s1 = k1 + c× k mod p;
s2 = r1 + c× v mod p
s3 = l1 + c× l mod p;
Π = Com,B,D, s1, s2, s3
Π−−−−−− Check that B 6= 1G1
• If the verifier and the designated entity are
the same entity. This implies that the verifier
holds the private signature key y (First case).
Hence the prover does not send the value D.
The verifier can compute it: D = By and goes
to (*)
• Otherwise, if the verifier doesn’t know the
private signature key y (Second case), then,
it checks that e(D, g3) = e(B, Y ) and goes to
(*)
(*) Compute: C˜ = gs11 h
s2
T Com
−c and D˜ =
Bs11 g
s3D−c
Check that: c = H(Com,B,D, C˜, D˜, ch)
Figure 4.1: A New Efficient Set-Membership Proof
The computation of the zero knowledge proof of knowledge Π is described in Figure 4.1.
Upon receiving Π, the verifier proceeds to the verification. We distinguish two cases.
In the first case, the verifier and the designated authority are the same. Thus, the verifier
holds the private signature key y. Consequently, the verification of Π occurs without
requiring any pairing computations. This implies that our set-membership proof does
not require pairing computations for both the prover and the verifier.
In the second case, the verifier does not have the private signature key y of the designated
authority. Then, the verifier needs to perform some pairing computations in order to
verify Π. Nevertheless, the prover still has no pairing computations to perform. This is
particularly interesting for the m-ticketing use case.
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4.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 2. If the |Φ|−SDH assumption holds, then the protocol in Figure 4.1 is a
zero-knowledge argument of set-membership for a set Φ.
Proof 2 (sketch).
The completeness of the protocol follows by inspection.
The soundness follows from the extraction property of the underlying proof of knowl-
edge and the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. In particular, the ex-
traction property implies that for any prover P ∗ that convinces V with probability ,
there exists an extractor which interacts with P ∗ and outputs a witness (k, v, l) with
probability poly(). Moreover, if we assume that the extractor input consists of two
transcripts:
{Y,∑, Com,B,D, c, c˜, s1, s˜1, s2, s˜2, s3, s˜3}
the witness can be obtained by computing (all the computations are done mod p):
k = (s1 − s˜1)/(c− c˜),
ν = (s2 − s˜2)/(c− c˜),
l = (s3 − s˜3)/(c− c˜)
The extractor succeeds when (c− c˜) is invertible in Zp. If the following check
D = By
holds , this implies that:
D = By = Bk1g
l
and then
ByBk = gl.
Let us denote by Ak = B
1/l. Note that we necessarily have l 6= 0, otherwise this would
imply that the prover knows the secret value y (which would be equal to –k mod p). We
therefore have
Ay+kk = g
and consequently that
Ak = g
1/(y+k)
So the prover knows a valid BB signature on the value k. This implies that k ∈ Φ.
Also note that if D = By then this implies that the Prover P only knows one represen-
tation of D in the base B1 and g. Otherwise this would imply that P knows the private
key y. Indeed, suppose that P knows two representations of D in the base B1 and g.
Let us denote by (k, l) and (k˜, l˜) these two representations. Since G1 is a prime order
group and B1 6= 1 and g 6= 1, this implies that k 6= k˜ and l 6= l˜. Since
D = Bk1g
l = Bk˜1g
l˜,
this implies that
Bk−k˜1 = g
l−l˜
and that
B
(k−k˜)/(l−l˜)
1 = g.
Let us denote by
y˜ = (k − k˜)/(l − l˜).
then
D = By = Bk1g
l = B−kB−(ly).
Since G1 is a prime order group this implies that
y = −k − ly˜.
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If k /∈ Φ, then P ∗ can be directly used to mount a weak-chosen attack against the BB
signature scheme with probability poly() of succeeding. Thus  must be negligible.
Finally, to prove (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge property, we construct a simu-
lator Sim that will simulate all interactions with any (honest verifier) V ∗.
1. Sim retrieves Y and
∑
from V ∗.
2. Sim randomly chooses k ∈ Φ and l ∈ Z∗p and computes B = Alk , B1 = B(−1) and
D = Bk1g
l.
3. Sim randomly chooses c, s1, s2, s3 ∈ Z∗p and computes Com1 = gs11 hs2T Com−c and
D1 = B
s1
1 g
s3C−c.
4. Sim outputs S = {Com,B,D,Com1, D1, c, s1, s2, s3}
Since G1 is a prime order group, then the blinding is perfect in the first two steps and
S and V ∗’s view of the protocol are statistically indistinguishable.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a new set-membership proof that enables a prover to
prove that he owns an element of a public set without revealing it. Unlike the previ-
ous constructions, this proof does not require pairing computations at the prover side.
However, when the verifier does not know the designated authority private key (the ver-
ifier and the designed authority are distinct), the verifier may need to do some pairing
computations. We will use our new set-membership proof in the construction of our
m-ticketing protocol in Chapter 7. Prior that, we outline the related work to public
transport service in the next chapter.
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Dans ce chapitre, nous de´crivons l’e´tat de l’art concernant les syste`mes de transport
public et spe´cifions les entite´s d’un syste`me de transport ainsi que l’architecture du
te´le´phone mobile et le mode`le de se´curite´, utilise´s dans les deux chapitres suivants. En
ce qui concerne l’e´tat de l’art, nous e´tudions, dans un premier temps, les protocoles pro-
pose´s par les standards et les solutions commerciales. Ensuite, nous nous inte´ressons
aux solutions de la litte´rature qui ont propose´ des protocoles assurant certaines pro-
prie´te´s lie´es au respect de la vie prive´e des utilisateurs. En particulier, nous de´crivons
une vulne´rabilite´, que nous avons de´couverte, du protocole propose´ par Rupp et al. [2]
qui a e´te´ publie´ a` FC’13. Concernant les entite´s de notre syste`me, nous conside´rons
l’utilisateur, l’autorite´ de transport et une nouvelle entite´ qu’on appelle “autorite´ de
re´vocation”. Cette dernie`re est comple`tement inde´pendante de l’autorite´ de transport et
est capable de re´voquer l’anonymat des utilisateurs et des titres de transport. Quant aux
phases d’un syste`me de transport, nous en distinguons quatre: initialisation du syste`me,
enregistrement d’un utilisateur, demande d’un titre de transport et validation de celui-
ci. Nous pre´cisons e´galement que l’application transport sera imple´mente´e sur une carte
SIM. Enfin, nous de´finissons, d’une manie`re informelle, le mode`le de se´curite´ associe´ a`
un syste`me de transport. Ce mode`le sera formalise´ pour les deux cas d’usage dans les
chapitres suivants.
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5.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we detail related work on privacy-preserving solutions for public trans-
port service. We begin by describing the CALYPSO standard in Section 5.2. In Sec-
tion 5.3, we present some commercial mobile contactless solutions for transport service
while showing to which extent they guarantee the users’ privacy. We review proposed
privacy-preserving transport systems in the literature in Section 5.4. These studies have
helped us to identify the important security and privacy properties required to build
privacy-preserving mobile solutions for transport system. We give further details about
the Rupp et al. [2] attack that we discovered in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6 and Sec-
tion 5.7, we give an overview of our transport system. We present the architecture
overview and the entities of the system as well as the trust model. We also recall the
main phases of a transport system. These phases will be personalized according to the
use case, i.e., m-pass or m-ticketing use case. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Standardization
The CALYPSO standard [85, 86] (ISO 24014-1:2007 norm) introduced the contactless
aspects across a European consortium composed of transport operators such as the
Belgium STIB and the French RATP. CALYPSO specifies the details of all the trans-
actions related to e-ticketing for contactless transport services from the purchase of the
ticket/pass to their uses. This standard is very precise, in particular when describ-
ing operations such as the card authentication, the validator authentication and the
messages exchanged between these two entities. Moreover, performance issues such as
the computational time are also included in this standard, particularly for contactless
smartcards.
5.3 Commercial Transport Solutions
Many commercial mobile transport solutions have recently emerged. For instance, the
service Touch and Travel (T&T) [87] has been proposed by the German federal railways
Deutsche Bahn since 2008 and the mobile contactless public transport service based on
the Octopus card [88, 89] has been proposed by PCCW-HKT, one of Hong Kong’s major
mobile network operators and Octopus Cards Limited (OCL) since 2013.
The T&T service is one of the first contactless mobile ticketing services. A user must
start the T&T application upon departure. Once he reaches his destination, the user
must indicate the end of his trip. Designating departure and arrival stations can be
performed by using a touchpoint if one is available at the station, relying on the GPS
as captured by his smartphone or based on the network cell location.
Regarding the Octopus card, it is a popular contactless smart card used for public
transport and retail payment in Hong Kong. Such cards, which can be seen as electronic
purses, have unique identifier for all the user’s transactions [90].
The solutions mentioned above do not satisfy all the privacy requirements. they are
limited to only protect the users’ privacy against outsiders and not against the transport
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authority. Indeed, they suffer from the linkability issue, as it enables the transport
authority to track users.
5.4 Mobile Privacy-Preserving Solutions for Public Trans-
port
In this section, we give an overview of solutions for NFC transport services in the
literature. Most of them do not address the anonymity and unlinkability issues, and the
few who do either are not yet efficient enough to cope with the constraint of running in
less than 300 ms, or present privacy weaknesses.
In the follow-up papers [91, 92], Tamrakar and Ekberg proposed a contactless m-ticketing
transport service. The main idea of this service is that a user, who has already subscribed
to the service, can buy some credits and then purchases tickets. The ticketing application
is authorized to locally generate a ticket before then charging the user account. Like
for T&T service, the user has to specify the departure and arrival stations. Depending
on the trust assumptions that are made, the authors propose two architectures relying
or not on a trusted execution environment [26]. While this solution complies with
the main functional requirements of public transport service, a user’s anonymity and
the unlikability of his trips are not ensured. Indeed, the user personal data, such as
his identifier and location, are protected against outsiders but revealed to the service
provider.
Heydt-Benjamin et al. were the first to propose a cryptographic framework for transport
service [93]. The authors’ approach uses e-cash, anonymous credentials, and proxy re-
encryption [40]. They discuss the challenges that a privacy-preserving transit system
should solve. Using cryptographic transit tickets should not disable basic capabilities like
cloning detection, virtual ticket backups or transfers, ticket revocation. The efficiency
of the use of a virtual ticket, especially over contactless technologies, is also important.
Derler et al., authors of [94], have analyzed the efficiency of a selective disclosure protocol
in the latest smartphones. In a nutshell, a selective disclosure protocol allows a user to
reveal that he possesses some property linked to his identity, but without revealing his
identity itself or any unnecessary information. With respect to the ticketing use case,
they used a one time-show protocol, which is the Brands DSA-based protocol [95, 96].
Thanks to this protocol, during the product validation phase, the user is able to prove
the validity of his credentials without disclosing them. Even though this system provides
anonymous tickets, the m-tickets, hence the users’ trips, remain linkable. Moreover, the
ability to recover the identity of a user (by an independent entities such as a judge) is
not provided. In the other hand, Derler et al. implementation introduces an important
delay (2− 15s) even if it is shared between a mobile (Nokia 6131) and a secure element
(an embedded G&D smart card). This is because their group signature implementation
uses pairing based cryptography.
In [97], Isern-Deya and his co-authors proposed an automatic fare collection system
for temporal and spatial services, which is based on the BBS group signature [54, 55].
Thus, they provided revocable anonymity and unlinkability for the users of the service.
The main drawback of this solution is that although it has been implemented on a
smartphone, the waiting time at the entrance and exit of the transport network is still
prohibitive, i.e., in the order of seconds.
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More recently, Rupp et al. [2] proposed at FC 2013 a privacy preserving pre-payment
protocol with refund for public transport. The main goal of Rupp et al. is to minimize
the number of coins a user needs to pay for a trip. This would minimize the number
of computationally expensive spending transactions. To this end, the user withdraws
a single coin be worth the most expensive ride in the coin credential. Then, the user
will be refunded. The verification procedure (of the refund) is too costly to handle on
constrained devices. The lack of verification could lead to serious privacy weaknesses: a
malicious transport authority could link users’ trips. We detail the Rupp et al. protocol
and its privacy weakness in the following section in order to illustrate the difficulty to
build a protocol ensuring a high level of privacy.
In Table 5.1, we classify the analyzed proposals depending on:
1. Anonymity: the ability to identify users during the use of the transport service by
outsiders or by the transport authority,
2. Unlinkability: the ability to track a user either over one journey (entrance and exit
of the journey) or over different journeys, by outsiders or the transport authority,
3. Hardware: the hardware that has been used for the implementation, if the proposal
has been implemented, and
4. Efficiency: a proposal is efficient if the validation time is less than 300ms.
Ref. Anonymity Unlinkability Hardware Efficiency
Tamrakar et al. [91, 92] × × Mobile / TEE √
Heydt-Benjamin et al. [93]
√ √ × ×
Derler et al. [94]
√ × Mobile and Secure Element ×
Isern-Deya et al. [97]
√ √
Mobile ×
Rupp et al. [2]
√ × Secure Element ×
Table 5.1: Comparison of the analyzed proposals
To summarize, balancing users’ privacy with efficiency and security needs of the trans-
port authority is not an easy task. In the next section, we give further details about the
privacy weakness of Rupp et al. protocol, published in FC 2013, that we discovered.
5.5 The Privacy Weakness of Rupp et al. Solution
In this section, we give further details about the payment protocol for public transport
proposed by Rupp et al. at FC 2013 [2] and called P4R. Then, we present an attack
that enables a malicious transport authority to break users’ privacy.
At first, the user buys a trip authorization token (TATi) which consists of an (extended)
coin in Brands’ scheme [95, 96]. This token enables the user to perform one trip. Then,
the user receives a fresh refund token RT .
RT = SNRT such that SNRT ← G
The user sets a variable R to 1 and υ to 0. R will be used to aggregate blinding factors
and υ is the refund amount. At the entry turnstile, the user shows a TATi and proves its
ownership. Right after this, the user receives a refund calculation token (RCTi) which
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consists of a MAC on TATi, a timestamp and the reader ID. At the turnstile of the
exit, the user shows his RCT and proves the ownership of the TATi contained within
it. In addition, he collects refund on his RT , as described in Figure 5.1. A refund
value ω is represented as a ω-times BLS signature [98] SNd
ω
RT such that d is the secret
BLS signature key of the transport authority. Later, the user redeems his RT . This
consists on sending a blinded version of his RT (RT ′ = RT r), SNRT , R and the collected
amount υ to the transport authority. The latter checks the validity of both SNRT and
the signature,
e(SNRRT , h
dυ)
?
= e(RT ′, h) (2).
Collecting Refund
User Exit turnstile
r ← Z∗p ω←−−−−−−−−−− Determine the refund ω based on the received
information in RCT
RT ′ = RT r RT
′
−−−−−−−−−−−→
υ = υ + ω, R = Rr mod p, RT = RT ′′ RT
′′
←−−−−−−−−−−− RT ′′ = RT ′dω (1)
Redeeming Refund
User Transport authority
r ← Z∗p, RT ′ = RT r, R = Rr mod p
SNRT ,RT
′,υ,R−−−−−−−−−−−→ check validity of SNRT , υ < p− 1,
e(SNRRT , h
dυ )
?
= e(RT ′, h) (2)
Figure 5.1: The refund protocols of Rupp et al. solution [2]
In [2], Rupp et al. assume that, for efficiency reasons, users don’t verify their RTs.
Indeed, verifications of refund tokens (step 1 in Figure 5.1) is too costly and can not be
handled by constrained devices such as SIM cards. This lack of verification could lead
to serious privacy weaknesses: a malicious transport authority could link users’ trips.
More precisely, for a given station, the transport authority is able to identify all the users
who left at this station. To this end, in step (1) in Figure 5.1, instead of computing
RT ′′ = RT ′dω ,
the transport authority chooses a variable t,
t← Z∗p
and computes
RT ′′=RT ′tdω .
The user will not detect thatRT ′′ is improperly calculated because there is no verification
on the user’s side. The refund token RT will then carry on the exponent t till the
redeeming refund step, i.e., RT ′ = SN tjRdυRT where j corresponds to the number of times
the user left the targeted station, R is the product of all the variables r and υ is the sum
of all the refunds ω. At the redeeming refund step, upon receiving the serial number
SNRT , the blinded version of the refund token RT
′, the refund amount υ, and the
aggregate blinding factor R, the transport authority will as usual check the validity of
SNRT and whether the amount is within the allowed range [0, p − 1]. Now, in order
to verify the signature and distinguish users who exited at the relevant station, the
transport authority starts by checking the relation (2). If (2) holds, this implies that
the user did not left the targeted station. Otherwise, the transport authority checks:
e(SN t
jR
RT , h
dυ) = e(SNRT , h)
tjRdυ = e(SN t
jRdυ
RT , h) = e(RT
′, h) (3)
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To do so, the transport authority will repeat the computations with different values of
j until the relation (3) holds. When
e(SN t
jR
RT , h
dυ)
?
= e(RT ′, h) (3)
holds, this implies that the user left the targeted station j times.
In order to monitor several stations at the same time, the transport authority will have
a list of variables t, e.g., tA for station A, tB for station B, etc. At the redeeming refund
step, the transport authority will test different values of t until it finds the ones that
satisfy the relation
e(SN
∏
tjxx R
RT , h
dυ)
?
= e(RT ′, h) (4)
where tx characterizes a station x and jx represents the number of exits at the station
x. For instance, if the user left the station A four times, the station B twice and the
station M once, relation (4) will be as follows:
e(SN
t4At
2
Bt
1
MR
RT , h
dυ)
?
= e(RT ′, h).
In this way, the transport authority will be able to identify the users that left a pool of
targeted stations but also the number of times they exited at these stations: this clearly
implies that users’ trips are linkable.
However, solving relation (4) and finding the right tuples (tx, jx), becomes quickly a
complex and unmanageable task when the number of targeted stations increased (more
than three for example). To mitigate this, a malicious transport authority could only
monitor two stations at the same time and periodically change these monitored stations.
In this way, the transport authority will be able to monitor a large number of stations
and will have a global overview of the users’ journeys which breaks the privacy property
of Rupp et al. system. We would like to emphasize that privacy holds in P4R if we
assume that the transport authority is “honest but curious”, i.e., it will not deviate from
the refund protocol, but such an assumption is too strong in the context of transport
systems [99].
In order to mitigate this issue, the user should check the received refund (Step (1) in
Figure 5.1). This verification implies pairing computations. However, in constraint
environments such as the SIM card, this is not feasible yet. A straightforward solution
would be to delegate these computations to the smartphone. Such a solution, however,
has two main drawbacks. On the one hand, delegating computations to an untrusted
environment, i.e., the smartphone which could be compromised by spywares, will affect
the user’s privacy. On the other hand, verifying the received refund token would lead to
inefficient transactions at exit turnstiles.
This attack shows how difficult is to construct an efficient protocol (validation time less
than 300 ms) over a resource constrained device like the SIM card while ensuring the
highest privacy level.
5.6 Architecture
In this section, we give the different entities of our public transport system. These
entities are the same for both the m-pass and m-ticketing use cases. Then, we detail our
architecture. Finally, we recall the main phases in a public transport service.
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In our public transport system, i.e., m-pass or m-ticketing system, we consider three
different entities. The user (U) is the owner of an NFC-enabled smartphone and wants
to use the transport service via a transport application. The transport authority (TA)
is the manager of the transport service. Besides these two entities, we consider a third
actor which is a revocation authority (RA). It can revoke the transport products, i.e., m-
pass or m-ticket, and users’ anonymity, and is completely independent of the transport
authority. This role may be split between several authorities in such a way that they
should all agree and cooperate before recovering a user’s identity.
At the user’s side, as shown in Figure 5.2, we consider an untrusted mobile platform
(smartphone) with an incorporated trusted secure element. We use a SIM card as a
tamper resistant secure element since it could be certified EAL4+ [24]. Using a SIM
card will ensure the integrity of the implementation. Indeed, the transport cardlet
manages the cryptographic credentials of the transport application and executes required
cryptographic computations.
Transport 
Application 
Transport 
cardlet 
Figure 5.2: Architecture Overview
The main phases of a public transport service, i.e., m-pass service and m-ticketing ser-
vice, are system initialization, user registration, product request and product validation.
• System initialization: during this phase, the transport authority initializes the
public parameters and keys of the transport system.
• User registration: during this phase, the user will register himself to transport
service.
• Product request : during this phase, the user will get his transport product from the
transport authority, e.g., a monthly m-pass, a set of 10 m-tickets. if the transport
system is functioning in a pre-payment way, the user must pay his product during
this phase. Otherwise, the transport service operates in a post-payment way. In
this case, the user will be charged later.
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• Product validation: during this phase, the user has to interact with the validator
in order to prove the authenticity of his transport product.
5.7 Trust Model
In this section, we informally describe the attacker model in a public transport service.
We give more details in Chapter 6 with respect to the mobile pass use case and in
Chapter 8 for the m-ticketing use case.
We assume that the attacker has full control over communication channels. He has the
ability to compromise any user’s smartphone, i.e., mobile operating system. Moreover,
the attacker can compromise one or more users. In such a case, he can read / modify
keys stored on or read / modify programs running within the SIM card of the corrupted
user. However, we assume that he is not able to read / modify keys stored on or read /
modify programs execution that take place within the SIM card of an uncorrupted user.
We also suppose that the attacker can compromise the transport authority but not the
revocation authorities.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the related work to transport system and showed, through
the privacy attack against the Rupp et al. protocol, that it is not obvious to find the
right balance between the user’s privacy and the solution’s efficiency. We also described
our mobile platform architecture and recall the transport service phases. We informally
defined the attacker model as well. This model will be formally and finely specified in
Chapter 6 for the m-pass use case and in Chapter 7 for the m-ticketing use case.
In the next chapter, we introduce our m-pass solution together with its formal security
analysis and performance results.
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Dans ce chapitre, nous pre´sentons les re´sultats [100] qui ont e´te´ publie´ dans la revue
“ICST Trans. Mobile Communications Applications”. Nous proposons un service mobile
sans contact respectant la vie prive´e des utilisateurs: l’identite´ d’un utilisateur ne peut
pas eˆtre lie´e a` ses actions lors de l’utilisation du syste`me de transport. Notre protocole
est base´ sur une variante de sche´ma de signature de groupe: les signatures Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya. Meˆme si un utilisateur est cense´ rester anonyme et ses actions intrac¸ables,
nous avons conc¸u une technique pour lever son anonymat dans des circonstances ex-
ceptionnelles. Nous avons e´galement imple´mente´ un prototype qui de´montre que notre
solution re´pond aux principales exigences fonctionnelles des syste`mes de transport: a`
savoir que la validation d’un titre de transport doit s’effectuer en moins de 300 ms, et
ce, meˆme si la batterie du smartphone est e´puise´e. En outre, nous avons formellement
valide´ la se´curite´ de notre protocole dans le mode`le de l’oracle ale´atoire.
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-preserving contactless mobile pass solution, in
which a user’s identity cannot be linked to his trips when using the transport system.
In particular, an eavesdropper and the transport provider are not able to track the
journeys of the user. To achieve this objective, we have developed a privacy-preserving
protocol for a contactless mobile pass, whose security is based on the combination of
a secure element in a smartphone and on a privacy-enhancing cryptographic protocol.
Even if a user should remain anonymous and his actions unlinkable in his daily journeys,
we have designed a technique for lifting his anonymity in extreme circumstances. This
exceptional procedure can be called for instance under the order of a judge, in case of a
fraud or a murder.
This chapter is organized as follows. At first, we detail the framework of our m-pass
system in Section 6.2 and our protocol in Section 6.3. Then, we introduce our functional
requirements and formalize the security and privacy requirements in Section 6.4. We
show that our protocol meets the requirements, that we set previously, in Section 6.5.
Finally, we give details about the performance results of our solutions in Section 6.6 and
conclude this chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Framework of an M-Pass System
We model our m-pass system onto four phases. Besides the phases described in Sec-
tion 5.6, we introduce a new phase called “revocation” phase.
First of all, the m-pass system parameters and keys are initialized during the System
initialization phase. Then, the user registers to the transport service (user registration)
and retrieves his m-pass credentials (product request) during the Registration phase. In
the validation phase, the user proves his legitimacy to use the transport service without
disclosing his identity. Finally, the revocation phase consists in revoking a user (i.e.,
retrieving a user’s identity based on an anonymous m-pass) and revoking an m-pass
(i.e., denying access to the transport service based on a user’s identity).
Next, we model these phases with various algorithms and protocols (Figure 6.1) executed
by the entities described in Section 5.6. In the m-pass protocol, we rename the revocation
authorities by Opening authorities (OA).
U
OA
TA
GetMPass
Register IdentUser
IdentMPass
UKeyGen
Keygen
SignMPass
VerifyMPass
AntiPassBack
Figure 6.1: M-Pass Framework Overview
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System initialization
Setup(1λ): This probabilistic algorithm outputs pp, a description of the system param-
eters. We assume that pp are implicit to the other algorithms, and that they include λ,
the security parameter. They are also an implicit input to the adversary, we will then
omit them.
Keygen(pp): This probabilistic algorithm outputs the two following secret/public key
pairs: (sko, pko) for the opening authorities and (skt, pkt) for the transport authority.
The system public key gpk is eventually set as (pp, pkt, pko).
Registration
UKeygen(gpk, IDU): This probabilistic algorithm outputs a secret key sku for a user’s
identifier IDU .
Register(U(gpk, sku, IDU ), OA(gpk, sko, DBo)): This is an interactive protocol between
a new user with his identifier IDU and his private key sku, and the opening authorities
that take on input its private key sko and its secured database DBo where the user
will be registered. If the user accepts the protocol, he gets a registration proof µ. If
the opening authorities accept the protocol, the user’s identity, i.e., his identifier and a
commitment of his private key, will be stored within the database DBo.
GetMPass(U(gpk, sku, µ), TA(gpk, skt, DBt)): This is an interactive protocol between a
registered user with his private key sku and his registration proof µ, and the transport
authority with its private key skt and DBt. If the transport authority accepts the
protocol, its output is a CL-certificate (A, B, C, D) and a commitment C1 of the user’s
secret key sku. C1 and the user identifier are stored within the database DBt.
Validation
SignMPass(gpk, sku, bsn, rc): This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a reg-
istered user private key sku, a time slot bsn and a random challenge rc. It outputs a
signature σ.
VerifyMPass(gpk, σ, bsn, rc): This is a deterministic algorithm that outputs 0 if the
signature σ with respect to bsn and rc is valid. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Revocation
AntiPassBack(σ1, σ2): This is a deterministic algorithm that takes on input two valid
signatures σ1 and σ2 (which have been generated during the execution of the algorithm
SignMPass). If σ1 and σ2 have been generated by the same user during the same time
slot bsn, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
IdentUser(σ,DBo, DBt): This is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a signa-
ture σ (which has been generated during the execution of the algorithm SignMPass),
the secured database of the opening authorities DBo and the secured database of the
transport authority DBt. It outputs the identifier IDU of the registered user who gen-
erated the signature σ. If the user who generated the signature σ is not registered, it
outputs ⊥.
IdentMPass(C1, σ, bsn, rc): This is a deterministic algorithm that takes on input C1 a
commitment of sku (a user’s secret), a signature σ (which has been generated during the
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execution of the algorithm SignMPass), a time slot bsn, and a message rc. It outputs 0,
if σ is a signature on bsn and rc, and corresponds to committed secret on C1. Otherwise,
it outputs ⊥.
6.3 Untraceable Mobile Pass
The main idea of our solution is to use a DAA scheme in order to enable an enrolled
user to be anonymous inside the group of other subscribers of the m-pass service. More
precisely, our solution is based on the DAA scheme of Brickell et al. [44], which we
adapted in order to handle revocation features. For the sake of simplicity in this section,
we define our protocol by taking into account only one group of subscribers (e.g., sub-
scribers for an m-pass valid in zone 1 of Paris.): the group of persons having an m-pass
for using the public transport system. We treat the generic case of several groups later.
6.3.1 M-Pass Protocol
System initialization The transport authority considers two hash functions, H and
H1, modeled as random oracles:
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
Then, he picks up randomly a generator G1 (respectively G2) of G1 (respectively G2):
G1
$← G1 ,
G2
$← G2 .
The public parameters of the group are gpp such that:
gpp← (G1,G2,GT ,H,H1, e,G1, G2).
(recall that e is a bilinear map and GT is a multiplicative cyclic group of order p, cf.
Chapter 3). The transport authority generates his public and private keys (pkt, skt) to
sign messages such that:
skt ← (x, y) $←− Zp × Zp ,
pkt ← (X,Y )← ([x]G2, [y]G2) .
Similarly, the opening authorities generate its public and private signature keys (pko,
sko) and its public and private Paillier encryption keys (pkp, skp) such that:
pkp ← (n, gp) ,
skp ← (a, b)
where a, b, n and gp are computed as in Section 3.4.3.2.
In consequence, the group public key pkg is set up such that:
pkg = (gpp, pkt, pko, pkp)
where gpp is the public parameters of the group. The keys pkt and pko are used to verify
signatures issued respectively by the transport authority and the opening authorities.
The key pkp is used for encryption.
Regarding the user, his private key sku is the sum of two random secret values: s
′ and
s′′. s′ is randomly chosen by the m-pass cardlet from Zp. s′′ is randomly chosen by the
opening authorities from Zp then securely sent to the m-pass cardlet. In such a way,
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no computation in G2 will be required to the cardlet (as the cardlet cannot do such
computations). Moreover, neither the smartphone nor the Opening authorities have the
user’s private key. In Figure 6.2, we detail the generation protocol of a user’s private
key sku.
Smartphone Smartcard Cardlet Opening authorities
Public input: pkg Public input: pkg Public Input: pkg
Private Input: Private Input: s′ Private Input: sko, s′′, DBo
r′2
$← Z∗p,
s′−−− s′ $← Zp
Compute:
B′2 = [r2′]G2,
C′2 = [s′]G2,
c′2 = H(C′2, B′2),
s′2 = r′2 − c′2 s′mod p,
Π′2 = SOK(s′ : C′2 = [s′]G2)
= (c′2, s′2)
C′2,Π′2−−−−−− C
′
2,Π
′
2−−−−−− Compute:
B˜′2 = [c′2]C′2 + [s′]G2
If c′2
?
= H(C′2, B˜′2)
then, s′′ $← Zp
else abort.
Compute:
C′′2 = [s′′]G2, then,
C2 = C′2 + C′′2
= [s′]G2 + [s′′]G2
= [s′ + s′′]G2
Compute:
C2,s
′′
−−−−− = [sku]G2
sku = s′ + s′′
Figure 6.2: User’s Private Key Generation Protocol
User registration During the registration phase, described in Figure 6.3, the m-pass
cardlet establishes two secure channels with the opening and transport authorities.
First, the registration of the user to the opening authorities consists of two steps. (1)
The m-pass cardlet computes a commitment C1 on the private key sku of the user and a
signature of knowledge Π1 proving the knowledge of the private key sku used to compute
C1. Then, it sends C1, C2, Π1 along with B1 (this value enable the verification of Π1),
to the opening authorities.
The opening authorities verify that these computations are correct. If this verification
succeeds, it means that C1 and C2 are commitments on the same secret value (sku here)
known by the user. In this case, the opening authorities send back a signature µ of C1
and stores the triplet (C1, C2, µ) in the database DBo, which has to remain private and
secure.
(2) Then, upon receiving the signature µ, the m-pass cardlet sends C1, µ, C0 (the Paillier
encryption of the user’s private key sku) and a signature of knowledge Π
′
1 proving that
the user knows the secret encrypted in C0 and used to compute C1, to the transport
authority, which then checks the validity of the signature (using pko) and the proof.
If the verifications are successful, the transport authority computes and sends a blind
CL-certificate [77] (A,B,C,D) on the private key of the user (recall that CL-signature
schemes allow a signature to be issued on messages that are not known to the signer,
but to which the signer only knows a commitment). We would like to mention that for
a given sku, a user can have only one m-pass (one blind CL-certificate (A,B,C,D)). If
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Register: Registration within the database of the opening authorities
Smartcard cardlet Opening authorities
Public input: pkg , C2 Public Input: pkg
Private Input: sku Private Input: sko, DBo
r
$← Z∗p
Compute:
B1 = [r]G1
C1 = [sku]G1
c = H(C1, B1)
s = r − c skumod p
Π1 = SOK(sku : C1 = [sku]G1)
= (c, s)
C1,C2,Π1−−−−−−−− Compute:
B˜1 = [c]C1 + [s]G1
If c
?
= H(C1, B1)
and e(C1, G2)
?
= e(G1, C2)
Then Compute:
µ = Signature(sko, C1)
µ
−−−−−−−− Store (C1, C2, µ) in DBo
GetMPass: Registration within the database of the transport authority
Smartcard cardlet Transport authority
Public input: pkg , µ Public Input: pkg
Private Input: sku Private Input: skt, DBt
j
$← Z∗n
Compute:
C0 = g
sku
p j
n mod n2
Π′1 = SOK(sku : C1 = [sku]G1 ∧ C0 = gskup jn mod n2)
C0,C1,µ,Π
′
1−−−−−−−−− If verify(pko, µ) and verify Π′1
Then Compute a signature on C1:
a
$←− Zp
A = [a]G1
B = [y]A
C = [x](A+D)
D = [a.y]C1
A,B,C,D
−−−−−−−−− Store (user, C1) in DBt
Figure 6.3: Registration Protocols
the user wants an other m-pass, he should use a new private key sk′u. At the end, the
transport authority saves (IDuser, C1) inside his database DBt.
The databases DBo and DBt will be used only for de-anonymizing or blacklisting of
users as detailed later in Section “Countermeasures”. Once the registration phase is
completed, user’s registration data are stored in both the transport and opening author-
ities databases. He is now allowed to use his m-pass application to access the transport
service.
M-pass validation The validation of the m-pass, described in Figure 6.4, is used by
the user to prove that he is entitled to use the transport service without disclosing his
identity. The process is split into two parts: the first part (called precomputation in
Figure 6.4) can be performed in advance (before the actual validation) while the second
part (called m-pass validation in Figure 6.4) should be done during the validation itself
at the gate.
When the validation at the gate occurs, the validator sends a random challenge rc
and a time slot bsn to the m-pass cardlet that will respond with a DAA σ on these
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Precomputations: randomization of the CL-Certificate
Smartcard cardlet Gate
Public input: pkg Public Input: pkg, bsn
Private Input: sku
l
$← Zp
Compute:
R = [l]A, S = [l]B,
T = [l]C and W = [l]D
k
$← Zp
Compute:
R2 = [k]S
M-pass validation
Compute:
rc, bsn
−−−−−−−−−−− rc $← {0, 1}γ
J = H1(bsn)
R1 = [k]J
K = [sku]J
c = H(J,K,R, S, T,W,R1, R2, rc)
s = k + c.sku modp
σ=(R,S,T,W,K,c,s)−−−−−−−−−−−−− Compute:
J ′ = H1(bsn)
R1 = [s]J
′ − [c]K, R2 = [s]S − [c]W
Verify:
e(R, Y )
?
= e(S,G2)
e(T,G2)
?
= e(R+W,X)
c
?
= H(J ′,K,R, S, T,W,R1, R2, rc)
If the user is blacklisted, then access
is denied. Otherwise, access is granted.
Figure 6.4: SignMPass / VerifyMPass - Validation Protocol
challenges. The bsn message is constant during a fixed period of time (typically 5
minutes) and enables the implementation of the anti-pass back feature described in
Section “Countermeasures”. During the validation phase, the m-pass cardlet has very
few computations to perform, only the ones that involve the secret key sku, the basename
bsn and the challenge rc. The m-cardlet first computes J = H1(bsn) and a commitment
K on sku with respect to the base J : K = [sku]J . It then computes a signature of
knowledge (c, s) proving that it knows the discrete logarithm of K with respect to the
base J . Afterwards, it communicates the DAA signature σ on rc and bsn to the gate.
This DAA σ consists of a randomized CL-certificate (R,S, T,W ), pre-computed by the
m-pass application, along with J , K, c, and s. Roughly speaking, the DAA signature σ
is a signature of knowledge (cf. Section 3.2.3.3) on rc and bsn, proving that (R,S, T,W )
is a CL-certificate on the secret value committed in K and that the m-pass cardlet knows
this committed value. Then, the validator verifies that the signature σ is valid and is
not blacklisted. If the verification is successful, the validator grants access to the user
to the transport network.
Groups A group of users is defined by a group public key pkg. We suggest to regularly
update this key to ensure that it has only a limited validity period. Indeed, the users
have to update their CL-certificate every time the group public key is updated. A user,
who did not update his certificate accordingly, will not any more be considered as a
member of the group and thus will not be able to generate a valid signature during the
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validation phase. Moreover, by regularly updating the group public key, we limit the
size of the blacklist containing the revoked m-passes.
For the sake of simplicity, we have considered so far a single group of users (i.e., a
unique group public key), in order to distinguish a legitimate user from an illegal one.
In practice, we have to distinguish different kinds of m-passes and consequently different
groups of users. A m-pass is often characterized by its type (e.g., student, senior,
disabled) and its fare zones (i.e., holders of such fare zone are entitled to travel on.).
Thus, potentially a validator gate may embed several group public keys. For example,
in the situation in which three groups of users exist: {student, fare zone 1-2}, {student,
fare zone 1-5} and {student, fare zone 2-3}, a validator located in a zone 3 station will
accept the users of the groups {student, fare zone 1-5} and {student, fare zone 2-3}.
Thus, in order to verify the validity of all types of m-passes, a validator may have to
store several group public keys.
If the number of groups is huge, storing their respective group public keys will be quite
inefficient. We therefore propose that, during the validation phase, the m-pass cardlet
sends to the validator the group it belongs to. In this way, the verification time will be
constant even if the number of group public keys is large.
6.3.2 Countermeasures
In order to ensure the security of our privacy-preserving m-pass solution, we provide, in
this section, an “anti-passback” feature prohibiting consecutive uses of the same m-pass
in the same place and during a given period of time, a “de-anonymization” protocol
to retrieve the identity of a user in case of emergency or fraud as well as a revocation
solution which allows to revoke m-passes.
Anti-passback The anti-passback feature of a transport service denies the access to a
user that has already used the m-pass during the previous minutes or seconds depending
on how the system is configured. For example, the entrance gate should deny the access
if two users try to enter consecutively using the same transport pass.
During the validation phase, the validator stores the signature σ1 for a time slot bsn. If
the user tries to re-use his m-pass during this time slot, the m-pass cardlet will compute
and send a new signature σ2. The validator is able to detect that σ1 and σ2 are computed
by the same m-pass cardlet by comparing the two parameters K of the signatures σ1
and σ2. If they are the same, this means that the two signatures σ1 and σ2 originate
from the same m-pass cardlet.
When the gate changes the value of bsn, two DAA signatures cannot be linked any more
using K. Thus, renewing bsn frequently is mandatory in order to guarantee that the
actions of users cannot be linked by the transport authority.
De-anonymization The de-anonymization procedure, described in Figure 6.5, is an
implementation of the algorithm IdentUser. It allows the transport authority to identify
the m-pass (and consequently the holder of this pass) that has generated a particular
signature. For instance, in case of a fraud, the logs contained in a gate can be used to
identify the corresponding malicious users. Of course the transport authority cannot
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de-anonymize users on his own, which would otherwise harm their privacy. Thus, the
revocation of the anonymity of a signature cannot be done without the consent and the
cooperation of the opening authorities.
First, the transport authority sends the targeted signature σ = (R,S, T,W, J,K, c, s)
to the opening authorities. Based on this signature and the secret database DBo, the
opening authorities search for the triplet (C1, C2, µ) such that e(J,C2) matches with
e(K,G2). If the equality holds, this means that C2 and K are two commitments on the
same secret value (i.e., sku in this case). Then, it replies with the corresponding C1.
Finally, based on the database DBt and the received C1, the transport authority finds
out the identity of the user IDuser.
Transport authority opening authorities
Public input: pkg, DBt, σ Public Input: pkg
Private Input: skt Private Input: sko, DBo
σ−−−−−− Find (C1, C2, µ) in DBo such that:
e(J,C2) = e(K,G2)
Knowing C1
C1−−−−−−−
Find (IDuser, C1) in DBt
Figure 6.5: IdentUser - User De-Anonymization Protocols
Blacklist management The blacklisting procedure, described in Figure 6.6, uses
the IdentMPass algorithm. It allows the transport authority to revoke an m-pass such
that it cannot access anymore to the transport service. For example, a user that has
lost his smartphone can ask the transport authority to blacklist his m-pass, or in case
of a fraud the de-anonymized m-pass can be blacklisted by the transport authority.
If the transport authority wants to exclude a user, the authority seeks for the relevant
commitment, C1, of the user in the database DBt and sends it to the opening authorities.
Upon receiving C1, the opening authorities retrieve the corresponding commitment C2
and computes (for all bsn starting from the time the m-pass has been blacklisted):
e(H1(bsn), C2). The number of values e(H1(bsn), C2) computed could appear to be
large, but it stays limited as we propose to renew regularly the group public keys to
implement the validity duration of all m-passes. Thus, depending on the frequency of
changes of bsn and of group public keys, the size of the computed set can vary.
Finally, the set of computed values e(H1(bsn), C2) is sent back to the transport authority
that forwards it to all the validators of the transport system. Thus during the validation
phase, the validator will receive a signature σ = (R,S, T,W, J,K, c, s) from an m-pass.
It will check the validity of the signature and that the m-pass is not blacklisted. To this
end, the validator will check whether e(K,G2) matches with one of the computed values
e(H1(bsn), C2). If the equality holds, this means that C2 and K are two commitments
on the same secret value (i.e., sku in our context), and thus the user is blacklisted
and the validator denies access to this user. The validator will then typically send a
specific message to the m-pass cardlet to lock it. Clearly, this locking message has to be
authenticated to thwart denial-of-service attacks.
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Transport authority Opening authorities
Public input: pkg, DBt, IDuser Public Input: pkg
Private Input: skt Private Input: sko, DBo
Knowing IDuser
Find (IDuser, C1) in DBt
C1−−−−−−−−−− Knowing C1
Find (C1, C2, µ) in DBo
∀σ, if ∃e(H1(bsn), C2)
e(H1(bsn),C2)−−−−−−−−− ∀bsn, Compute e(H1(bsn), C2)
such that e(K,G2) = e(H1(bsn), C2),
the validator denies the access to the user.
Figure 6.6: Protocol for Blacklisting a User.
6.4 Requirements
We consider three types of requirements: functional requirements which are “efficiency”
and “versatility”, security requirements which consist in “correctness”, “traceability”
and “Non-frameability”, and privacy requirements which comprises “unlinkability”.
6.4.1 Functional Requirements
Efficiency An m-pass systems must fulfill functional requirements imposed by trans-
port operators [7], in particular the validation of an m-pass must be performed in less
than 300ms. We must consider that a SIM card has limited computation capabilities.
In particular, pairing APIs are not available on current SIM cards.
Versatility The user smartphone and the validator cannot be assumed to be con-
nected to a back-end server during the validation phase. This enables the user to use
his m-pass in any kind of situation, especially in areas with low connectivity, e.g., un-
derground, or if the battery of his mobile is flat.
6.4.2 Security and Privacy Model
We formally define the security and privacy properties (except the correctness property)
of our m-pass protocol in which the attack capabilities of a probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A are modeled by providing him access to some oracles. In the sequel,
HU will denote the set of honest users and MU the set of corrupted users. We assume
that A receives all the exchanged messages in our system. A acts as an active adversary
as regards to the messages issued by malicious users and as a passive adversary with
respect to honest users.
ORegisterHU is an oracle that will be used by an adversary in order to register honest
users. By calling this oracle with IDU as argument, the adversary adds a new user. The
oracle runs sku ← UKeygen(gpk, IDU ) and adds IDU to the set HU . The private key
sku is kept secret and a commitment of sku is returned to the adversary.
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ORegisterMU is an oracle that will be used by an adversary in order to register malicious
users. The adversary calls this oracle with argument the identifier IDU of a user and
sets his private key to sku. The identity IDU is added to the set MU .
OCorruptUser(IDU ) is a user secret key oracle enabling the adversary to obtain the
private key sku of a user IDU ∈ HU . The oracle sends sku to A.
OGetMPassU is an oracle that runs the user’s side in the GetMPass protocol. This
oracle will be used by an adversary playing the role of a malicious TA. The adversary
gives to the oracle an identity IDU of an honest registered user. If the user accepts the
protocol, the adversary gets a CL-certificate of the user.
OGetMPassT is an oracle that runs the transport authority side in the GetMPass pro-
tocol. This oracle will be used to simulate the execution of the protocol between a user
(corrupted or not) and an honest TA.
OSignMPass(IDU , bsn, rc) is an oracle that takes as input the identifier IDU of an
honest and registered user (he has one valid CL-certificate), a fresh time slot bsn and
a challenge rc, and outputs a signature σ on bsn and rc. The oracle records (IDU , σ,
bsn, rc) in a list Set.
OIdentUser(σ) is an oracle that takes on input a signature σ and outputs the identifier
IDU of the user who generated the signature σ.
OIdentMPass(C1, σ, bsn, rc) is an oracle that takes on input C1 a commitment of sku
(a user’s secret, a valid signature σ (which has been generated during the execution of
the algorithm SignMPass), a time slot bsn and a message rc. It indicates whether the
signature has been generated on bsn and rc, and using the committed secret on C1.
Correctness Informally speaking, our protocol is correct if (1) a valid m-pass enables
to generate valid signatures, (2) honestly generated signatures are accepted, (3) a val-
idated signature enables opening authorities to identify the user who generated it, (4)
opening authorities can link all the signature generated by a given registered user that
obtained a valid m-pass, and (5) valid signatures generated by the same user during the
same time slot bsn are linkable.
Unlinkability Informally speaking, it should be impossible, except for the opening
authorities, to track an m-pass obtained by a user, in particular, to distinguish which
of users produced a given signature for every bsn to link two signatures validated by
the same user. For this, an adversary has full control over the transport authority (in
particular it owns the private key skt) and all the users except two honest users i0 and
i1. The adversary can initiate the IdentUser protocol over any signature and can get
the user’s identity behind it, except for the signatures generated by i0 and i1. He can
also initiate the IdentMPass protocol for all the users except for i0 and i1. We define
the unlinkability experiment ExpunlinkA (1λ) in Figure 6.7. The scheme is unlinkable if
for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the advantage Advunlink−bA (1λ) =
|Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) = b]− 1/2| is negligible.
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Expunlink−bA (1
λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅
2. (gpk, skt, sko)← Keygen(pp)
3. (i0, i1, bsn, rc) ← A(gpk, skt, DBt: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser, OGetMPassU ,
OSignMPass, OIdentUser, OIdentMPass)
4. If i0 or i1 ∈MU then return ⊥.
5. If OSignMPass has been requested on i0 or i1 with bsn then return ⊥.
6. b← {0, 1}
7. σb ← SignMPass(gpk, skib , bsn, rc)
8. b′ ← A(gpk, skt, DBt, σb, σ1−b: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser, OGetMPassU ,
OSignMPass, OIdentUser, OIdentMPass)
9. If OCorruptUser has been requested on i0 or i1 then return ⊥.
10. If OSignMPass has been requested on bsn on either i0 or i1, then return ⊥.
11. If OIdentUser has been requested on σb then return ⊥.
12. If OIdentMPass has been requested on(i0, σb, bsn, rc) or (i1, σb, bsn, rc) then return ⊥.
13. return b′
Figure 6.7: Unlinkability Security Experiment
Traceability Informally speaking, it should be impossible for anyone to validate
an m-pass, i.e., generate a valid signature σ, such that the algorithm IdentUser re-
turns ⊥, i.e., an identifier IDU that doesn’t appear in the transport authority database
DBt. We formally define the traceability experiment Exp
trac
A (1λ) in Figure 6.8. The
scheme is traceable if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the probability
Pr[ExptracA (1λ) = 1] is negligible.
ExptracA (1
λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅
2. (gpk, skt, sko)← Keygen(pp)
3. (σ, bsn, rc)← A(gpk: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser, OGetMPassT ).
4. If VerifyMPass(gpk, σ, bsn, rc) =⊥ then return 0.
5. If IdentUser(σ,DBo, DBt) =⊥ return 1 else return 0.
Figure 6.8: Traceability Security Experiment
Non-Frameability Informally speaking, it should be impossible for anyone to falsely
accuse a honest user of having used his m-pass. We formally define the non-frameability
experiment ExpNfraA (1
λ) in Figure 6.9. The scheme is non-frameable, if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time adversary A, the probability
Pr[ExpNfraA (1
λ)=1] is negligible.
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ExpNfraA (1
λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅; Set← ∅
2. (gpk, skt, sko)← Keygen(pp)
3. (σ, bsn, rc) ← A(gpk, skt, sko, DBt, DBo: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OGetMPassU , OSignMPass)
4. If VerifyMPass(gpk, σ, bsn, rc) =⊥ or IdentUser(σ,DBo, DBt) =⊥ then return 0
5. If IdentUser(σ,DBo, DBt) = IDU ∈ HU and (IDU , σ, bsn, rc) /∈ Set then return 1 else return 0.
Figure 6.9: Non-frameability Security Experiment
6.5 Security Analysis
We prove that our m-pass protocol provides the security and privacy properties defined
in Section 6.4.
Forking Lemma. We use the Forking Lemma [101] in our proofs, to prove that an
adversary A is not able to produce a new valid signature σ (see Figure 6.4) unless he
knows the secret sku corresponding to the valid CL-certificate (R, S, T , W ) and the
discrete logarithm of K in the base J .
Using the notation of [101], if an adversary is able to produce a valid signature σ (rc,
bsn, σ1, h, σ2) where σ1 = (J , K, R, S, T , W , R1, R2, rc), h = H(J , K, R, S, T , W ,
R1, R2, rc), and σ2 = s then an adversary A′ can produce two valid signatures (rc, bsn,
σ1, h, σ2) and (rc, bsn, σ1, h
′, σ′2) such that h 6= h′.
Theorem 3 (Unlinkability). Our m-pass protocol satisfies the unlinkability require-
ment, in the random oracle model, under the XDH assumption.
Proof 3 (sketch). We give a security proof as a sequence of games, using Shoup’s
methodology [102]. We will only give a high-level description of the initial game (Game
0) and brief descriptions of the modifications between successive games.
Game 0: This is the original attack game with respect to a given efficient adversary A.
The Challenger C can construct the public parameter gpp for A. It also chooses the keys
for the Paillier encryption scheme and the ones for the transport and opening authorities.
C sends gpp and skt to A and answer his requests as follows:
• ORegisterHU requests: the Challenger C randomly chooses sku ∈ Z∗p, computes
C1 = [sku]G1 and, C2 = [sku]G2, returns (C1, µ) to the adversary A and stores
(C1, C2 = [sku]G2, µ) in DBo.
• ORegisterMU requests: C randomly chooses s′′ ∈ Z∗p and sends it to A along with
a signature µ on the commitment C1 = [s
′ + s′′]G1 provided by A (where s′ is a
secret value chosen by A). C stores (C1, C2 = [s′ + s′′]G2, µ) in DBo.
• OCorruptUser requests: the Challenger C retrieves sku and gives it to A.
• OGetMPassU requests: C retrieves sku and proceeds normally to obtain a certifi-
cate on sku
Chapter 6. A Practical and Privacy-Preserving Mobile Pass 73
• OSignMPass requests: the Challenger C has all the values (sku, A, B, C, D)
that has been issued in OGetMPassU / ORegisterHU requests. Therefore, C can
generate signatures on any bsn and rc.
• OIdentUser(σ) requests: the Challenger C uses the algorithm IdentUser to iden-
tify the user who generated σ.
• OIdentMPass(C1, σ, bsn, rc) requests: the Challenger uses the algorithm IdentMPass
to determine whether σ has been generated using the committed secret in C1 or
not.
Challenge phase: The adversary A outputs two honest users (i0, i1), a message rc, and
a basename bsn. C randomly chooses a value b from {0, 1} and issues a valid signature
σb on rc and bsn on behalf of ib. The goal of A is to guess the value b. After hav-
ing received its challenge, A can query ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OGetMPassU , OSignMPass, OIdentUser and OIdentMPass but with the following
restrictions: it cannot query:
• the OCorruptUser oracle on i0 or i1,
• OSignMPass oracle on i0 or i1,
• OIdentUser oracle on σb,
• OIdentMPass oracle on (i0, σb, bsn, rc) or (i1, σb, bsn, rc)
At the end of the game, the adversary A outputs a bit b′, its guess. Let S0 be the event
that b = b′ in this game and Si the event that b = b′ in the game i. We have,
|Pr[S0]− 1/2| = Advunlink−bA = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ)]− 1/2|
Game 1: this game is the same as Game 0 except that we replace the value K = [skib ]J
in the signature σb by a random value of the group G1 and simulate the “signature of
knowledge” σb . Such a simulated proof can be easily done in the random oracle model
using standard techniques. Under the XDH assumption, the adversary A cannot detect
this change. Indeed, we can easily construct an XDH distinguisher D, as proven below
in Claim 1 (further details about Claim 1 are given after the unlinkability proof), with
XDH-advantage satisfying:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| 6 qH × qR × AdvXDHD (1λ) (1)
where AdvXDHD (1λ) is the XDH-advantage of D in solving the XDH problem and qH
(respectively qR) a bound on the number of hash queries (respectively ORegisterHU
requests). In the sequel, we will use the simplified notation AdvXDH to denote the
XDH-advantage of some efficient algorithm in solving the XDH problem.
Game 2: This is the same game as Game 1 except that we replace the CL-certificate
(R, S, T , W ) on skib by a CL-certificate on a random value and then simulate the
“signature of knowledge” σb. Such a simulated proof can easily be done in the random
oracle model using standard techniques. Under the XDH assumption, A cannot detect
this change. Indeed, we can easily construct an XDH distinguisher D, as proven below
in Claim 2 (further details about Claim 2 are given after the unlinkability proof), with
XDH-advantage satisfying:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S2]| 6 qR × AdvXDH (2)
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In the Game(2), the unlinkability-challenger C gives no information (in a strong infor-
mation theoretic sense) to A about the bit b (since the CL-certificate and the “tag” K
have been replaced by random values). Therefore we have:
Pr[S2] = 1/2
We can now give an upper bound for Advunlink−bA (1
λ):
Advunlink−bA (1
λ) = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ)]− 1/2| = |Pr[S0]− Pr[S2]|
We have:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S2]| = Σj=1j=0|Pr[Sj ]− Pr[Sj+1]| ≤ qH × (qR + 1) AdvXDH
Therefore under the XDH assumption Advunlink−bA (1
λ) is negligible.
We can then conclude that our proposed m-pass protocol satisfies the unlinkability
requirement, in the random oracle model, under the XDH assumption.
Claim 1: |Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ qH × qR × AdvXDH
Proof of Claim 1 (sketch): let A be an adversary who breaks the unlinkability re-
quirement of our m-pass protocol with non-negligible advantage. We will construct an
algorithm D, using A as an oracle, which solves the XDH problem. Let X be D’s chal-
lenger in the XDH-game. X selects a bit d and sends to D an XDH-triplet if d = 1 and
a random one if d = 0. Let (G1, A = [a]G1, B = [b]G1, C = [c]G1)∈ G41 be D’s XDH-
challenge. D has to decide whether d = 1 (i.e. c ≡ ab mod p) or not. D first defines
the public parameters gpp of the m-pass protocol from the ones of the XDH-challenge,
where H and H1 are random oracles under the control of D. D also chooses the keys for
the Paillier encryption scheme and the ones for the transport and opening authorities.
D randomly selects i∗ in [1; qR] and j∗ in [1; qH ]. D sends gpp and skt to A and answers
its requests as follows:
• ORegisterHU requests: for the i-th request, D will acts as follows:
1. if i 6= i∗, then it randomly chooses sku ∈ Z∗p, computes C1 = [sku]G1 and,
C2 = [sku]G2, returns (C1, µ) to the adversary A and stores (C1, C2 =
[sku]G2, µ) in DBo.
2. if i = i∗, D randomly chooses α and β in Z∗p, computes C1 = [αa]G1 + [β]G1
= [αa+ β]G1 (where [a]G1 comes from the XDH challenge) and returns (C1,
µ) to the adversary A.
• ORegisterMU requests: D randomly chooses s′′ ∈ Z∗p and sends it to A along with
a signature µ on the commitment C1 = [s
′ + s′′]G1 provided by A (where s′ is a
secret value chosen by A). D stores (C1, C2 = [s′ + s′′]G2, µ) in DBo.
• OCorruptUser requests: if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ , D retrieves skui and gives it to the
adversary A and aborts otherwise.
• OGetMPassU requests: if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ , D retrieves skui and proceeds normally
to obtain a certificate on skui . Else, it randomly chooses a value C0 ∈ Zn2 and
simulates the proof Π′1 (this is possible in the random oracle model) and obtains
a blind CL-certificate (A, B, C, D) on C1 = [αa+ β]G1.
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• Hash requests: upon receiving the j-th request on bsn, D proceeds as follows: if
no previous request was made on bsn, then we distinguish two cases: if j 6= j∗,
then D selects δ ∈ Z∗p and outputs H1(bsn) = [δ]G1. Else, it selects γ ∈ Z∗p and
outputs H1(bsn) = [b]G1 + [γ]G1 = [b + γ]G1, where [b]G1 comes from the XDH
challenge. If bsn has already been queried then D returns the same output as the
first request.
• OSignMPass requests: upon receiving a query on (IDU , rc, bsn), D proceeds as
usual if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ , else we distinguish the two following cases:
1. If bsn is the one that was requested in the j∗-th hash request then D aborts.
2. Else, it chooses a fresh value δ ∈ Z∗p (if bsn has not already been queried),
computes H1(bsn) = [δ]G1 and K=[δ]C1=[δ(αa + β)]G1. D simulates the
signature of knowledge σ (which is possible in the random oracle model),
outputs σ and stores (σ, rc, bsn) in Set.
• OIdentUser(σ) requests: upon receiving a query on (σ, rc, bsn), D checks if (σ, rc,
bsn) belongs to Set. If so, it returns IDUi∗ . Else it uses the IdentUser algorithm,
to identify the user who generated σ.
• OIdentMPass(C1, σ, bsn, rc) requests: D checks if (σ, rc, bsn) belongs to Set.
If so, it returns “1” to A, which means that the signature comes from IDUi∗ .
Otherwise, it uses the algorithm IdentMPass to determine whether σ has been
generated using the committed secret on C1 or not.
Challenge phase: A outputs two honest identities IDi0 and IDi1 , a message rc and a
basename bsn. If a hash request on this basename was already submitted during the j-th
request then D aborts if j 6= j∗. D randomly selects a bit b and aborts if IDib 6= IDUi∗ .
Else, it issues a signature σb on rc and bsn on behalf of ib as follows: if no hash request
was submitted on bsn, then it selects γ ∈ Z∗p and outputs H1(bsn) = [b]G1 + [γ]G1 =
[b + γ]G1. It randomly chooses l ∈ Z∗p to randomize the blind CL-certificate (A, B, C,
D) on C1 = [αa + β]G1: (R = [l]A, S = [l]B, T = [l]C, W = [l]D). It then computes
K = [α]C + [β]B+ [αγ]A+ [βγ]G1 and simulates the “signature of knowledge” σb = (R,
S, T , W , K). Note that if c ≡ ab mod p, the signature σb issued by D in the challenge
phase is indistinguishable from an original one; else it is a random one.
After the Challenge phase, D proceeds as in the previous phase. At the end of the game,
the adversary outputs a bit b′, its guess. If b′ = b, then D returns 1 to X and 0 otherwise.
Let F be the event that D did not abort. We have
Pr[d′ = 1/d = 1] = Pr[S0 ∧ F ]
and
Pr[d′ = 1/d = 0] = Pr[S1 ∧ F ]
therefore:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ qH × qR × AdvXDHD (1λ)
Claim 2: |Pr[S1]− Pr[S2]| 6 qR × AdvXDH
Proof of Claim 2 (sketch): the proof is similar to the proof of Claim 1; only the
construction of the signature σb differs in the two proofs. We will construct an algorithm
D, using A as an oracle, which solves the XDH problem. Here again, let us denote by X
D’s challenger in the XDH-game and by (G1, A = [a]G1, B = [b]G1, C = [c]G1)∈ G41 its
XDH-challenge. D has to decide whether d = 1 (i.e. c ≡ ab mod p) or not. D first defines
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the public parameters gpp of the m-pass protocol from the ones of the XDH-challenge,
where H and H1 are random oracles under the control of D. D also chooses the keys for
the Paillier encryption scheme and the ones for the transport and opening authorities.
In particular, D knows skt = (x, y) the private key of the transport authority. Let qR
be a bound on the number of ORegisterHU requests. D randomly selects i∗ in [1; qR],
sends gpp and skt to A, and answers its requests as follows:
• ORegisterHU requests: for the i-th request, D will acts as follows:
1. if i 6= i∗, then it randomly chooses sku ∈ Z∗p, computes C1 = [sku]G1 and,
C2 = [sku]G2, returns (C1, µ) to the adversary A and stores (C1, C2 =
[sku]G2, µ) in DBo.
2. if i = i∗, D randomly chooses α and β in Z∗p, computes C1 = [αa]G1 + [β]G1
= [αa+ β]G1 (where [a]G1 comes from the XDH challenge) and returns (C1,
µ) to the adversary A.
• ORegisterMU requests: D randomly chooses s′′ ∈ Z∗p and sends it to A along with
a signature µ on the commitment C1 = [s
′ + s′′]G1 provided by A (where s′ is a
secret value chosen by A). D stores (C1, C2 = [s′ + s′′]G2, µ) in DBo.
• OCorruptUser requests: if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ , D retrieves skui and gives it to the
adversary A and aborts otherwise.
• OGetMPassU requests: if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ , D retrieves skui and proceeds normally
to obtain a certificate on skui . Else, it randomly chooses a value C0 ∈ Zn2 and
simulates the proof Π′1 (this is possible in the random oracle model) and obtains
a blind CL-certificate (A, B, C, D) on C1 = [αa+ β]G1.
• Hash requests: upon receiving the j-th request on bsn, D proceeds as follows: if no
previous request was made on bsn, then D selects δ ∈ Z∗p and outputs H1(bsn) =
[δ]G1. If bsn has already been queried then D returns the same output as the first
request.
• OSignMPass requests: upon receiving a query on (IDU , rc, bsn), D proceeds as
usual if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ , else, if bsn has not been queried, it chooses a fresh value
δ ∈ Z∗p, computes H1(bsn) = [δ]G1 and K=[δ]C1=[δ(αa+ β)]G1. D simulates the
signature of knowledge σ (which is possible in the random oracle model), outputs
σ and stores (σ, rc, bsn) in Set.
• OIdentUser(σ) requests: upon receiving a query on (σ, rc, bsn), D checks if (σ,
rc, bsn) belongs to Set. If so, it returns IDUi∗ . Else, it uses the IdentUser
algorithm, to identify the user who generated σ.
• OIdentMPass(C1, σ, bsn, rc) requests: D checks if (σ, rc, bsn, rc) belongs to Set.
If so, it returns “1” to A, which means that the signature comes from IDUi∗ .
Otherwise, it uses the algorithm IdentMPass to determine whether σ has been
generated using the committed secret in C1 or not.
Challenge phase: A outputs two honest identities IDi0 and IDi1 , a message rc and a
basename bsn. D randomly selects a bit b and aborts if IDib 6= IDUi∗ . Else it issues a
signature σb on rc and bsn on behalf of ib as follows: if no hash request was submitted
on bsn, then it selects δ ∈ Z∗p and γ ∈ Z∗p and outputs H1(bsn) = [δ]G1. It then
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computes the values (R, S, T , W , K) of the signature σ as follows: R = [b + γ]G1
(where [b]G1 comes from the XDH challenge), S = [y(b + γ)]G1, T = [x](R + W ) and
W = [y]([α]C + [β]B + [αγ]A + [βγ]G1). It then randomly chooses K in the group
G1 and simulates the “signature of knowledge” σb = (R, S, T , W , K). Note that if
c ≡ ab mod p, the blind CL-certificate (R, S, T , W ) on C1 issued by D in the challenge
phase is indistinguishable from an original one; else it is a CL-certificate on a random
one.
After the Challenge phase, D proceeds as in the previous phase. At the end of the game,
the adversary outputs a bit b′, its guess. If b′ = b, then D returns 1 to X and 0 otherwise.
Let F be the event that D did not abort. We have
Pr[F ] ≥ 1/qR
We also have:
Pr[d′ = 1/d = 1] = Pr[S1 ∧ F ]
and
Pr[d′ = 1/d = 0] = Pr[S2 ∧ F ]
therefore:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S2]| ≤ qR × AdvXDHD (1λ)
Theorem 4 (Traceability). Our m-pass protocol satisfies the traceability requirement,
in the random oracle model, under the LRSW assumption.
Proof 4 (sketch). Let C be the Challenger of the adversary A in the traceability
experiment. C will use A to break the LRSW assumption. The Challenger C has access
to a CL-certificate oracle. The Challenger has on input the public key of transport
authority pkt. C chooses also the keys for Paillier encryption scheme. It can, then,
construct the public parameters gpp for A and answer the requests of the adversary A
as follows:
• ORegisterHU requests: the Challenger C randomly chooses sku and computes
C1 = [sku]G1, and C2 = [sku]G2.
• ORegisterMU requests: the Challenger C randomly chooses s′′ and sends this value
to A. It then sends a signature µ on the value C1 provided by A.
• OCorruptUser requests: C gives sku to the adversary A.
• OGetMPassT requests: if IDU ∈ HU , C retrieves sku. If IDU ∈MU , C decrypts
C0 and retrieves sku. The Challenger C then calls the CL-certificate oracle with
the input sku. The CL-certificate oracle returns (A, B, C, D). C gives (A, B, C,
D) to the adversary.
• OSignMPass requests: the Challenger C has all the values (sku, A, B, C, D)
that has been issued in ORegisterHU / OGetMPassT requests. Therefore, C can
generate signatures on any bsn and rc.
Eventually, the adversary A outputs a valid signature σ˜ = (R˜, S˜, T˜ , W˜ , K˜, c˜, s˜) on
a challenge rc and a basename bsn such that the algorithm IdentUser on σ does not
return an ID of a registered user (ID does not match with the databases DBt, DBo),
and consequently, the CL-certificate (R˜, S˜, T˜ , W˜ ) certifies an unknown value s˜ku that
has not been requested to the CL-certificate oracle
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Using the Forking Lemma, the replay technique and the soundness property, the Chal-
lenger can extract s˜ku from σ˜, and (R˜, S˜, T˜ , W˜ ) is a valid CL-certificate on s˜ku. This is
a forgery because the value s˜ku has (by definition) never been asked to the CL-certificate
oracle. Thus, C breaks the LRSW assumption.
Therefore, our m-pass protocol is traceable under the LRSW assumption.
Theorem 5 (Non-Frameability). Our m-pass protocol satisfies the non-frameability
requirement, in the random oracle model, under the SDL assumption.
Proof 5 (sketch). LetA be an adversary against the non-frameability requirement. We
construct a reduction C using A against SDL problem challenges. Let (G1, C˜1 = [s]G1,
G2, C˜2 = [s]G2) be the SDL challenge. The Challenger C must output s.
Let qR be the bound on the number of ORegisterHU requests. C selects i∗ ∈ [1, qR],
construct the public parameters gpp for A as in the initialisation phase, and answers its
queries as follows.
A chooses the keys for the opening and transport authorities.
• ORegisterHU requests: when A makes the ith ORegisterHU query to register a
user, C will run the user’s private key generation protocol with a fresh value s′ if
i 6= i∗. When i = i∗, C sets C ′2 = C˜2 and simulates the proof Π′2 (this is possible
in the random oracle model). It then computes C2=C˜2 + [s
′′]G2=[s+ s′′]G2 where
s′′ is provided by A. Let C1 = C˜1 + [s′′]G1. C simulates the proof Π1 and obtains
from A a signature µ.
• ORegisterMU requests: C does not need to do anything.
• OCorruptUser requests: C returns the corresponding sku of the user IDUi if i 6= i∗
and aborts otherwise.
• OGetMPassU requests: C acts normally if IDUi 6= IDUi∗ . Otherwise, it randomly
chooses C0, simulates the non-interactive proof Π
′
1, and obtains from A a valid
CL-certificate (A, B, C, D) on s˜ku = s+ s
′′.
• OSignMPass(IDU , bsn, rc) requests: the challenger C acts normally if IDUi 6=
IDUi∗ . Otherwise, C picks a random value β in Z∗p, computes J = H1(bsn) = [β]G1
(this is possible in the random oracle model), and then K = [β]C1 = [β(s +
s′′)]G1 = s˜kuJ . C then simulates the non-interactive proof σ.
Eventually, the adversary A outputs a valid signature σ˜ = (R˜, S˜, T˜ , W˜ , K˜, c˜, s˜)) on a
challenge r˜c and a basename ˜bsn such that:
• the algorithm IdentUser on σ˜ returns an an identifier ˜IDU ∈ HU , and
• the oracle OSignMPass has not been called to generate this signature,
If ˜IDU 6= IDUi∗ then C aborts. Using the Forking Lemma, the replay technique and
the soundness property, the Challenger can extract s˜ku from σ˜. As s˜ku = s+ s
′′ mod p,
s = s˜ku− s′′ mod p. C is then able to solve the SDL problem since it will not abort with
a probability 1/qR.
Therefore, our m-pass protocol is non-frameable under the SDL assumption.
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6.6 Implementation
In this section, we describe the prototype implementing our mobile pass system. The
software components involved in the transport service are represented in Figure 5.2.
The validator is simulated by a Java swing application connected to an NFC reader
using the ISO14443B protocol. The cardlet is embedded within a SIM card. We used
a regular Galaxy S3 smartphone running Android 4.1.2. The Android system does not
need any modification as the Seek for Android patch [103] has been already added by
Samsung in order to access secure elements. In the following, we give more technical
details about the validator and the SIM card, the used cryptographic parameters, and
the performance results as well.
6.6.1 Validator Details
The validator has been developed over a PC, i.e., an Intel(R) Xeon(R) with a E5-1620
CPU with 4 cores running at 3.70GHz under a 64-bit Linux OS, in Java and Scala.
The Java software uses a native library for EC scalar multiplications and pairings. This
library depends on libGMP for big integers computations and benefits from its assembly
optimizations. Furthermore, computations are distributed between threads (at JVM
level) to benefit from the multi-core architecture of the PC. Regarding the NFC reader
of the validator, we used is an Omnikey 5321 dual interfaces.
6.6.2 SIM Card Details
The SIM card handles requests from the validator using the NFC contactless interface.
Our SIM card is compliant with
• Global Platform Card specifications version 2.2.1,
• Javacard version 2.2.2 and
• Javacard virtual machine version 3.0.1 classic.
Those features allow to develop Java Card Applets so-called cardlets, to load them
on the SIM Card and to execute them thanks to the Java Card virtual machine. In
order to provide a very efficient signature computation, we chose a SIM Card equipped
with an arithmetic coprocessor. Thanks to this latter, we were able to meet the timing
performances required by the transport operators (typically less than 300 ms), by offering
non standardized Java Card APIs to the transport cardlet. Those APIs allow to compute
efficiently:
• modular operations on large integers like addition, subtraction, multiplication,
exponentiation, etc.,
• arithmetic operations on elliptic curves like scalar multiplication and point addi-
tion.
Those customized APIs are mapped to assembly subroutines that drive the arithmetic
co-processor directly.
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6.6.3 Curve and Pairing Parameters
We used a 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curve [104] over Fq since this family of curves provides
an optimal size for G1 and G2 while preventing the MOV attack [105] due to their
embedding degree of 12. G1 is the group of Fq - rational points of order p and G2 is the
subgroup of trace zero points in E(Fq12)[p]. Our pairing is of type-3 [106].
The curve and pairing parameters that we used in the implementation of our protocols
are:
q = 82434016654300907520574040983783682039467282927996130024655912292889294264593
p = 82434016654300907520574040983783682039180169680906587136896645255465309139857
b = 5
6.6.4 Performance Results
The validation of an m-pass occurs in two phases: pre-computations and real-time com-
putations. The pre-computations consists in randomizing the CL-certificate (A, B, C,
D). Regarding the real-time computations, it occurs when the user taps the validator
with his smartphone. After detecting the smartphone and selecting the m-pass cardlet,
the validator sends the basename bsn and the challenge rc to the m-pass cardlet. The
signature, computed by the cardlet, is sent back to the validator that checks it and
displays the result.
6.6.4.1 Pre-Computations
Some pre-computations operations are delegated to the transport application within the
smartphone after receiving A, B, C and D from the cardlet. The smartphone application
then generates a pool of pre-computed tokens by multiplying each variable A, B, C and
D by a random l. Then, the pool of generated tokens is sent back to the cardlet.
1 signature 20 signatures
175 ms 3.47 s
Table 6.1: M-Pass Pre-Computation Timings
The elements that the card has to store for one signature are one Zp element and 5 un-
compressed points (such that four of them we store also one byte for compression). The
total size of these elements is 356 bytes. In our implementation, we did pre-computations
for 20 signatures. Regarding the timings, detailed in Table 6.1, the pre-computations
for preparing one signature occurs in average in 175 s.
6.6.4.2 Real-Time Computations
Table 6.2 gives timings (average over more than 60 trials and standard deviation between
parentheses) for all real-time computations (the whole validation protocol) which include
the signature generation and verification. The timings include as well the NFC exchanges
Chapter 6. A Practical and Privacy-Preserving Mobile Pass 81
duration. The performance of our solution is critical for the validation of the m-pass.
The whole validation process takes in average 205.27 ms, which is quite efficient. It
enables to add the authentication of the validator into a window of time of 300 ms.
We denote by “Battery-Off” a powered-off phone either by the user, or because the
battery is flat. It is possible to use the service even if the smartphone has run out of
battery. Indeed, the m-pass application hosted in Android is involved only in the pre-
computation phase. Once this step is done, the validator interacts with the smartcard
via the NFC controller and sends the energy via the NFC magnetic field. In this case, the
smartcard runs the signature with lower performances. We measured a total transaction
time of 596.81 ms.
Signature+NFC Verification Total
Battery-On 184.24 ms (16.41)
20.79 ms (5.29)
205.27 ms (16.66)
Battery-Off 576.34 ms (39.33) 596.81 ms (39.38)
Table 6.2: M-Pass - Timings of Real-Time Operations
The signature generation consists in computing a signature σ = (R, S, T , W , K, c,
s) and the NFC communication time. The considered operations for generating the
signature are only one hash value and lightweight operations in Zp. The size of the
computed signature is 229 bytes (sent by 1 APDUs). Regarding the communication
between a SIM card and a reader, it is slow, but the whole process (Signature+NFC)
remains very fast, i.e., 184.24 ms on average.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a privacy-preserving mobile pass solution for transport
service that can be embedded into an NFC-enabled smartphone. This solution enables
users to use the transport service in an anonymous and unlinkable manner, preventing in
particular the risk of being tracked by the transport authority. However, in exceptional
circumstances (e.g., under the injunction of a judge), the identity of the user associated
to an anonymous validation can be de-anonymized and his rights to access the transport
network revoked. Thus, this solution is flexible enough to ensure the standard security
properties while providing a high level of privacy to users.
The cryptographic protocol behind our mobile pass solution is based on group signatures
that are used when authenticating with the entrance gates of the transport network.
When a user authenticates to the validator, he signs on a challenge on behalf of a group,
thus hiding his identity from the transport operator. The unlinkability of the different
actions of the user is obtained by changing regularly the challenge sent by the validator.
In the situation in which a malicious service operator deliberately refuses to renew the
challenge, we suggest to detect such an attack by collecting the received challenge using
an Android application for implementing the detection.
The functional requirements of a transport use case mainly consist of the validation
time constraint and the operating when the smartphone battery is flat. In this chapter,
we showed that the proposed protocol fulfill these functional requirements whilst using
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strong security parameters. This is by implementing a prototype using a standard NFC-
enabled SIM card and gathering the validation timing over more than 60 trials. The
m-pass validation can be completed in 205.27 ms when the mobile is switched on, and
in 596.81 ms when the mobile is switched off or its battery is flat.
In the next chapter, we address the privacy problem of the mobile ticketing use case.
Although this use case has similarities with the mobile pass use case, it presents more
granularity and hence, preserving the same privacy level requires a new cryptographic
solution.
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Dans ce chapitre, nous pre´sentons une partie des re´sultats [80] qui ont e´te´ publie´s dans
la revue “Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs)” de la confe´rence
PETS 2015. Nous concevons un protocole se´curise´ pour le cas d’usage billetterie mobile
(m-ticketing) sans contact (NFC) pour un service de transport public. Ce protocole re-
specte l’anonymat des utilisateurs et empeˆche les ope´rateurs de transport de tracer leurs
clients. A` cette fin, nous utilisons la nouvelle preuve d’appartenance a` un ensemble, in-
troduite dans le chapitre 4, et proposons e´galement plusieurs optimisations du sche´ma de
signature Boneh-Boyen, permettant l’ame´lioration de sa performance lors des transac-
tions sans contact (NFC). Notre protocole permet e´galement la re´vocation de l’anonymat
d’un utilisateur ou d’un billet. Cette option est uniquement possible pour les autorite´s de
re´vocation. Le protocole de m-ticketing offre aussi une plus grande flexibilite´ par rapport
aux solutions pre´ce´dentes car il permet le post-paiement et la validation hors ligne des
m-tickets. Nous avons formellement valide´ la se´curite´ de notre protocole dans le mode`le
de l’oracle ale´atoire. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que notre protocole remplit l’exigence
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fonctionnelle impose´e par les transporteurs: a` savoir la validation d’un m-ticket doit se
de´rouler en moins de 300 ms, tout en utilisant des parame`tres cryptographiques (taille
des cle´s) ade´quats. En effet, nous mettons en place un prototype utilisant une carte SIM
NFC. La validation d’un m-ticket peut eˆtre comple´te´e en 184.25 ms lorsque le mobile est
allume´, et en 266.52 ms lorsque le mobile est e´teint ou la batterie est vide.
7.1 Introduction
The second use case of the transport service is the mobile ticketing. Although this
use case has some similarities with the m-pass use case, it has more granularity which
applies new privacy issues. A user holds a book of maxticket m-tickets that enables him
to have maxticket trips. Every m-ticket is identified by an index k ∈ [1..maxticket] and
a serial number. In order to ensure a high privacy level, we must ensure the anonymity
of the m-tickets indexes in addition to the user’s anonymity and the unlinkability of the
m-tickets serial numbers. The reader can note that the index problem does not exist in
the mobile pass use case. Indeed, the m-pass use case can been seen as a simplification
of the m-ticketing use case, and hence, ensuring the same privacy level is simpler. In
Table 7.1, we summarize the major differences between both use cases.
M-pass M-ticketing
User’s privacy
1. Anonymity of the user
2. Unlinkability between the different m-
pass usages
1. Anonymity of the user
2. Unlinkability between the serial num-
bers of different m-tickets
3. Anonymity of a m-ticket index
Structure 1 m-pass N m-tickets
Trips ∞ 1 ticket per trip
Table 7.1: M-Pass vs M-Ticketing
In this chapter, we propose a new cryptographic protocol for the m-ticketing use case that
provides strong authentication, strict anonymity, and unlinkability properties, whilst
remaining efficient when implemented in constrained environments like SIM cards. To-
wards this goal, we use the new set-membership proof introduced in Chapter 4. The
new set-membership proof does not require provers nor verifiers (but in a specific sce-
nario for verifiers) to perform pairing computations, especially on the prover side. It is
therefore particularly suitable for our (ticketing) setting where provers hold SIM cards
that do not support such costly computations. We also propose several optimizations
of Boneh-Boyen signature schemes which are of independent interest and increase the
performance and efficiency of BB-signatures. Based on these cryptographic primitives,
our m-ticketing protocol enables to securely validate an m-ticket without disclosing any
personal information to the transport operator, even if the latter is malicious. We push
forward a strict privacy requirement when using one of the numbered m-tickets: for
example, if the user uses the m-ticket number 3 from the book of m-tickets [1..10], the
transport operator will only be able to check that the used m-ticket is one among the
ten m-tickets [1..10].
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This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we detail the framework of our
m-ticketing system. We describe our protocol and show how we ensure a secure post-
payment in Section 7.3. Then, we formalize our functional, security and privacy re-
quirements in Section 7.4 and formally demonstrate that our protocol ensures these
requirements in Section 7.5. Finally, we give details about the performance results of
our protocol in Section 7.6 and conclude in Section 7.7.
7.2 Framework of an M-Ticketing System
We recall that we consider three different entities in our m-ticketing system. The user
(U) is the owner of an NFC-enabled smartphone and wants to use the transport service.
The transport authority (TA) is the manager of the transport service. The revocation
authority (RA) can revoke m-tickets and users’ anonymity, and is completely indepen-
dent of the transport authority. This role may be split between several authorities in
such a way that they should all agree and cooperate before recovering the identity of an
m-ticket holder.
An m-ticketing system consists of six different phases in our protocol. (1) The m-
ticketing system parameters and keys are initialized during the initialization. (2) The
registration phase enables a user to register to the transport service. (3) In the permission
token request phase, a user gets a permission token allowing him to generate maxticket
m-tickets. (4) The validation phase consists in generating and validating an m-ticket.
(5) The revocation phase enables to retrieve the identity of a user who generated a given
m-ticket and the m-tickets obtained by a given user. Finally, (6) the reporting phase
enables a user to report his usage (i.e. the m-tickets that he did not use) to the transport
authority and the transport authority to detect any duplication of m-tickets (i.e., m-
tickets that have been validated several times). In the sequel, these phases are modeled
with various algorithms and protocols (Figure 7.1) executed by the above entities.
U
RA
TA
Register
TokenRequest
IdentUser
IdentTicket
UKeyGen
Keygen
GenTicket
ReportTicket ValidateTicket
IdentDuplicate
Figure 7.1: M-Ticketing Framework Overview
Initialization
Setup(1λ): This probabilistic algorithm outputs pp a description of the system param-
eters. We assume that pp are implicit to the other algorithms, and that they include
λ, the security parameter, and maxticket, the number of m-tickets that each book of
m-tickets contains. They are also an implicit input to the adversary, we will then omit
them.
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Keygen(pp): This probabilistic algorithm outputs the two following secret/public key
pairs: (rsk, rpk) for the revocation authority and (tsk, tpk) for the transport authority.
The system public key gpk is eventually set as (pp, tpk, rpk).
Registration
UKeygen(gpk, IDU ): This probabilistic algorithm outputs a secret/public key pair (usk,
upk) for a user identifier IDU .
Register( U(IDU , upk), TA(DBREG)): This is an interactive protocol between a new
user that takes as input his identity IDU and his public key upk, and the TA that takes
as input the database DBREG where the identifiers of the registered users will be stored.
If TA accepts the protocol, the user’s identity and public key are stored within DBREG.
Permission token request
TokenRequest( U(upk, gpk), TA(tsk, gpk,DBREG)): This is an interactive protocol be-
tween a user that takes as input (upk, gpk), and the TA that takes as input (tsk, gpk,
DBREG). If the user accepts the protocol, his output is a permission token τ that
will enable him to generate/validate a book of maxticket m-tickets. If TA accepts the
protocol, its output is a transcript view of the protocol.
Validation
GenTicket(gpk, τ): This probabilistic algorithm takes as input a user’s permission token
τ and outputs an m-ticket Tickk with a serial number Bk such that k ∈ [1..maxticket].
ValidateTicket(gpk, T ickk): This deterministic algorithm takes as input a ticket Tickk.
If Tickk is valid, it outputs 1 and Tickk is stored within the database DBUsedT ickets that
will be used to detect the m-tickets that have been used several times. Otherwise, it
outputs 0.
Revocation
IdentUser(rsk, DBREG, Tickk): This deterministic algorithm takes as input the private
key of the revocation authority, rsk, the registration database of TA, DBREG, and a
valid m-ticket Tickk. It outputs the identifier IDU of the registered user who obtained
Tickk. If IDU does not belong to DBREG, it outputs ⊥.
IdentTicket(rsk, view, IDU ): This deterministic algorithm takes as input the private
key rsk, a user’s identifier IDU and a transcript view of an execution of TokenRequest
with this user. It outputs all the m-tickets that can be generated from the token obtained
after the execution of the TokenRequest protocol that led to view.
Reporting
ReportTicket(τ): This algorithm is executed by a user with his permission token τ .
The user generates all the unused m-tickets and collects them in a usage report R. R is
then sent to the transport authority.
IdentDuplicate(Bk, DBUsedT ickets): This deterministic algorithm takes as input Bk the
serial number of a valid m-ticket Tickk and DBUsedT ickets, and outputs the number of
occurrences of Bk in DBUsedT ickets.
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7.3 Untraceable Mobile Ticketing System
At the beginning, as shown in Figure 7.2, the user registers at the transport service.
Then, he retrieves a permission token A from the transport authority. This token enables
the generation of maxticket m-tickets (an m-ticket book
1). The token A is a BB signature
on a secret s known only by the user. The secret s identifies a type of m-tickets book.
At the validation phase, the user authenticates the validator and sends an m-ticket Tickk:
(Bk, E,Π). Bk is a unique serial number of the m-ticket, E is an ElGamal encryption
of gs1, and Π is a ZKPK. Π proves that (1) the user has a valid BB signature on s
without revealing neither s nor the signature A, (2) E is an encryption of gs1 without
revealing s and (3) k belongs to [1..maxticket] without revealing k. (3) is based on the
new set-membership proof detailed in Chapter 4.
Finally, the user post-pays by regularly reporting unused m-tickets, i.e., by revealing
the unused m-ticket serial numbers Bk to the TA. This enables to detect any malicious
behaviour, i.e., validating more m-tickets than what were obtained, without breaking
the user’s privacy. Additional countermeasures allows to recover the user’s identity and
retrieve his m-tickets, with the agreement of the authorities.
SIM
Secret s
Generate {Bk}
of size maxticket
Transport Authority
Validator (IDV )
DBREG
DBUsedT ickets
Registration: (IDU , hU )
store
Permission Token: A
(A,C0, s2, c, µ)
store
Reporting unused Bk check
Verification of Π
ch
T ickk:
(Bk, E,Π)
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(Bk
, E
,Π
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, D
T )
Ticket
Validation
RSA Signature of
TS: timestamp
RCV : challenge
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Challenge RCV
Auth.
Authorities
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revocation
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Search
user tickets
C0 s1
Search
Bk
Figure 7.2: The M-Ticketing Protocol Overview
1We assume that m-tickets have a unique rate per area such as in Paris [107], Berlin [108] and
Moscow [109] undergrounds. The user can have different types of m-tickets books such that every book
is characterized by a rate, an area and the number of available m-tickets (maxticket), e.g., a book of 10
m-tickets valid in area 1 and the price of one m-ticket is 1.30e.
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7.3.1 M-ticketing Protocol
Our protocol is divided in four phases: system initialization, user registration, permission
token request and validation. The later includes the validator authentication and the
m-ticket validation.
System Initialization In the sequel, we consider, except when it is explicitly men-
tioned, bilinear maps e : G1×G2 → GT where all groups G1, G2 and GT are multiplica-
tive and of prime order p. Let g, g0, g1, gt, gT , gU , h, G, H be nine generators of G1
and g2, g3 two generators of G2. The user’s SIM card will perform computations only in
G1 (note that current SIM cards are not designed to handle pairing computations nor
computations in G2 or GT .).
The revocation authorities set two pairs of keys: a private and public keys of the thresh-
old ElGamal cryptosystem (pkRG, skRG) and a private and public keys of the threshold
Paillier cryptosystem (pkRP , skRP ).
We assume that the private keys are shared among the revocation authorities (e.g.,
using the technique proposed in [110] for El Gamal and the technique proposed in [73]
for Paillier). In order to decrypt a ciphertext, a minimal number t (the threshold) of
these authorities should cooperate.
The public key, pkRG, consists of the elements (gT , hT = g
xT
T ), where gT is a random
generator of G1, and the corresponding private key, skRG, is formed by xT ∈ Z∗p. Let a
and b be random primes for which a, b > 2, a 6= b, |a| = |b| and gcd(ab, (a−1)(b−1)) = 1;
let n = ab, Π = lcm(a − 1, b − 1), K = Π−1 mod n, and gP = (1 + n); then the public
key, pkRP , is (n, gP ) and the secret key, skRP , is (a, b).
The transport authority (TA) sets for each group, i.e., a type of m-tickets book, a key
pair of the BB signature scheme. The private key is a random element γ ∈ Z∗p and the
corresponding public key is W ′ = gγ0 and W = g
γ
2 . The transport authority sets another
key pair of the BB signature scheme which will be used for the set-membership proof.
The private key is a random element y ∈ Z∗p and the corresponding public key is Y = gy3 .
The user owns a public/private key pair (xU ∈ Z∗p, hU = gxUU ). During the permission
token request, the user obtains from TA a token A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r). The value s is jointly
chosen by TA and the user (but only known by the user) whereas r is known by both
entities.
User Registration We denote by IDU a user’s identity and DBREG the database
where the TA saves the identities of registered users. First, the user sends his public key
hU and his identity IDU to TA. Then, he signs, using Schnorr signature scheme [111],
a random challenge rc received from TA, using his private key xU . If the signature is
valid, TA saves the tuple (IDU , hU ) in DBREG. Then, the user securely introduces his
banking credentials in order to be subsequently charged.
Permission Token Request The permission token request phase is detailed in
Figure 7.3. A permission token (A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r), r) consists of an (extended) BB-
signature [77] on s (the secret member group key only known by the user, whereas r is
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known by the user and TA). Thanks to his permission token, the user will be able to
use maxticket m-tickets. The value of maxticket is set by TA and linked to the key pair
(γ,W = gγ2 ) used by TA during the permission token request protocol. TA will use a
different pair of keys for each possible value of maxticket, i.e., for each group associated
to each type of m-tickets book.
At the end of this phase, TA saves in DBREG the view (A,C0, s2, c, µ) where C0 is the
Paillier encryption of s1 such that the secret s = s1 + s2 and (c, µ) are the commitment
and signature by the user of his secret s.
User Transport Authority
Public input: The public parameters Public Input: The public parameters
Private Input: xU Private Input: γ,DBREG
Choose s1 ∈ Z∗p, j ∈]0, n[
Compute:
Com = gs11 ;
C0 = g
s1
P j
n mod n2
Π1 = POK(s1, j : Com = g
s1
1 ∧ C0 =
gs1P j
n mod n2)
Com,Π1,C−−−−−−−−−−− Verify Π1
Choose s2 ∈ Z∗p
Let s = s1 + s2 mod p,
then Com × gs21 = gs11 gs21 = gs1+s21 =
gs1 = c
Choose r ∈ Z∗p
Compute:
A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r)
Verify Π2
A,r,g
s2
1 ,Π2−−−−−−−−−−− Π2 = POK(γ : W
′ = gγ0 ∧Aγ = c×hA−r)
Compute:
c = gs11 g
s2
1 = g
s1+s2
1 = g
s
1;
µ = Sign(xU , A, g
s1
1 , g
s2
1 )
µ−−−−−−−−−−− Verify µ
Compute: s = s1 + s2
s2−−−−−−−−−−− Save (A,C0, s2, c, µ) associated to
(IDU , hU ) in DBREG
Figure 7.3: The Protocol of a Permission Token Request
Validation In this phase, the validator is authenticated, the permission token is
verified and finally the m-ticket is validated.
Validator Authentication
The validator authentication consists of a challenge / response protocol. The user sends
a Random Challenge RCV to the validator gate. Upon receiving RCV , the validator
replies with the RSA signature on a timestamp (TS) and the received challenge (we use
a short public verification exponent v in order to have a fast verification in the SIM
card).
Then, the m-ticketing cardlet checks the received signature. If it succeeds, the m-
ticketing cardlet checks the validity of the permission token based on the timestamp
(TS) sent by the validator. Indeed, if TS is lower than D (TS < D), the permission
token is still valid. Then, the cardlet checks whether the number of used m-tickets
reached maxticket, the number of authorized post-paid m-tickets. If a check fails, the
m-ticketing cardlet aborts and the m-ticketing application displays a message to ask the
user to renew the permission token.
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M-ticket Validation
An m-ticket Tickk (indexed k) is characterized by a serial number Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t along
with an ElGamal encryption E = (C1 = g
a
T , C2 = g
s
1 × haT ) of gs1. To prove the validity
of a m-ticket, the user must prove that:
• k belongs to Φ = [1..maxticket] using our new set-membership proof (described in
Chapter 4),
• He knows a valid BB signature A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r) on s (without revealing s and the
signature),
• E is an encryption of gs1.
Therefore a m-ticket Tickk is represented by (Bk, E,Π) where Π = POK(k, a, s, r, A :
Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t ∧A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r) ∧ C1 = gaT ∧ C2 = gs1 × haT ∧ k ∈ [1..maxticket]).
Remark 2 (BB optimizations): Proving the knowledge of a valid BB-signature
A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r) on a value s, without revealing s or the signature and without using
pairings on the prover’s side can be done as follows:
The prover first randomizes A by choosing a random value α ∈ Z∗p and computes B0 =
Aα. Since A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r) this implies that B0 = A
α = (gαs1 h
α)1/(γ+r) and then that:
Bγ+r0 = g
αs
1 h
α (7.1)
Let us note by B′ = B−10 and C = B
γ
0 . From (7.1), we have:
C = gαs1 × hα ×B′r (7.2)
As a result, in order to prove that he knows a BB-signature A on the value s, without
revealing s nor the corresponding signature, the prover just has to send B0 and C (that
he can compute using (7.2)) to the verifier and prove that he knows the representation
of C with respect to (g1, h, B
′): ΠBB = POK(α, s, r :C = gαs1 × hα × B′r). The proof
consists in B0, C and ΠBB (and no pairing computations are needed on the prover’s
side to compute ΠBB). The verifier will have to check that B0 6= 1G1 , that C = Bγ0 (via
pairing computations or by using the key γ if it owns this key) and that ΠBB is valid.
If all the verifications hold, the verifier will be convinced that the prover knows a valid
BB-signature.
As described in Figure 7.4, the validator verifies the proof Π, saves the date and time
of the operation DT , the serial number of the validated m-ticket Bk, the El Gamal
encryption E (of gs1) and the proof Π. These verifications can be done in two ways. In the
first case, the validator holds the private keys γ (the private key of TA) and y (the private
key used during the set-membership2). Hence, he can perform the verification of Π
without executing any pairing computations. In such a case, the protocol is run without
any pairing computations either on the user side (SIM card) or on the validator side. In
the second case, the validator does not hold the private keys γ and y. Therefore, in order
to perform the verification of Π, the validator would execute pairing computations. We
still achieve our goal, i.e., no pairing computations at the user side (SIM card).
2This situation does not question the security of our protocol because the validator belongs to the transport
authority trusted area.
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M-ticketing cardlet Validator
Public input: The public parameters and
the public keys of the revocation and trans-
port authorities hT ,W, Y
Public Input: The public
The sets Φ = [1..maxticket] and
∑
= {A1, A2, ..., Amaxticket}
where Ai = g
1/(y+i) for i ∈ Φ The sets Φ and ∑
Private Input: A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r), k(The
index of the ticket that will be used), s
Private Input: The private signature
keys γ and y (in some scenario)
D day: validity end date of the permission token
Pre-computations:
Compute Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t
Choose a ∈ Z∗p and Compute: C1 = gaT , C2 = gs1 × haT
Computation of elements involved in the proof that the user knows a valid signature on s
Choose α ∈ Z∗p and Compute (see remark 2): B0 = Aα; B′ = B−10 ; C = gαs1 × hα ×B′r
Choose r2, r3, r4, a1, d1, b1, α1, t, t1, t3, t4, t5, ν, d′, f ′ ∈ Z∗p
Compute: T ′ = GsHr2 ; β = αs; T ′′ = T ′αHr3 ; r5 = r3 + αr2(mod p); Com = gk1h
ν
T
Pick the valid BB signature corresponding to the element k: Ak = g
1/(y+k)
Choose l ∈ Z∗p and Compute: B = Alk; B1 = B−1; D = Bk1 gl
Choose k1, l1, r1 ∈ Z∗p and Compute: Com1 = gk11 hr1T ; D1 = Bk11 gl1
δ = s+ k; f = a+ ν; K = gtB
−1
k = B
s+k
k = B
δ
k; L = C2Com = g
s+k
1 h
a+ν
T = g
δ
1h
f
T
Computation of the witnesses
Compute: C′1 = g
a1
T ; C
′
2 = g
d1
1 × ha1T ; R′ = Gd1Ht1 ; R′′ = T ′α1Ht3 ;
C′ = gb11 h
α1B′t; T ′4 = G
b1Ht5 ; K′ = Bd
′
k ; L
′ = gd
′
1 × hf
′
T
Real time computations
Validator authentication
Choose RCV ∈ Z∗p and Check that the
number of used m-tickets < maxticket
RCV−−−−−−−−−− TS = getTimeStamp() and Compute:
SignatureRSA, the RSA signature on
RCV
Verify SignatureRSA and Check that TS < D
SignatureRSA−−−−−−−−−−− and TS
m-ticket Validation
Compute: c= H(C, C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′,
Com, B, D, K, C′1, C
′
2, R
′, R′′, C′, T ′4,
Com1, D1, K′, L′, ch)
ch−−−−−−−−−− Choose ch ∈ Z∗p
s1 = k1 + c× k mod p; s2 = r1 + c× ν mod p Check that B 6= 1G1
s3 = l1 + c× l mod p; ω1 = a1 + c× a mod p • If The validator holds the private signa-
ture keys y and γ (First case), the prover
does not send the value D and C. The ver-
ifier can compute it: D = By , C = Bγ0 .
Then goes to (*)
ω2 = d1 + c× s mod p; ω3 = t1 + c× r2 mod p
ω4 = b1 + c× β mod p; ω5 = α1 + c× α mod p
ω6 = t+ c× r mod p; ω8 = t3 + c× r3 mod p
ω10 = t5 + c× r5 mod p; ω11 = d′ + c× δ mod p
ω12 = f ′ + c× f mod p • Otherwise, if the validator doesn’t know
the private signature key y and γ (Second
case), then, check that e(D, g3) = e(B, Y );
e(C, g2) = e(B0,W ) and goes to (*)
Let E = (C1, C2) and the proof
Π = (C, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com, c, B, D, s1,
s2, s3, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω8, ω9, ω10,
ω11, ω12)
Bk, E,Π
(*) Compute: C˜=gs11 h
s2
T Com
−c;
D˜=Bs11 g
s3 D−c; C˜1=gω1T C
−c
1 ; C˜2=g
ω2
1
hω1T C
−c
2 ; R˜
′=Gω2 Hω3 T ′−c; C˜′=gω41 h
ω5
B′ω6 C−c; R˜′′=T ′ω5 Hω8 T ′′−c; T˜4=Gω4
Hω10 T ′′−c; K˜′=Bω11k K
−c; L˜′=gω111
hω12T L
−c
Check c=H(C, C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com,
B, D, K, C˜1, C˜2, R˜′, R˜′′, C˜′, T˜ ′4, C˜, D˜,
K˜′, L˜′, ch)
Send (Bk, E,Π, IDV , DT ) to TA in order
to be saved within the secured database
DBUsedTickets; IDV is the identity of the
validator and DT is the date and time of
the transaction.
Figure 7.4: The validation Protocol
Chapter 7. A Practical and Privacy-Preserving Ticketing Service 92
We emphasize that owing to our improvements on Boneh-Boyen based Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature scheme, all the computations (required to validate an m-ticket)
are performed by the SIM card. We do not need to outsource part of the computations
to the powerful but untrusted mobile phone. Consequently, the user’s privacy is ensured
with respect to the smartphone itself. Even a compromised mobile, e.g., containing a
spyware, cannot collect any information about our m-ticketing application computations.
At the end of a successful m-ticket validation, the validator sends (Bk, E,Π) to TA in
order to be saved within a centralized and secured database DBUsedT ickets jointly with
his identity IDV and the date and time of the transaction DT . In such a way, the TA
will detect any malicious behaviour such that a multiple usage or cloning (cf. Paragraph
“Countermeasures”).
Theorem 6. The protocol in Figure 7.4 is a ZKPK of a permission token (A, r, s) and
a value k such that Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t , k ∈ [1..maxticket] and E = (C1, C2) is an El Gamal
encryption of gs1.
Proof 6 (Sketch proof). As mentioned in Chapter 3, a zero knowledge proof of
knowledge must be complete, sound and zero-knowledge.
The completeness follows by inspection.
Soundness: roughly speaking, the whole proof Π can be divided in three sub-proofs Π1,
Π2 and Π3, where:
Π1 = POK(α, s, r, r2, r3, r5, a : C = g
αs
1 × hα × B′r ∧ T ′ = GsHr2 ∧ T ′′ = T ′αHr3 =
GαsHr5 ∧ C1 = gaT ∧ C2 = gs1 × haT )
Π2 = POK(k, ν, s, r2 : Com = g
k
1h
ν
T ∧ T ′ = GsHr2 ∧K = gtB−1k = Bs+kk )
Π3 = POK(k, ν, l : Com = g
k
1h
ν
T ∧D = Bk1gl)
If the verifier accepts the proof Π this means that: D = By (1) and C = Bγ0 (2).
Note that the proofs Π1, Π2 and Π3 are classical variants of Schnorr’s proof of knowledge.
Using the ”extractors” of these proofs of knowledge, we can retrieve k, α, s, r, l.
From (1) we have: D = By = Bk1g
l. This implies that ByBk = gl. Let us denote by
Ak = B
1/l. (Note that l 6= 0, otherwise this would imply that the prover knows the
secret value y). We therefore have Ay+kk = g and therefore that Ak = g
1/(y+k). So the
prover knows a valid BB signature on the value k. This implies that k ∈ [1..maxticket].
From (2) we have that C = Bγ0 = g
αs
1 × hα × B′r. This implies that Bγ+r0 = gαs1 × hα.
Let us denote by A = B
1/α
0 , this implies that A
γ+r = gs1×h (Note that α 6= 0, otherwise
this would imply that the prover knows the secret value γ). So A = (gs1h)
1/(γ+r). The
prover therefore knows a valid permission token (A, r, s).
In conclusion, the prover knows a permission token (A, r, s) and a value k such that
Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t , k ∈ [1..maxticket] and E = (C1, C2) is an El Gamal encryption of gs1.
(Honest-verifier) Zero-Knowledge: since Π1, Π2 and Π3 are classical ZKPK, we can
easily construct simulators Sim1, Sim2 and Sim3 (respectively) for such proofs. From
these simulators, it is straightforward to construct a simulator Sim that will simulate
all interactions with any (honest) verifier V ∗. Since G1 is a prime order group, then the
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blinding would be perfect and the output of Sim and V ∗’s view of the protocol would
be statistically indistinguishable.
Revocation We distinguish two levels of revocation: the user’s anonymity revocation
and the m-tickets revocation. In the first case, the transport authority would like to get
the user’s identity corresponding to a given m-ticket. In the second case, the transport
authority would like to revoke all the m-tickets of a given user, e.g., upon the request of
the user further to the theft of his smartphone.
In order to recover a user’s identity based on a used m-ticket Tickk = (Bk, E,Π), TA
sends E to the revocation authorities. Together, the revocation authorities decipher E
and retrieve the commitment of s (gs1). By using DBREG the database of registered
users and gs1, TA will find the user’s identity in the tuples (A,C0, s2, c, µ, IDU , hU ).
In order to retrieve the m-tickets of a user based on his identity IDU ′ , first of all, TA must
find the tuple (A,C0, s2, c, µ, IDU , hU ) from DBREG such that IDU = IDU ′ . Then, TA
sends C0 (The Paillier encryption of s1) to the revocation authorities. Similarly to the
first case, the revocation authorities decipher together C and retrieve s1. Upon receiving
s1, TA computes s = s1 + s2, hence, it can retrieve all the m-tickets (Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t )
of the user.
7.3.2 A Secure Post-Payment Process
One novelty of our m-ticketing protocol, in addition to the respect of users’ privacy, is
to give the ability to charge a user after the usage of m-tickets.
Regular Reporting In a post-payment approach, the m-ticketing application must
report unused m-tickets to the back-end server, before the pre-defined D day. Thus,
the regular reports does not question the privacy of the user. The following example
gives further clarification. Suppose that the user retrieved a permission token of 5
m-tickets. Before D day, he used 4 m-tickets, i.e., m-tickets number 1, 2, 3 and 4.
On D day, the m-ticketing application will report to the back-end server the m-ticket
number 5 using a network connection. The report contains B5 = g
1/s+5+1
t and the proof
Π = POK(k, s, r, A : B5 = g
1/(s+5+1)
t ∧A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r) ∧ 5 ∈ [1..5]).
Regularly revealing the unused m-tickets enables the transport authority to (1) charge
the user, (2) check the reliability and accuracy of the reports without questioning the
user’s privacy. Indeed, the unlinkability of user’s m-tickets (Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t , E,Π), both
during the use of the service and during the reporting phase, is ensured owing to the
q-DDHI and DDH assumptions (cf. unlinkabililty proof in Section 7.5).
Countermeasures A malicious user’s goal simply consists on not paying or paying
less than what he is supposed to. To do so, he may try to block the reporting or attack
the cardlet of the SIM.
If the user blocks network communications in order to block reporting, the SIM cardlet
will refuse to issue m-tickets for a permission token after reaching the limit of maxticket,
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or the limit of the time window controlled by D. This countermeasure C relies on the
security of the SIM card.
If the user performs a successful physical attack against the SIM card, which is extremely
difficult [24], he may try to (1) defeat the countermeasures C and never do reports, or
(2) use the same m-ticket several times or (3) report a used m-ticket. In the first case,
the TA will notice that the user did not respect the D day limitation (reporting his
usage before the D day). In the other cases, this will be detected in DBUsedT ickets
(two m-tickets with the same serial number). TA can, then, decide to break the user’s
anonymity and retrieve all his m-tickets usage history.
Thus, the user is forced to report his consumption and renew his permission token lest
the service is unusable or TA breaks his anonymity.
Note that forging an m-ticket is not possible, even with a compromised SIM because of
the unforgeability property.
7.4 Requirements
Similarly to the m-pass system, we consider three types of requirements: functional
requirements which are “efficiency” and “versality”, security requirements which consist
in “correctness”, “unforgeability” and “Non-frameability”, and privacy requirements
which comprises “unlinkability”.
Obviously, the two transport system use cases, namely m-pass and m-ticketing, share
the same requirements. However, as shown in what follows, these requirements are
differently interpreted.
7.4.1 Functional Requirements
Efficiency Similarly to the m-pass system, a m-ticketing system must fulfil functional
requirements imposed by transport operators [7], in particular the validation of an m-
ticket must be performed in less than 300ms. We must consider that a SIM card has
limited computation capabilities. In particular, pairing APIs are not available on current
SIM cards.
Versatility The mobile phone and the validator cannot be assumed to be connected
to a back-end server during the validation phase. This enables the user to use an m-ticket
in any kind of situation, especially in areas with low connectivity, e.g., underground, or
if the battery of his mobile is flat. Moreover, the m-ticketing system must support
both pre-payment and post-payment modes, i.e., an m-ticket can be prepaid or charged
later (after its use and before a given date that we denote later by D day). In the
post-payment mode, the transport authority must learn the total number of m-tickets
used by each customer in order to charge them. This is not an easy task especially for
anonymous and unlinkable m-tickets.
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7.4.2 Security and Privacy Model
Besides the correctness property, we formally define three security and privacy properties
of our m-ticketing protocol in which the attack capabilities of a probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A are modeled by providing him access to some oracles. In the sequel,
HU will denote the set of honest users and MU the set of corrupted users. We assume
that A receives all the exchanged messages in our system. A acts as an active adversary
as regards to the messages issued by malicious users and as a passive adversary with
respect to honest users.
ORegisterHU is an oracle that will be used by an adversary in order to register honest
users. By calling this oracle with IDU as argument, the adversary adds a new user. The
oracle runs (upk, usk)← UKeygen(gpk, IDU ) and adds IDU (along with upk) to the set
HU . The private key usk is kept secret and public key upk is returned to the adversary.
ORegisterMU is an oracle that will be used by an adversary in order to register malicious
users. The adversary calls this oracle with argument the identifier IDU of a user and
sets his public key to upk and his private key to usk. The identity IDU (along with
upk) is added to the set MU .
OCorruptUser is a user secret key oracle enabling the adversary to obtain the private
key usk of a user IDU ∈ HU . The oracle transfers IDU to MU and returns usk.
OTokenRequestU is an oracle that runs the user’s side in the TokenRequest protocol.
This oracle will be used by an adversary playing the role of a malicious TA. The adversary
gives to the oracle an identity IDU of an honest user and his public key upk. If the user
accepts the protocol, the adversary is given a transcript view of the protocol.
OTokenRequestT is an oracle that runs the transport authority side in the TokenRequest
protocol. This oracle will be used to simulate the execution of the protocol between a
user (corrupted or not) and an honest TA.
OGenTicket(IDU , view) is an oracle that takes as input the identifier IDU of an honest
user and a transcript view of an execution of the TokenRequest protocol with this user
and outputs an m-ticket Tickk using a fresh index k that has not been used in a previous
query of OGenTicket on IDU and view. The oracle records (IDU , Tickk) in a list Set.
OIdentT icketT (IDU , view) is an oracle that takes as input the identifier of a user IDU
and a transcript view of an execution of TokenRequest with this user and outputs all
the m-tickets that this user is able to generate.
OIdentUserT (Tickk) is an oracle that returns the identifier IDU of the user who gen-
erated an m-ticket Tickk.
OReportT icket(IDU , view) is an oracle that takes as input the identifier IDU of an
honest user and a transcript view of a TokenRequest execution with this user and
outputs the set of unused m-tickets. For each unused m-ticket Tickk, the oracle records
(IDU , Tickk) in Set.
Correctness Informally speaking, our protocol is correct if (1) a valid permission
token enables to generate valid m-tickets, (2) honestly generated m-tickets are accepted,
(3) a validated m-ticket enables revocation authorities to identify the user who generated
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it and (4) revocation authorities can retrieve all the m-tickets generated by a given
registered user that obtained a valid permission token.
Unforgeability Informally speaking, it should be impossible for anyone (1) to vali-
date more m-tickets than what he obtained i.e. an adversary who retrieved N tokens τ
(N books of maxticket m-tickets) should not be able to generate more that N ∗maxticket
m-tickets; (2) to validate m-tickets such that the algorithm IdentUser returns ⊥, i.e., an
identifier IDU that doesn’t appear in DBREG. We formally define the unforgeability ex-
periment ExpunforgA (1
λ) in Figure 7.5. The scheme is unforgeable if for any probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A, the probability Pr[ExpunforgA (1λ) = 1] is negligible.
ExpunforgA (1
λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅
2. (gpk, tsk, rsk)← Keygen(pp)
3. ({T ickjkj }
j=l
j=1, {Ri}i=fi=1 ) ← A(gpk: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OTokenRequestT , OGenTicket, OReport T icket). An Ri corresponds to a “usage report”,
i.e., a set on unused m-tickets.
4. Let DB be an empty database.
5. For j from 1 to l do {If ValidateTicket(gpk, T ickjkj ) then store T ick
j
kj
in DB}.
6. For i from 1 to f do {Validate the m-tickets of the report Ri and store valid unused m-tickets in DB}
7. For all T ickk in DB do {b = IdentDuplicate(Bk, DB) where Bk is the serial number of the m-ticket
T ickk
If b¿1, then delete all the duplicates of the m-ticket T ickk.
If IdentUser(rsk,DBREG, T ickk) outputs ⊥ then return 1 and aborts. }
8. If L the number of m-tickets that remained within DB is greater that N ∗ maxticket (L > N ∗
maxticket) where N is the number of calls of the oracle OTokenRequestT and maxticket is the
number of authorized m-tickets by token, then return 1 else return 0
Figure 7.5: Unforgeability Security Experiment
Non-Frameability Informally speaking, it should be impossible for anyone to falsely
accuse an honest user of having spent an m-ticket. We formally define the non-frameability
experiment ExpNfraA (1
λ) in Figure 7.6. The scheme is non-frameable, if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time adversary A, the probability
Pr[ExpNfraA (1
λ)=1] is negligible.
ExpNfraA (1
λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅; Set← ∅
2. (gpk, tsk, rsk)← Keygen(pp)
3. (T ickk)← A(gpk, tsk, rsk, DBREG, DBUsedTickets: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OTokenRequestU , OGen Ticket, OReportT icket)
4. If ValidateTicket(gpk, T ickk) = 0 or IdentUser(rsk, DBREG, T ickk) =⊥ then return 0
5. If IdentUser(rsk,DBREG, T ickk) = IDU ∈ HU and (IDU , T ickk) /∈ Set then return 1 else return 0.
Figure 7.6: Non-frameability Security Experiment
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Unlinkability Informally speaking, it should be impossible, except for the revocation
authorities, to trace the m-tickets obtained by a user, in particular: (1) to link m-tickets
obtained during the permission token request phase to the validated/used ones; (2) to
link two m-tickets validated by the same user or to decide whether two validated m-
tickets have the same number/index or not; (3) to link validated m-tickets to non-used
m-tickets reported by the user to the transport authority. For this, an adversary has full
control over the transport authority (in particular it owns the private key tsk) and all
the users except two honest users i0 and i1. The adversary can initiate the IdentUser
protocol over any m-ticket and can get the user’s identity behind it, except for the m-
tickets generated by i0 and i1. He can also initiate the IdentTicket protocol for all
the users except for i0 and i1. We define the unlinkability experiment Exp
unlink
A (1λ) in
Figure 7.7. The scheme is unlinkable if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary
A, the advantage Advunlink−bA (1λ) = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) = b]− 1/2| is negligible.
Expunlink−bA (1
λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅
2. (gpk, tsk, rsk)← Keygen(pp)
3. (i0, k0, i1, k1) ← A(gpk, tsk, DBREG, DBUsedTickets: ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU ,
OCorruptUser, OTokenRequestU OGenTicket OIdentT icketT OIdentUserT OReport T icket)
4. If i0 or i1 ∈MU then output ⊥.
5. (a) let i0 and i1 run the protocol TokenRequest and get the permission tokens τ0 and τ1 and output
view0 and view1.
(b) T ickkb ← GenTicket(gpk, τ0) and Tickk1−b ← GenTicket(gpk, τ1), with b ∈ {0, 1}
6. b′ ← A (gpk, tsk, DBREG, DBUsedTickets, T ickkj , T ickk1−j : ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU ,
OCorruptUser, OToken RequestT OGenTicket OIdentT icketT OIdentUserT OReport T icket),
with j ∈ {0, 1}
7. If OCorruptUser was requested on i0 or i1, or OIdentT icketT was requested on (i0, view0) or (i1,
view1) then output ⊥.
8. If OIdent UserT was requested for T ickkj or T ickk1−j , output ⊥.
9. If OReportT icket was requested for i0 or i1 and i0 and i1 did not validate the same number of
m-tickets then output ⊥.
10. Return b′
Figure 7.7: Unlinkability Security Experiment
7.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that our m-ticketing protocol provides the security and privacy
properties defined in Section 7.4.
Lemma 1. If the q-SDH assumption holds in G1 then the q-SDH-I assumption holds
in G1.
Proof. See for example [112] for a proof of this Lemma.
Remark: The triplet (r′, s′, A′) corresponds to a permission token of our m-ticketing
protocol. In the sequel, we will call the oracle O a BB-signature oracle and the value s′
the permission token secret (or token secret for short).
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Forking Lemma. We use the Forking Lemma [101] in our proofs, to prove that an
adversary A is not able to produce a new valid m-ticket Tickk (respectively a Schnorr’s
signature µ, see Figure 7.3) unless he knows all the underlying secrets (a, s, r, A, k)
(respectively the secret xU ).
Using the notation of [101], if an adversary is able to produce a valid ticket Tickk
(k, σ1, h, σ2) where
σ1=(C, C1, C2, B0, T
′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C ′1, C
′
2, R
′, R′′, C ′, T ′4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′,
ch),
h=H(C, C1, C2, B0, T
′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C ′1, C
′
2, R
′, R′′, C ′, T ′4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′,
ch) and
σ2=(s1, s2, s3, ω1, ω2,..., ω12)
then it can produce two valid m-tickets (k, σ1, h, σ2) and (k, σ1, h
′, σ′2) such that h 6= h′.
Theorem 7 (Unforgeability). Our m-ticketing protocol satisfies the unforgeability
requirement, in the random oracle model, under the q-SDH assumption. The proof is
detailed below.
Proof 7 (sketch of proof). Let A be an adversary who breaks the unforgeability re-
quirement of our m-ticketing protocol with non-negligible probability. We will construct
an algorithm B, using A as an oracle, which breaks the q-SDH-I assumption. B receives
on input from its challenger (G1, g0, g1, gU h, W ′ = gγ0 ) the public parameters of the
q-SDH-I challenge and has access to a BB-signature oracle. The other generators of the
m-ticketing system are randomly chosen.
B also chooses the keys for the Paillier encryption scheme. It sends W ′ and the public key
of the Paillier scheme to A. The private and public keys of the El Gamal cryptosystem
can be chosen either by A or B. B is therefore able to construct the public parameters
pp for A and can answer to its requests as follow:
• ORegisterHU requests: B randomly chooses xU ∈ Zp and computes hU = gxUU .
• ORegisterMU requests: B does not need to do anything.
• OCorruptUser requests: B gives xU to A.
• OTokenRequestT requests: B plays as follows: B first receives a Paillier encryp-
tion C0. It decrypts it (recall that B chose the private key for the Paillier en-
cryption scheme) and retrieve the corresponding plaintext s1. It then queries the
BB-signature oracle on s where s = s1 + s2 and s2 is randomly chosen by B.
The BB-signature oracle sends back a pair (r,A = (gs1h)
(1/(y+r) with r ∈ Zp ,
and B transmits it to A along with the value s2. So B perfectly simulates the
OTokenRequestT for A.
• OGenTicket(IDU , view) requests: since B knows the values of all the tokens
(A, r, s) that have been issued during OTokenRequestT requests, it can easily
answer to OGenTicket queries. The simulation of this oracle is perfect.
• OReportT icket(IDU , view) requests: B proceeds as in an OGenTicket request for
each unused m-ticket.
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We differentiate two types of adversaries:
• Type-1 Forger: an adversary that outputs a valid m-ticket Tickk which cannot
be linked to a registered user (corrupted or not).
• Type-2 Forger: an adversary that outputs more valid m-tickets than he obtained.
We show that both Forgers can be used to solve the q-SDH-I problem. However, the
reduction works differently for each Forger type. Therefore, initially B chooses a random
bit cmode ∈ 1, 2 that indicates its guess for the type of forgery that B will output.
If cmode = 1
Eventually, B outputs, with non-negligible probability, a valid m-ticket Tickk′ = (Bk′ ,
E′, Π′) such that the algorithm IdentUser, on the input Tickk′ , returns an unknown
identifier ID (i.e., does not appear in DBREG).
First case : c = gs
′
1 (the plaintext encrypted in E
′) has been queried during an
OTokenRequestT request but no corresponding signature µ has been produced. This
means that the adversary didn’t receive the value s2 (where s
′ = s′1 + s2) from the
OTokenRequestT oracle. We know from the Forking Lemma and the proofs Π and Π1
that A necessarily knows s′ and s2. Since only gs21 has been revealed by this oracle dur-
ing the OTokenRequestT , A could be used to extract Discrete Logarithms. Therefore
under the DL assumption, this first case could only occur with negligible probability.
Second case : E′ is an encryption of a commitment c = gs′1 of a value s′ that has not been
queried during a OTokenRequestT request. Therefore s′ has not been queried to the
BB-signature oracle either. Using the Forking Lemma and the soundness property of the
proof Π1, B is able to extract with non-negligible probability the secrets (a′, s′, r′, A′, k′)
underlying the m-ticket Tickk′ . B outputs the triplet (r′, s′, A′) to its challenger of the
q-SDH-I assumption and therefore breaks it.
If cmode = 2
Eventually, A outputs, with non-negligible probability ξ, L = N ×maxticket + 1 valid
m-tickets 3 {Tickjkj}
j=L
j=1 , where N is the number of calls to the OTokenRequestT oracle,
maxticket is the number of authorized m-tickets by token and Tick
j
kj
= (Bkj , E,Π). Let
us denote by (s1, s2,..., sN ) the N token secrets submitted to the BB-signature oracle.
W.l.o.g, we may assume that all these values are different (recall that a token secret s
is jointly computed by A and B). We therefore have N ×maxticket distinct token pairs
(si, k) with i ∈ {1, ..., N} and k ∈ {1, ...,maxticket}. Let Γ be the set containing all these
token pairs and Tickij the m-ticket corresponding to the token pair (si, j).
Among the L m-tickets output by A, there is at least one m-ticket Tickk∗ for which the
corresponding token pair (s∗, k∗) does not belong to Γ. Otherwise this would mean
that two m-tickets among these L m-tickets, e.g., Tickk1 and Tickk2 , have the same
token pair (since L > N×maxticket. Let us denote by (s∗1, k1) (respectively (s∗2, k2)) the
token pair corresponding to Tickk1 (respectively Tickk2). Therefore the serial number
B∗k1 of Tickk1 would be equal to B
∗
k2
the one of Tickk2 : B
∗
k1
= g
1/(s∗1+k1+1
t = g
1/(s∗2+k2+1
t
3Without loss of generality, we do not make any distinction between a m-ticket and an unused m-ticket.
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= B∗k2 . This case cannot occur since all duplicates (i.e. m-tickets which have the same
serial numbers) are discarded in the experiment ExpunforgA (1
λ).
Suppose now that s∗ ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sN}. Since (s∗, k∗) /∈ Γ this implies that k∗ /∈
{1, ...,maxticket}. Such a case will happen with negligible probability under the q-SDH
assumption (see Theorem 2). Therefore s∗ /∈ {s1, s2, ..., sN} and consequently has not
been queried to the BB-signature oracle (A is in fact a Type-1 Forger). B then picks
a random m-ticket Tickk′ among the L m-tickets output by A. With probability 1/L,
it has chosen Tickk∗. Using the Forking Lemma and the soundness property of the
proof Π, B is able to extract with non-negligible probability the secrets (a′, s′, r′, A′, k′)
underlying the m-ticket Tickk′ . B outputs the triplet (r′, s′, A′) and therefore breaks the
q-SDH-I assumption with non-negligible probability ξ/L.
To complete the proof, we need to clarify why we discard duplicates in ExpunforgA (1
λ).
We consider that Tickk = (Bk, E,Π) and Tickk′ = (Bk′ , E
′,Π′) are duplicates if their
serial numbers are equal. Let us denote by (s, k) (respectively (s′, k′)) the token pair
corresponding to the ticket Tickk (respectively Tickk′). Since Bk = Bk′ , we have s+ k
= s′ + k′ mod p.
First case : (s, k) = (s′, k′)
This implies that Tickk and Tickk′ are in fact the same tickets. We can therefore discard
one of them.
Second case : (s, k) 6= (s′, k′)
Case 2.1 : s or s′ /∈ {s1, s2, ..., sN}. This implies that A is a Type-1 Forger. Under the
q-SDH-I assumption, this case will occur with negligible probability.
Case 2.2 : s and s′ ∈ {s1, s2, ..., sN}. This implies that k and k′ ∈ {1, ...,maxticket}.
Otherwise A could be used to break the q-SDH assumption (see the proof of Theorem 2).
Since s and s′ have been randomly chosen (they are jointly computed by A and B), the
probability that s+ k = s′ + k′ mod p is negligible. Therefore Case 2.2. will occur with
negligible probability either.
Consequently, under the q-SDH assumption, only the first case could occur and we only
discard tickets that come from the same token secret.
Theorem 8 (Non-Frameability). Our m-ticketing protocol is non-frameable, in the
random oracle model, under the q-DDHI assumption. The proof is detailed below.
Proof 8 (sketch of proof). We assume that the challenger C in the experiment
ExpNfraA (1
λ) receives a random instance (gx1 , gx2 ,...,gxl) of the one-more DL prob-
lem where g is a random generator in G1. C will run the adversary A as a subroutine
and act as A’s challenger in the non-frameability experiment. Because C is against the
one-more DL assumption, he has access to a DL oracle. C picks three random values ξ1,
ξ2 and ξ3 in Zp and computes g1 = gξ1 , gU = gξ2 and G = gξ31 . The other generators of
the m-ticketing system are randomly chosen. A chooses the keys tsk for the transport
authority and rsk for the revocation authority and C chooses the key skRP for the Pail-
lier encryption scheme. C is therefore able to construct the public parameters pp for A
and can answer to its requests in the following way:
• ORegisterHU requests: C answers using his input of the one-more DL problem. C
puts hUi= (g
xi)ξ2= gxiU
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• ORegisterMU requests: C does not need to do anything.
• OCorruptUser requests: C uses the DL oracle to give the corresponding xi to the
adversary.
• OTokenRequestU requests: C first uses his input of the one-more DL problem
to compute the commitment Com: C puts Com= (gxj )ξ1= gxj1 . If the protocol
doesn’t abort then we put s=xj+s2 mod p and c = g
s
1, where xj is unknown to
C and s2 is provided by A. In the random oracle model, C is able to perfectly
simulate the proof of knowledge Π1 as well as the Schnorr’s signature µ.
• OGenTicket(IDU , view) requests: All the values involved in the computation of
an m-ticket Tickk can be easily simulated by C except T ′ and Bk. To compute
T ′ = GsHr2 where r2 is a random value chosen by C, it proceeds as follows: T ′ =
(Com × gs21 )ξ3Hr2 = GsHr2 . As C does not know the value s it cannot compute
or simulate the value Bk = g
1/(s+k+1)
t . It will therefore choose a random value
R and define Bk as R. In the random oracle model, C can simulate the proof of
knowledge Π using standard techniques. The simulation is not perfect since we
replace the value Bk by a random value R. However A will not detect this change
unless he can solve the q-DDHI problem.
• OReportT icket(IDU , view) requests: C proceeds as in an OGenTicket request for
each unused m-ticket.
Now, we assume that the adversary A manages to produce a valid m-ticket Tickk such
that it breaks the non-frameability of our m-ticketing protocol and it mades t requests
to the OCorruptUser oracle. This means that this m-ticket has not been obtained on
a OGenTicket query and the IdentUser algorithm on Tickk outputs an identifier IDU
which is in HU along with a Schnorr’s signature µ that proves that this m-ticket comes
from a permission token obtained by this user4 .
It follows from the Forking Lemma that if A is able to produce a valid m-ticket Tickk
(k, σ1, h, σ2) where
σ1=(C, C1, C2, B0, T
′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C ′1, C
′
2, R
′, R′′, C ′, T ′4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′,
ch),
h=H(C, C1, C2, B0, T
′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C ′1, C
′
2, R
′, R′′, C ′, T ′4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′,
ch) and
σ2=(s1, s2, s3, ω1, ω2,..., ω12) then it can produce two valid m-tickets (k, σ1, h, σ2) and
(k, σ1, h
′, σ2) such that h 6= h′. Using the technique of replay and the soundness property
of the proof Π, one is able to extract all the secret values (a, s, r, A, k).
First case: the value s corresponds to a permission token obtained during an O
TokenRequestU on IDUi (i.e., g
s
1 is equal to the value c produced during such a re-
quest). C outputs the t values xi that comes from the requests to the DL oracle plus the
value xj = s− s2 mod p and so breaks the one-more DL assumption.
Second case: the value s does not correspond to a permission token obtained during
an OTokenRequestU on IDUi (meaning that all the values c generated during such
requests are different from gs1). We know by the definition of the experiment that no
4We would like to emphasize that since the output of IdentUser can be publicly verifiable, a wrong IdentUser
procedure is statistically negligible (even for a powerful adversary).
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OCorruptUser oracle query (and consequently no DL oracle query) has been made on
this identity. Therefore the public key hUi corresponding to IDUi is in the one-more DL
problem input. It follows from the Forking Lemma that if A is sufficiently efficient to
produce such a signature µ, then there exists an algorithm A’ which can produce two
Schnorr’s signatures with non-negligible probability. Using the techniques of replay and
soundness, C is able to extract the private key xU used to generate the signature µ. C
outputs the t values xi, coming from the requests to the DL oracle, plus the value xUi
and so breaks the one-more DL assumption.
We prove the non-frameability under the q-DDHI and one-more discrete logarithm as-
sumptions [50]. We use in fact the OMDL assumption to get a better reduction, but
the proof can also be done under the discrete logarithm assumption. As the q-DDHI
assumption implies the DL one, we can conclude that our m-ticketing protocol is non-
frameable, in the random oracle model, under the q-DDHI assumption.
Theorem 9 (Unlinkability). Our m-ticketing protocol satisfies the unlinkability re-
quirement, in the random oracle model, under the q-DDHI and DDH assumptions. The
proof is detailed below.
Proof 9 (sketch of proof). We prove the unlinkability under a slightly weaker
model than the one presented in Section 7.4. Indeed, we consider a slightly different
experiment in which the adversary cannot query the revocation oracle OIdentUserT .
We rename this new requirement Unlinkability*. We would like however to emphasize
that the access to revocation functionalities will likely be carefully controlled in a real
deployment of an m-ticketing system. Therefore, unlinkability* is a reasonable model to
consider.
Anyway, in order to satisfy the original unlinkability requirement, we just need to replace
the ElGamal encryption scheme, which only satisfies IND-CPA security, by an IND-
CCA2 encryption scheme. It is well-known that by double encrypting the same message
under an IND-CPA scheme and using a simulation sound proof of equality of plaintexts,
we obtain an IND-CCA2 scheme. Therefore, by using the double ElGamal encryption
scheme, which was proved IND-CCA2 in [113], our m-ticketing protocol would satisfy
the original unlinkability requirement.
Let A be an adversary who breaks the unlinkability requirement of our m-ticketing
protocol. W.l.o.g. we will consider that a query to the OReportT icket oracle on (IDU ,
view) for the report of j unused m-tickets is equivalent to j queries to the OGenTicket
on (IDU , view).
Let m = maxticket. We will say that an adversary A against our unlinkability experiment
Expunlink−bA (1
λ) is a Type-(i, j) distinguisher, with i ≤ m − 1 and j ≤ m − 1, if A
after having received its challenge (from its Expunlink−bA (1
λ)-challenger) makes at most
i queries to the OGenTicket oracle on (i0, view0) and j queries to the OGenTicket
oracle on (i1, view1). We can remark that a Type-(i, j) distinguisher, with i ≤ m − 1
and j ≤ m− 1, is also a Type-(m− 1, m− 1) distinguisher. We may therefore, without
loss of generality, restrict our attention to Type-(m − 1, m − 1) distinguishers. In
the sequel, we will thus assume that A is such an adversary. More precisely, we will
suppose that after receiving Tickkb and Tickk1−b , A arbitrarily queries theORegisterHU ,
ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser, OIdentT icketT and OTokenRequestU oracles and then
queries the OReportT icket oracle on (i0, view0) and (i1, view1).
Chapter 7. A Practical and Privacy-Preserving Ticketing Service 103
We give a security proof as a sequence of games, using Shoup’s methodology [102]. We
will only give a rather high-level description of the initial game (Game 0) and brief
descriptions of the modifications between successive games.
Game 0: This is the original attack game with respect to a given efficient adversary A.
The challenger C randomly chooses g, g0, g1, gt, gT , gU , h, G, H nine generators of
G1 and g2, g3 two generators of G2. It also chooses the keys for the Paillier encryption
scheme as well as the ones for the transport authority and revocation authorities. C
sends gpk and tsk to A. C answers to A’s requests as follows:
• ORegisterHU requests: C randomly chooses xU ∈ Zp and computes hU = gxUU .
• ORegisterMU requests: C does not need to do anything.
• OCorruptUser requests: C gives xU to A.
• OTokenRequestU requests: C chooses a random value s1 to obtain a valid permis-
sion token (A, r, s) and uses xU to generate the signature µ.
• OGenTicket(IDU , view) requests: C uses its permission token (A, r, s) and a fresh
index k that has not been used in a previous query of OGenTicket on IDU and
view and computes a ticket Tickk = (Bk, E,Π).
• OIdentT icketT (IDU , view) requests: C computes the m-tickets Tickk based on the
secret s corresponding to the user identifier IDU and gives them to A.
• OReportT icket(IDU , view) requests: C proceeds as in a OGenTicket request for
each unused m-ticket.
The adversary chooses two honest users i0 and i1, and two indexes k0 and k1. C runs
the protocol TokenRequest with i0 and i1, and outputs the corresponding views, view0
and view1, to A. It then generates two valid m-tickets: Tickkb = (Bkb , Eb,Πb) for i0 and
Tickk1−b = (Bk1−b , E1−b,Π1−b) for i1 and send them to A. The goal of A is to guess
the value of b. After having received its challenge, A can queries the ORegisterHU ,
ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser, OTokenRequestU , OGenTicket, OIdentT icketT and
OReportT icket oracles but with the following restrictions: it cannot query the O
CorruptUser oracle on i0 or i1 or the OIdentT icketT oracle on (i0, view0) or (i1, view1)
and cannot query the OReport T icket oracle on (i0, view0) or (i1, view1) if both users
did not validate the same number of m-tickets (otherwise it can easily win this game).
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a bit b′, its guess. Let S0 be the event
that b = b′ in this game and Si the event that b = b′ in game i. We have: |Pr[S0]− 1/2|
= Advunlink−bA (1
λ) = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) = b]− 1/2|
Let {Ticki
kib
= (Bi
kib
, Ei
kib
,Πi
kib
)}i=m−1i=1 denote the m − 1 unused (reported) m-tickets of
i0 and {Tickiki1−b = (B
i
ki1−b
, Ei
ki1−b
, Πi
ki1−b
)}i=m−1i=1 the ones of i1, where the kib’s and the
ki1−b’s belongs to {1, ...,m}.
• Game(0,b): This is the same game as Game 0 except that we replace the El
Gamal ciphertext Eb by an encryption of a random value and then simulate the
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proof Πb. Such a simulated proof can easily be done in the random oracle model us-
ing standard techniques. Under the DDH assumption, A cannot detect this change.
Indeed, we can easily construct a DDH distinguisher D with DDH-advantage sat-
isfying:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S(0,b)]| ≤ AdvDDHD (1λ) (1)
where AdvDDHD (1λ) is the DDH-advantage of D in solving the DDH problem. In
the sequel we will used the simplified notation AdvDDH (respectively Advq−DDHI)
to denote the DDH-advantage (respectively the q-DDHI advantage) of some effi-
cient algorithm in solving the DDH (respectively q-DDHI) problem.
• Game(0,1-b): This is the same game as Game(0,b) except that we replace the
El Gamal ciphertext E1−b by an encryption of a random value and then simulate
the proof Π1−b. Such a simulated proof can easily be done in the random oracle
model using standard techniques. Under the DDH assumption, A cannot detect
this change. Indeed, we can easily construct a DDH distinguisher D with DDH-
advantage satisfying:
|Pr[S(0,b)]− Pr[S(0,1−b)]| ≤ AdvDDH (2)
• Game(0,0,b): This is the same game as Game(0,1-b) except that we replace
the serial number Bkb by a random value and then simulate the proof Πb. Such
a simulated proof can easily be done in the random oracle model using standard
techniques. Under the q-DDHI assumption, A cannot detect this change. Indeed,
we can easily construct a q-DDHI distinguisher D with q DDHI-advantage satis-
fying:
|Pr[S(0,1−b)]− Pr[S(0,0,b)]| ≤ Advq−DDHI (3)
• Game(0,0,1-b): This is the same game as Game(0,0,b) except that we replace
the serial number Bk1−b by a random value and then simulate the proof Π1−b. Such
a simulated proof can easily be done in the random oracle model using standard
techniques. Under the q-DDHI assumption, A cannot detect this change. Indeed,
we can easily construct a q-DDHI distinguisher D with q DDHI-advantage satis-
fying:
|Pr[S(0,0,b)]− Pr[S(0,0,1−b)]| ≤ Advq−DDHI (4)
Let Game 1 be the same game as Game(0,0,1-b)
Combining (1), (2), (3) and (4), we obtain:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ 2AdvDDH + 2Advq−DDHI
We then proceed similarly for each unused m-ticket of i0 and i1:
{Ticki
kib
= (Bi
kib
, Ei
kib
,Πi
kib
)}i=m−1i=1
and
{Ticki
ki1−b
= (Bi
ki1−b
, Ei
ki1−b
, Πi
ki1−b
)}i=m−1i=1 .
For i = 1 to m− 1, we define the following game.
• Game(i,b): This is the same game as Game i = Game(i-1,0,1-b) except that
we replace the El Gamal ciphertext Eib by an encryption of a random value and
then simulate the proof Πib.
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• Game(i,1-b): This is the same game as Game(i,b) except that we replace the
El Gamal ciphertext Ei1−b by an encryption of a random value and then simulate
the proof Πi1−b.
• Game(i,0,b): This is the same game as Game(i,1-b) except that we replace the
serial number Bi
kib
by a random value and then simulate the proof Πib.
• Game(i,0,1-b): This is the same game as Game i,0,b) except that we replace
the serial number Bi
ki1−b
by a random value and then simulate the proof Πi1−b.
Let Game i + 1 be the same game as Game(i,0,1-b). We obtain as above: |Pr[Si+1]−
Pr[Si]| ≤ 2AdvDDH + 2Advq−DDHI
Using our notation, Game m is the same game as Game(m-1,0,1-b). In the latter
game, the unlinkability-challenger gives no information (in a strong information theoretic
sense) to A about the bit b (since all the El Gamal ciphertexts have been replaced by
encryptions of random values and all serial numbers have been replaced by random
values). Therefore we have: Pr[Sm] = 1/2.
We can now give an upper bound for Advunlink−bA (1
λ) :
Advunlink−bA (1
λ) = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) = b]− 1/2| = |Pr[S0]− Pr[Sm]|
We have:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[Sm]| ≤ Σj=m−1j=0 |Pr[Sj ]− Pr[Sj+1]| ≤ 2m× (AdvDDH + Advq−DDHI)
Therefore under the DDH and q-DDHI assumptions, the advantage Advunlink−bA (1
λ) of
a Type-(m−1, m−1) distinguisher is negligible (and consequently the one of a Type-(i,
j) distinguisher, with i ≤ m− 1 and j ≤ m− 1, is also negligible).
We can then conclude that our proposed m-ticketing protocol satisfies the unlinkability*
requirement, in the random oracle model, under the DDH and q-DDHI assumptions.
7.6 Implementation
In this section, we give further details about the prototype implementing our m-ticketing
system in addition to the performance results of the m-ticket validation phase.
7.6.1 Prototype Details
The m-ticketing development platform is the same as the m-pass development platform.
The validator is simulated by a Java swing application connected to an NFC reader
using the ISO14443B protocol. The cardlet is embedded within a SIM card. We used
a regular Galaxy S3 smartphone running Android 4.1.2. For more details about the
validator and SIM card details, the reader can refer to Section 6.6.1 and Section 6.6.2.
We also use the same cryptographic parameters (curve and pairing) like in the m-pass
use case. Further details can be found in Section 6.6.3
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7.6.2 Validation Measurements
The validation of a m-ticket consists of two sub-phases. The transport cardlet has some
pre-compuations in the first sub-phase. This sub-phase occurs in off-line for instance
before arriving to station. Then, the second sub-phase comprises real-time computations.
Indeed, these computations occur when the user taps his smartphone on the validator
in order to enter the transport network.
7.6.2.1 Pre-Computations
The pre-computations consists in computing elements involved in proving that the user
knows a valid signature on his secret s. The elements that the card has to store for one
signature are 24 Zp elements, 10 compressed points and one digest output. The total
size of these elements is 1130 bytes. In our implementation, we did pre-computations
for 10 signatures (A set of 10 m-tickets). Regarding the timings, detailed in Table 7.2,
the pre-computations for preparing one signature occurs in 1.7 s.
1 m-ticket 10 m-tickets
1.7 s 17 s
Table 7.2: M-Ticketing - Timings of Pre-Computations
7.6.2.2 Real-Time Computations
Tables 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6, give timings (average over 50 trials and standard devia-
tion between parentheses) for all real-time computations (the whole validation protocol)
which include the validator authentication, the signature generation and an m-ticket
verification. The timings of the signature generation include as well the NFC exchanges
duration. We denote by “Battery-Off” a powered-off phone either by the user, or be-
cause the battery is flat. In this situation, as stated by NFC standards, NFC-access to
the SIM card is still possible, but with degraded performances.
Regarding the validator authentication, timings in Table 7.3, we chose to use RSA with
a 1984 bits key (this is the greatest size supported by the SIM card.) and a short public
verification exponent v (v = 65537). The validator asks the card for a challenge (RCV ).
Then, he sends back his response to this challenge, his own challenge (ch) (32 bytes)
and the current date (TS) (6 bytes).
Battery-On 56.98 ms (0.70)
Battery-Off 76.55 ms (7.46)
Table 7.3: M-Ticketing - Timings of the Validator Authentication
Table 7.4 gives the duration of a signature generation (computing an m-ticket Bk, E
and Π) and the NFC communication time. The considered operations for generating the
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signature are only one hash value and lightweight operations in Zp. The size of the com-
puted signature is 778 bytes (sent by 4 APDUs). Regarding the communication between
a SIM card and a reader, it is slow (≥ 85ms), but the whole process (Signature+NFC)
remains very fast, i.e., 123.01 ms on average.
Battery-On 123.01 ms (3.24)
Battery-Off 185.28 ms (18.68)
Table 7.4: M-Ticketing - Timings of the Card Signature and NFC Connections
For the signature verification by the validator, timings in Table 7.5, we distinguish
two cases: the validator holds the private signature keys (y, γ), or not. The extra
pairing computations performed in the second case do not add an important delay to
the verification step. This is because a regular desktop PC can efficiently achieve such
computations.
(1) without pairing (2) with pairing
4.43 ms (1.32) 12.19 ms (3.20)
Table 7.5: M-Ticketing - Timings of the Signature Verification
Table 7.6 gives the total duration of a m-ticket validation. In total, it occurs for the
first case (without pairing at the verifier side) in 184.25ms on average and in 191.80ms
for the second case (with pairing at the verifier side). When the battery is flat, the
validation occurs in at most 272, 55ms on average.
(1) without pairing (2) with pairing
Battery-On 184.25 ms (3.43) 191.80 ms (4.73)
Battery-Off 266.52 ms (17.91) 272.55 ms (25.73)
Table 7.6: M-Ticketing - Timings of Real-Time Computations
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we designed a secure m-ticketing protocol that prevents a malicious
transport authority from linking users’ trips. Moreover, as the entire computations are
done within the SIM card, we enhance the user’s privacy with regards to a compromised
smartphone. Owing to regular reports of unused m-tickets, the user is able to securely
post-pay for his m-tickets without disclosing any information about the performed trips.
Moreover, we planned countermeasures against m-ticket cloning and multiple usage.
Our proposal also satisfies the validation time constraint: an m-ticket validation can be
completed in 184.25 ms when the mobile is switched on, and in 266.52 ms when the
mobile is switched off or its battery is flat.
Chapter 7. A Practical and Privacy-Preserving Ticketing Service 108
As mentioned previously our mobile services, i.e., mobile pass and mobile ticketing, are
implemented within a SIM card, but, it can be implemented within a TEE as well. Using
the TEE as a development platform have advantages as well as drawbacks. On one hand,
it will provide more computational capabilities which will enable more efficiency. On
the other hand, a functionality like the ability to validate a transport product when the
smartphone is off will no longer be available. Moreover, a new technical issue arises.
Indeed, if a user changes his smartphone, he obviously would like to have the same
services within the new smartphone. If the application providing the service is running
within the SIM card, the service can be easily and securely transfered from a smartphone
to another (unplug / plug the SIM card). This is not the same case for the TEE.
Therefore, we have worked on the problem of migration of services between two TEE
and proposed, in the next chapter, a new secure TEE migration protocol.
Chapter 8
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Dans ce chapitre, nous pre´sentons les re´sultats [114] qui ont e´te´ publie´s a` la confe´rence
WISTP 2015. Nous de´crivons notre perception du de´ploiement et de la mise en œu-
vre d’un environnement d’exe´cution de confiance (TEE): nous organisons le TEE en
domaines de se´curite´ avec diffe´rents roˆles et privile`ges. Nous appelons profil TEE les
secrets et donne´es prive´es appartenant a` l’utilisateur et manipule´s par les applications
s’exe´cutant dans le TEE. En se basant sur le nouveau mode`le, nous construisons un pro-
tocole de migration de profils TEE assurant la confidentialite´ et l’inte´grite´ de ce dernier.
A` cette fin, nous utilisons une cle´ de re-chiffrement et un jeton d’autorisation par couple
de mobile, par fournisseur de service et par transfert. Nous avons e´galement valide´ notre
protocole avec AVISPA, un outil automatise´ de validation de protocoles de se´curite´.
8.1 Introduction
Like mentioned in Chapter 2, in the last years, a secure mobile operating system running
alongside the standard Rich Execution Environment (REE for short), has emerged: the
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Trusted Execution Environment (TEE for short). A TEE could have its own CPU
and memory, and hosts isolated Trusted Applications (TA for short) that provide secure
services to the applications running within the REE. These TAs belong to diverse service
providers. Each TA manipulates a profile, constituted of secret credentials and user’s
private data.
The TEE has been standardized by GlobalPlatform, however, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no specification or research work that models the TEE internal architecture
or ecosystem. For instance, comparing to smart cards, the GlobalPlatform Card Spec-
ifications [1] have worked on such a model and it is now widely deployed and accepted
by all the stakeholders. This is why we propose to study in which extent we can apply
it for the TEE context: we identified the limitations of the GlobalPlatform Card model,
in the TEE context, when the user wants to migrate its profile from one TEE to another
one.
A user, who has many devices or gets a new one, shall be able to securely migrate his TEE
profiles from a TEE to another compliant TEE. This problem of migration is currently
poorly addressed by TEE implementations, standardization and only few papers have
worked on designing TEE migration protocols [115, 116]. Two main solutions can be
considered: the straightforward solution, which consists in encrypting the profile (by
TEE source), transferring it and decrypting it (by target TEE), or a Trusted Server
based solution. These solutions present privacy weaknesses, as discussed in the next
sections.
In this chapter, we propose a new approach to transfer the TEE profiles from a TEE
to another compliant TEE while preserving its privacy. For this purpose, we propose to
organize the TEE into security domains (SD) with different roles and privileges.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we present the TEE technology
and describe the problem of profile migration. Then, in Section 8.3, we describe the
previous works and discuss how different are our objectives. We define our assumptions
and requirements in Section 8.4. Then, in Section 8.5, we give a detailed description
of our transfer protocol. We give the security analysis of our protocol in Section 8.6.
Finally, in Section 8.7, we present the validation of our protocol and we conclude in
Section 8.8.
8.2 Backgrounds and Problem Statement
Before using a service of the TEE, which is provided by a service provider, several steps
should occur.
1. User enrollment: the user registers to the service provided by the SP, using a
secure channel. This step allows to associate the user identity to a dedicated TA
inside the device.
2. The TA is personalized inside the TEE by the SP. The necessary application in
the REE is also installed. After this step, the service is active.
3. The user could acquire a new device and wish to securely transfer its TEE profiles
from the first device to the new one.
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4. The user may want to destroy its profile, also defined as disabling credentials [117].
In this chapter we focus on step 3, the migration of a TEE profile. Like step 1, step 3
can be threatened by an external attacker. If we suppose that an attacker may have
compromised the rich OS or control the network connection of the smartphone, then the
enrollment or migration steps become challenging tasks. Indeed, as shown in Figure 8.1,
as the interactions with a TEE crosses the REE, the attacker may succeed to migrate
the user’s profile from a victim to the attacker’s smartphone. This attack may succeed
because the service provider has no insurance about the TEE security and the user-to-
TEE binding. In the next section, we describe the solutions already proposed in the
literature in order to show their limitations and motivate a new way of migrating TEE
profiles.
REE
TEE
Device
TA
REE
TEE
New device
TA
Service provider
Trusted
App
Trusted
App
provisionning
Identity binding
User
migration:
new enrollment
attack vectors
Figure 8.1: The Life Cycle of a TEE-based Service
8.3 Related Work
The first papers that studied the security of TEE credentials tried to guarantee its local
(within the TEE) confidentiality and integrity. For instance in [118], authors proposed to
protect TEE data using a unique PUF (Physical Unclonable Functions) AES encryption
key for each device. In [119], authors proposed a TEE key attestation protocol proving
that a TEE key has been generated inside the TEE and never left this TEE.
Later, scientists have been interested in the enrollment problem (mainly user-device
binding) while assuming that there is no operator responsible for the management of the
TEE. For instance, Marforio et al. [115] explained that the user’s identity can be bound to
the device using a password or a SMS or by collecting the device’s IMEI. Unfortunately,
an attacker that controls the Rich OS can intercept the protocol exchanges. Thus,
Marforio et al. proposed some hardware and software modifications in order to secure
the enrollment process. Others, like in [116], assumed that the smartphone is safe at
the first use. This would enable to store a secret password in the TEE.
The problem of credential migration first appears for Trusted Platform Module (TPM),
which is in some way the TEE ancestor. The commands of key migration have been
specified in TPM specifications [120] and have undergone many improvements. Later,
Sadeghi et al. [121] proposed a property based TPM virtualization in order to have a
solution that supports software update and migration. The shortcoming of this solution
consists in omitting the service provider during the virtual TPM migration. However,
some credential migration requires service provider fresh and explicit agreement.
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In the specific context of TEE, the first attempt to address the problem of migration in
the TEE has been proposed by authors of [116]. Kari et al. have proposed a credential
migration protocol in open credential platforms [116]. They proposed to make the
credential migration user-friendly based on delegated-automatic re-provisioning. The
credentials are backup in clear in a trusted server. Then, the migration process is a re-
provisioning from the backup, protected by a secret password only known by the user.
The main weakness of this solution lies in the fact that its security, including to user’s
privacy, is entirely based on a the trustworthy of the trusted server (TS). This latter, as
third party, has full access to TEE credentials and user’s private data while it is not its
owner or provisioner. This proposal implies privacy issues that we want to address in
this thesis.
GlobalPlatform specifications related to smartcards have been interested in credential
management in secure elements (smart cards). However, it seems that the credential
privacy in some cases has been overlooked. In GlobalPlatform card specifications [1], the
smart card is organized into fully isolated areas called Security Domains (SD). There are
a root security domain called ISD for Issuer Security Domain and many Supplementary
Security Domains (SSDs) for the different Service Providers. Let us call SPSD the
security domain for a given SP. For instance, the ISD could be owned by the Mobile
Network Operator (MNO) and the SPSD could be owned by a bank. Once, the SPSD
created, there are two modes to manage the content of this SPSD: either directly from
SP to SPSD, or through ISD. In the first case, the credential migration process would be
naturally implemented in the application of the SP within the smart card: encryption
with the target public key, transfer and decryption, provided that the MNO initiates
the SP space in the target smart card. In the second case, the MNO plays the role of
firewall and proxy for the SPSD without having access to the content between SP and
its SSD (SPSD). SPSDs do not have any code enabling to perform a credential transfer.
If we adopt the first model for the TEE, the TEE profile migration would be processed
like in the smart card: the TEE profile migration process would be naturally imple-
mented in the TA of the SP: encryption with the target public TEE key, transfer and
decryption, provided that the TEE admin - MNO initiates the SP space in the target
TEE. As a consequence, each service provider would have to implement a migration
process for its service.
If we adopt the second model for the TEE, TEE admin will serve as the single entry
point to transfer point-to-point credentials: implementing the migration process would
imply privacy issues similarly to the Kari et al. [116] solution. TEE admin would have
full access to the SP credentials and user’s data in order to encrypt and transfer it. In
this chapter, we propose a new migration protocol, while adopting the second model,
where the TEE Admin plays the role of proxy without having access to SP credentials.
We consider the following properties:
• As trusted application profile contains credentials and also personal data (statis-
tics, usage data of the service), during the migration, the profile shall be accessible
only by legitimate entities: the SP and the user;
• A special third party, the TEE admin should be responsible of the role of instal-
lation, deletion and migration of trusted profiles;
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• The trusted application of the SP should not contain any code dedicated to the
migration protocol. All the migration software components should be handled by
the TEE admin.
8.4 Attacker Model and Requirements
We assume that the enrollment, provisioning and personalization processes are already
achieved: the trusted application is provisioned to the TEE and has access to its cre-
dentials and the user’s personal data. By the profile, we mean the credentials (allowing
the access to the service) and private data (related to personalization and the use of
application/service).
We consider three different actors: the user (the devices’ owner), the Service Provider
(e.g. the bank) and a TEE admin (e.g., Mobile Network Operator or smartphone manu-
facturer). Informally speaking, an attacker will attempt to access the transferred profile.
We model it as follows:
A1: Communication control. We consider that we have a Dolev-Yao [122] attacker
model: an attacker has full control over communication channels.
A2: TEE control. We consider that TEEs are enough resistant to physical attacks
according the Protection Profile proposed by GlobalPlatform [123] which is EAL2+
certified.
A3: REE control. Given the possible vulnerabilities of the rich OS, we assume that
an attacker can compromise the REE of a user’s device.
A4: Entities control and trustworthy. We assume that (i) an attacker cannot
spoof the SP, cannot compromise its dedicated spaces within the TEE and the SP
is honest, (ii) an attacker cannot spoof the TEE Admin and cannot compromise
its dedicated spaces within the TEE, however the TEE Admin can be honest-but-
curious and, (iii) the user is honest.
While keeping in view the above discussions, we define the security requirements that a
migration protocol shall meet as follows:
R1: Integrity. During the migration process, the integrity of the TEE profile should
be ensured. For a given profile, only the user and the relevant service provider
should be able to eventually modify the profile content.
R2: Confidentiality. During the migration process, the confidentiality of the TEE
profile should be ensured. For a given profile, only the user and the relevant
service provider should be able to eventually read the profile content.
8.5 TEE Migration Protocol
Considering the previous requirements, attacker model, and the GlobalPlatform Card
Specifications [1], we introduce a new approach for deploying services in a TEE where:
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TAs of a service provider are hosted in a Security Domain (SD) and a new actor, called
TEE admin, has a special SD and implements the migration functionalities. With such
a new software architecture, we build a protocol that allows to securely transfer a TEE
profile from one device to another one.
8.5.1 Architecture Overview
We organize the TEE into Security Domains (SD) [1]. Every SD can contain one or
many Trusted Applications (TA) from the same Service Provider. A SD is a fully
isolated zone. This functionality could be ensured by memory protection mechanisms,
firewall functionalities, data isolation techniques implemented at OS level of the TEE,
such as the ones used for Linux systems (SELinux, AppArmor,...). For example, in the
commercialized TEE solution of Trustsonic, such an architecture can be implemented
using containers. A SD manipulates cryptographic keys which are completely separated
from any other SD. These keys enable code execution integrity, credentials and user’s
private data integrity and confidentiality when using a service. Consequently, a SD must
not cipher his credentials or user’s private data using any external keys whatever is the
case, e.g., transfer. We define two types of SD, represented in Figure 8.2a:
1. SD without management rights (many per TEE): SP-SD (in green). They contain
the trusted applications of a service provider.
2. SD with management rights (only one per TEE): ROOT-SD (in orange). It is
responsible of creating and deleting SDs, downloading and installing packages in
SDs, and also migrating SDs from a TEE to another compliant TEE.
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Figure 8.2: Architecture and Protocol Overview
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8.5.2 Protocol Overview
In order to migrate a TEE profile from a source device to a target one, the user gets the
two devices nearby each other in order to establish a wireless communication, such as
NFC or bluetooth. Then, the user starts the migration application, noted Migrate-SD
in Figure 8.2a, within the ROOT-SD of the TEE source. In order to do this, the user
must be authenticated in both source and target TEEs. Owing to the authentication
procedure, the TEEs check that only the user enrolled by the TEE admin can start
the migration process. This authentication can be done through the “Trusted User
Interface” [124], or by using the password or the pin code setup at the enrollment phase,
or by using a biometry peripheral if available. The next steps of the protocol that involve
the two TEEs are presented in Figure 8.2b and described in the following.
Step 1. An authenticated key agreement takes place between the ROOT-SD of TEE
source and the ROOT-SD of target TEE. This prevents the TEE source from disclos-
ing critical information to a malicious environment and prevents the target TEE from
accepting malicious data.
Step 2. The TEE source requires a migration authorization from all service providers
that have a SD within the TEE source. If a service provider does not agree with the
migration of his relevant SD, the migration cannot take place. The migration authoriza-
tion is temporary and unique per pair of devices, per transfer and per service provider.
Indeed, the authorization is related to the date and time of the request that has been
initiated. Thus, it is valid only for a given period of time.
Step 3. At that time starts the groundwork for the authorization. First, the service
provider checks with the TEE admin whether the target TEE is stated compromised
(its corresponding keys have been revoked). Then, the service provider checks that the
target TEE is not already a client containing a service provider SD. Finally, the service
provider asks the TEE admin to set up a specific SD within target TEE, and updates
the SD credentials in order to be the unique master of this SD.
Step 4. Finally, the service provider replies to the TEE source with the authorization
and necessary migration credentials. The authorization consists of a service provider
signature proving his agreement regarding the migration of his SD. The credentials
consist of a re-encryption key [40, 41]. Using this re-encryption key, the Migrate-SD
application will be able to perform the transfer without having access to SD profile.
In order to send source profile to the target SD, the source SD provides its profile,
encrypted with its public key, to the TA, Migrate-SD, that should re-encrypt it with
the re-encryption key. In such a case, even if the TEE Admin is honest-but-curious, it
cannot eavesdrop the SD profile.
Step 5. The target TEE must check the validity of the received authorization. At this
time, the migration can start.
8.5.3 TEE Profile Migration Protocol
In the following, we introduce the notations and cryptographic keys used in our proto-
col. Later, we detail the phases of our protocol: Authenticated key agreement, Service
Provider authorization and TEE Profile migration.
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Cryptographic keys and notations We denote (sksrc, pksrc, certsrc) (resp. (sktgt,
pktgt, certtgt)) the TEE private root key and the certified TEE public root key of the
source (resp. target) ROOT-SD. These keys are used to authenticate the TEE and set
up a key session with an authenticated TEE. A TEE admin is characterized by a private
and public key pair (skAdmin, pkAdmin). It controls the ROOT-SD and certifies TEE
root keys. A Security Domain SP-SD is characterized by a root keys set (sksd, pksd,
certsd). This is an encryption keys set that enables to securely store SD profile. We
denote SP −SDsrc (resp. SP −SDtgt) the service provider SD within TEE source (resp.
target TEE). Consequently, the tuple (skSP−SDsrc , pkSP−SDsrc , certSP−SDsrc) (resp. the
tuple (skSP−SDtgt , pkSP−SDtgt , certSP−SDtgt)) is the root keys set of SP − SDsrc (resp.
SP − SDtgt). A service provider is characterized by (sksp, pksp) and a unique identifier
IDSP . It provides the security domains root keys and is responsible of the re-encryption
key and transfer authorization generation.
In the following, we denote by SignatureA, the signature on the message sent with the
signature using the private key of A.
Authenticated Key Agreement The authenticated key agreement (AKA, step 1
in Figure 8.2b) occurs in order to establish a secure session between two TEEs after a
mutual authentication. The AKA can be a password based key agreement [125] or a
public key authenticated Key agreement [126] and must be a two ways authentication. In
the first case, we can use the password or PIN or biometric data introduced by the user
during the authentication phase and in the second case, we can use the TEEs root keys.
At the end of this phase, the source and target TEEs will share a couple of ephemeral
keys (eKt, eKm) to secure the migration. eKt is the private session key, whereas eKm
is used for MAC computations.
Service Provider Authorization The TEE source requires a migration authoriza-
tion from all service providers having trusted applications within the TEE source (step
2 in Figure 8.2b). This protocol is described in Figure 8.3. For the sake of simplicity,
we consider only one service provider.
(1) The migration application within ROOT −SDsrc sends the request INIT RQ with
its signature noted SignatureROOT−SDsrc to the service provider through the TEE ad-
min. The request includes the identity of the service provider (IDSP ), the public key of
SP − SDsrc (pkSP−SDsrc) and the certified TEE public root keys of source and target
TEE (certsrc, certtgt). (2) When receiving the request, TEE admin checks the cer-
tificates (certsrc, certtgt), the signature and freshness of the request and a timestamp
(SignatureROOT−SDsrc)1. It should also check whether source or target TEE are com-
promised2 for example using the remote attestation protocols of Baiardi et al. [127]. (3)
If checks are successful, the TEE admin transmits the request (INIT ) to the relevant
service provider based on the IDSP received within the request.
(4) With the received request, the service provider checks if the TEE source (resp. target
TEE) has (resp. has not) an associated SP-SD by checking if certsrc (resp. certtgt) is
registered in its database. Then, (5) the service provider inquires TEE admin to create
a SP-SD within the recipient TEE via the SD−Create RQ(certtgt) command. (6) The
1TEE implementations like TrustZone offer access to trusted clocks for this usage.
2This is already the case for SIM card where MNOs checks if a SIM has been revoked.
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TEE admin signs the command (the signature SignatureTEEAdmin is performed on the
command and a timestamp) and forwards it to the trusted application Create− SDtgt
in order to create SP − SDtgt. (7, 8, 9, 10). The creation is acknowledged by Ack and
Param that are returned to the service provider (through the TEE Admin) in order to
let him be able to personalize SP − SDtgt, as done classically when personalizing TEE
security domains. (11) Once the SP − SDtgt installed, the service provider proceeds
to the update of SP − SDtgt credentials in order to have the exclusive control over
SP − SDtgt [1].
Finally, the service provider generates the migration authorization. It consists of a re-
encryption key Kproxy and a signature PERM . The signature PERM is computed
on the SP identifier IDSP , source and target TEE public keys as well as a timestamp:
PERM = {IDSP , certsrc, certtgt, T imeStamp}skSP . The re-encryption key Kproxy is
used to re-encrypt the SD − SPsrc content such that the result will be understandable
only by SP −SDtgt: Kproxy = rekeygen(pkSP−SDtgt , skSP−SDsrc). In the literature [40,
41], Kproxy is called a proxy key. (12, 13) The authorization is sent to the TEE Admin
who signs it and transmits it (with its signature) to ROOT − SDsrc.
TEE Profile Migration Using the re-encryption key, the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the migration phase is guaranteed. Any outsider cannot eavesdrop the SP −
SDsrc profile and a honest-but-curious TEE Admin has no visibility about the SP −
SDsrc profile. The migration occurs as follows.
As described in Figure 8.4, Migrate− SDsrc re-encrypts the protected profile of SP −
SDsrc (P ) using the proxy key Kproxy to obtain the cipher A. Only SP−SDtgt is able to
decrypt A. Afterwards, Migrate− SDsrc computes B and C. B is the encryption of A
and the identifier of the service provider owning SP − SDsrc (IDSP ) using the transfer
key eKt. Regarding C, it is the MAC of A and IDSP using eKm. At the end of these
computations, Migrate− SDsrc sends A, B, C and PERM to Migrate− SDtgt. that
proceeds to the verifications of PERM and C. The verification of PERM corresponds
to the verification of a signature, its freshness and that its parameters contain the right
certsrc and certtgt. Next, Migrate−SDtgt decrypts B in order to retrieve A and IDSP .
Based on the retrieved IDSP , Migrate− SDtgt transmits A to SP − SDtgt.
When the migration finishes, we have two possibilities. On the one hand, the security
policy of the service admits to conserve the TEE profile in the source. In such a case,
Migrate − SDtgt simply acknowledges that the TEE profile migration is completed
successfully (Signed Ack). On the other hand, the security policy of the service admits
to conserve only one profile. The TEE profile in the source should be destroyed. In order
to ensure a fair exchange, exchanges between Migrate − SDsrc and Migrate − SDtgt
must be performed via the service provider. Migrate−SDtgt acknowledges that the TEE
profile migration is completed successfully (Signed Ack). At this time, Migrate−SDsrc
asks the trusted application Destroy−SDsrc to destroy the SD corresponding to IDSP .
When the operation finishes, Migrate − SDsrc informs the service provider that the
transfer is accomplished. Hence, the service provider will not consider any more TEE
source as a client and revoke its corresponding keys.
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ROOT − SDsrc TEEAdmin SP ROOT − SDtgt
(sksrc, pksrc, certsrc) (skAdmin, pkAdmin) (sksp, pksp) (sktgt, pktgt, certtgt)
(1) INIT RQ(IDSP ,pkSP−SDsrc ,
certsrc,certtgt),
SignatureROOT−SDsrc−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(2) Verify(pkAdmin, certsrc)
Verify(pkAdmin, certtgt)
Verify(pksrc, SignatureROOT−SDsrc )
certsrc, certtgt /∈ {CompromisedTEE}
3) INIT (pkSP−SDsrc ,certsrc,
certtgt)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(4) certsrc ∈ {Clients}
certtgt /∈ {Clients}
(5) SD−Create RQ(certtgt)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(6) SD−Create()−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SignatureTEEAdmin
(7) Verify(pkAdmin,
SignatureTEEAdmin )
Execute the command
(8) Ack and Param←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SignatureROOT−SDtgt
(9)Verify(pktgt, SignatureROOT−SDtgt )
(10) Param−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(11)Personalize the root keys of SP − SDtgt
Compute the proxy key Kproxy
and the SP authorization PERM
(13) Kproxy,PERM←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SignatureTEEAdmin
(12) Kproxy,PERM←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(14)Verify(pkAdmin, SignatureTEEAdmin )
Figure 8.3: Service Provider Authorization Protocol
SP − SDsrc ROOT − SDsrc ROOT − SDtgt SP − SDtgt
P = Enc(pkSP−SDsrc ,profilesrc)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Compute:
A= Enc(Kproxy , P )
B= Enc(eKt, A and IDSP )
C= MAC(eKm, A and IDSP )
A, B, C and PERM−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Decrypt(eKt, B)
Retrieve IDSP
Verify(pkSP , PERM)
Verify(eKm, C)
A−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Signed Ack←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Destroy SP − SDsrc
Inform the SP of the
achievement of the migration
Figure 8.4: Profile Migration Protocol
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8.5.4 Performance Remarks
As current TEE implementation does not give access to low level cryptographic prim-
itives we cannot implement the whole protocol. To give an idea of performances, the
reader should note that TEEs exploit the CPU of the smartphone with an amount of
RAM of some MBs. Thus performance are comparable with what can be obtained in the
Rich OS. For example, a RSA computation is achieved in 20 ms on a Galaxy SIII smart-
phone. Our reencryption scheme needs lower than a RSA computation: we measured,
on a Galaxy SIII a reencryption time of about 4 ms.
8.6 Security Analysis
User Identification During a TEE profile migration, it is important to ensure that
the target TEE (target device) belongs to the owner of the source TEE (source device).
In our model, this is guaranteed by the concept of demonstrative identification [128].
Indeed, we proposed to run the migration protocol over a wireless proximity technology
(NFC).
Requirements Analysis During the migration, an outsider or a curious TEE Admin
must not be able to read or modify the transferred TEE profile (R1, R2). This is ensured
by using the cryptographic re-encryption method. Indeed, the migration authorization,
delivered by the service provider, consists of two components: Kproxy and PERM .
PERM is a signature computed by the service provider on (IDSP , certsrc, certtgt,
timeStamp). An attacker would not be able to replay this authorization because of the
timestamp. Moreover, the transfer process would fail if certsrc (resp. certtgt) does not
correspond to the certified root public key used by source TEE (resp. target) during
the AKA phase. Regarding the re-encryption key Kproxy, it is computed based on the
private key of the source SD and the public key of the target SD. This means that a
cipher text of source SD, if encrypted using Kproxy, will be converted to a cipher text of
target SD. Thus, only source SD, target SD and the service provider have access (read
/ modify) to the TEE profile. If the re-encryption key Kproxy is improperly computed,
the attacker cannot get the TEE profile content.
TEE Admin Trustworthy Besides the cryptographic solution, our approach relies
on the trustworthy of the TEE Admin. We assume that a TEE Admin can only be
honest-but-curious and not malicious (compromised). Indeed, a malicious TEE Admin
can get access to service provider credentials and user’s private data. However, we es-
timate that the assumption of a honest-but-curious TEE Admin is reasonable. This is
because a malicious TEE Admin (when detected) risks not only huge financial damages
but also his reputation. Knowing that this role should be played by the device man-
ufacturer or the mobile network operator. In our opinion, this risk is far from being
taken.
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8.7 Protocol Validation
We validated our protocol using the AVISPA [9] tool web interface. AVISPA is an auto-
mated tool for the validation of security protocols. It takes as input a protocol modelled
in High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL). This latter is translated into
Intermediate Format (IF) and forwarded to the back-end analyser tools.
In Appendix A, we show (the core subset of) our migration protocol model written in
HLPSL. In this validation model, we mainly focused on Service Provider authorization
protocol (Figure 8.3) and Profile transfer protocol (Figure 8.4). Therefore, we assumed
that the user authentication and AKA steps have been successfully achieved. Moreover,
for the sake of simplicity, we did not consider the SP − SDtgt root key personalization.
We modeled our transfer protocol into six roles in addition to two standard roles (i.e.
“session” and “environment”). First, the role “sdSrc” (resp. “sdTgt”) refers to the SP−
SDsrc (resp. SP − SDtgt). Then, the role “src” (resp. “tgt”) represents the Migration
TA within TEE source (resp. target TEE). At last, “teeAdmin” and “sp” respectively
correspond to the entities TEE admin and Service Provider. Every role is modelled into
a state transition system. A state represents the reception and/or the transmission of a
message from our protocol. For instance, “State = 0” in the role “teeAdmin” corresponds
to the reception of INIT RQ by the TEE administrator in Figure 8.3. Regarding the
role called “session”, it represents a single session of our protocol where all the other
roles are instantiated.
All the roles communicate over Dolev-Yao [122] channels (channel(dy)), i.e., an adversary
can fully control the communication channels (A1). The attacker knowledge is defined
by the set of constants or variables of the intruder knowledge set in the main role
(environment) (A2, A3). Then, the intruder actions are modeled by the combination
of several sessions where the intruder may take part of the sessions running. On the
subject of our protocol, besides the initialization of intruder knowledge, we modeled
our attacker by the variable i (i for intruder). We note that the attacker i did not
compromise the SP and the TEE Admin nor their SDs (A4-i / A4-ii) because the roles
“sdsrc”, “sdtgt” and “spagent” are not played by the attacker in the initialized session
(Line 198).
The migration authorization, delivered by the service provider, consists of two com-
ponents: Kproxy and PERM . PERM is a signature computed by the SP on (IDSP ,
certsrc, certtgt, timeStamp). Regarding Kproxy, it is not a standard cryptographic tool.
Thus, AVISPA does not have its predefined predicate. Our model must manually put
up all its features. We designed the proxy re-encryption concept owing to the predicate
∧equal({EncSD} KProxy, {SDCred} PKSDtgt) at the end of the role “sdSrc”. This predicate
models the equality between “the encryption of EncSD (the encryption of SDCred using
the public key of the source SD) using the proxy key” and “the encryption of SDCred us-
ing the public key of the target SD”. If this equality does not hold, it means that Kproxy
is a fake key from an attacker which should be assimilated to a denied authorization of
the SP.
The HLPSL language provides four predicates to model security requirements. The
predicate secret(E, id, S) declares the information E as secret shared by the agents of
set S. This security goal will be identified by id in the goal section. In addition,
witness, request and wreuqest are used to model authentication goals. Regarding
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the security requirements R1 (integrity) and R2 (confidentiality with respect to out-
siders and a curious TEE Admin), we defined them in one goal owing to the predicate
secret(SDCred, secSDCred, {SDsrc, SP, SDtgt}) at the end of the role “sdSrc”. This predi-
cate expresses that the content of an SD should remain secret between the SD of TEE
source, the service provider and the SD of the target TEE.
We successfully validated our protocol with two AVISPA back-ends (AtSe and OFMC).
The AtSe back-end extracts attacks that defeat the security properties by translating
the model in constraints on the adversary’s knowledge. Using a unification algorithm it
integrates at each step of the protocol the new constraints. As our protocol is loop free,
the search of possible attacks is complete. Regarding the OFMC back-end, it builds the
infinite tree defined by the protocol analysis problem in a demand-driven way.
8.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a TEE architecture based on security domains. The
root security domain is controlled by the TEE admin and the other security domains
isolate the service providers trusted applications. With such an architecture, we have
proposed a practical and privacy-preserving TEE profile migration protocol. This proto-
col requires the dynamic interaction of the service provider and the TEE admin. Owing
to the security and functional characteristics of the used re-encryption method, the in-
tegrity and the confidentiality of the TEE profile, with respect to external attackers and
TEE Admin, are guaranteed. Finally, we successfully validated our protocol using the
AVISPA tool.
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Perspectives
(The french version is below)
In this thesis, we presented contributions related to contactless mobile services. In
addition to a secure TEE migration protocol, we presented three privacy-preserving
contributions, i.e., a new set-membership proof scheme and two new privacy-preserving
protocols for the public transport service.
We first introduced a new set-membership proof enabling a prover to prove in a zero-
knowledge way that he holds a secret belonging to a public set. The main idea is to
prove that the user knows a public signature on this secret without revealing neither the
secret nor the signature. Unlike the previous constructions, our set-membership proof
does not require pairing computations at the prover side and in certain use cases at the
verifier side too. This is very advantageous for resource constrained environments like
the SIM cards as we will show in the implementation of our prototypes.
Then, we proposed a privacy-preserving mobile pass protocol based on Direct Anony-
mous Attestation and Camenisch-Lysanskaya signature schemes. This protocol enables
a user to use the transport service without being tracked by the transport authority.
We adapted the existing schemes in order to provide a revocation option. Owing to this
property, the anonymity of a user can be lifted in extreme circumstances such as a judge
request or a fraud. We also provided other security features like the anti-pass back or
the black list management.
Afterwards, we provided a new privacy-preserving mobile ticketing protocol. Our pro-
tocol enables a user to use a book of m-tickets while ensuring the unlinkability of his
trips. To this end, we used our new set-membership proof and provided several opti-
mizations of Boneh-Boyen signatures in order to make it more efficient. Our protocol
ensures a strict anonymity: even the index of a m-ticket must not be revealed during a
m-ticket validation. We also defined a new feature: a secure post-payment mode where
a user can post-pay his usage without questioning his privacy. Moreover, we proposed
countermeasures against m-tickets cloning and double spending.
After building these protocols, for every one, we specified a framework, defined the
security and privacy requirements in a game-based model, and proved their security in
the random oracle model.
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In addition to security and privacy requirements, that we specified in the security models,
the transport service imposes a stringent time constraint, i.e., the validation time of a
transport product must be less than 300 ms. We therefore implemented our protocols
on a NFC-enabled SIM card in order to verify that our proposals satisfy this functional
requirement. Indeed, we respected the time constraint regarding the validation time of
the m-pass and the m-ticketing protocols. Our prototypes also have a major asset: they
work, with a limited degradation of performance, even when the smartphone is off or
the battery is flat.
Finally, the protocols previously presented can be implemented on TEE. Therefore, we
focused on the security of TEE data and software. We presented a new TEE ecosys-
tem and internal architecture in addition to a new approach to securely transfer TEE
credentials and private data from a TEE to another one. Indeed, we organized the
TEE into isolated security domains and introduced a new role, i.e., a TEE Admin who
manages the TEE security by handling the creation and deletion of security domains,
the download and installation of packages in SDs, and also the migration of SDs from a
TEE to another compliant TEE. The main idea of the migration protocol is the use of
a proxy re-encryption scheme. We validated our protocol using an automated security
protocol validation tool.
Other interesting issues related to TEE security or privacy in mobile contactless services
remain to be addressed.
We think that it is important to look at issues related to TEE credential attestation
(external / internal). Indeed, as mentioned previously trusted applications within the
TEE offer secure services to applications within the standard mobile OS. In order to
perform their functions, the trusted applications handle secrets and credentials. If the
credentials of a trusted application have been compromised, the offered service is not
any more secure and trustworthy. Therefore, it is important to be able to prove that the
used credentials have been generated and kept within the TEE, have not been revoked,
and that the trusted application using these credentials is authorised to use them, i.e.,
the used credentials do not belong to another trusted application.
As regards to users’ privacy, many privacy enhancing cryptographic tools exist, like
the group signature schemes used in this thesis. It would be interesting to apply the
optimizations introduced in this thesis in the context of other services like e-voting. Such
application bears security requirements and constraints similar to the public transport
use case. Indeed, in an e-voting system, voters must be authenticated (to verify that
they are entitled to vote) while keeping their votes secret. This is quite alike to what is
required in a transport service where subscribers should be authenticated whilst ensuring
the anonymity of their transport product. Besides to these basic requirements, in e-
voting system, two additional properties should be satisfied: voters should be able to
verify that not only their own votes have been taken into account in the final tabulation
but also those of other voters. Moreover, they should not be able to prove how they
voted in order to render useless any attempt of bribery or coercion. Although these
properties do not have their counterparts in the transport context, the last one (coercion-
resistance) is usually obtained by using “anonymous credentials”, which are generally
based on group signatures. We believe that our optimizations on group signatures could
significantly enhance the efficiency of coercion-resistant voting schemes.
Conclusion et perspectives
Dans cette the`se, nous avons pre´sente´ plusieurs contributions lie´es aux services mobiles
sans contact, a` savoir, une nouvelle preuve d’appartenance a` un ensemble, deux nouveaux
protocoles permettant de pre´server la vie prive´e d’usagers des transports publics ainsi
qu’un protocole se´curise´ de transfert de secrets d’un TEE a` un autre.
Notre premie`re contribution consiste en une nouvelle preuve, a` divulgation nulle de con-
naissance, permettant a` un prouveur de convaincre un ve´rifieur que son secret, dont il
a re´ve´le´ une mise en gage, appartient a` un ensemble public. L’ide´e principale est de
prouver que l’utilisateur connaˆıt une signature publique sur ce secret sans re´ve´ler ni
le secret ni la signature. Contrairement aux constructions pre´ce´dentes, notre preuve
d’appartenance a` un ensemble ne ne´cessite pas de calculs de couplages du coˆte´ du prou-
veur voire dans certains cas du coˆte´ du ve´rifieur. Ceci est tre`s avantageux pour les
environnements a` ressources limite´es comme les cartes SIM, comme cela a e´te´ illustre´ a`
travers l’imple´mentation de nos diffe´rents prototypes.
Nous avons ensuite propose´ une carte d’abonnement aux transports publics, similaire au
passe Navigo de la RATP mais offrant de meilleures garanties en termes de se´curite´ et
de respect de la vie prive´e. Le de´tenteur d’une telle carte peut aussi prouver a` une borne
de transport qu’il dispose d’un titre de transport valide sans eˆtre trace´ par l’autorite´
de transport. Nous nous somme appuye´s pour cela sur des accre´ditations anonymes et
des sche´mas de signature de type Camenisch-Lysanskaya. L’anonymat d’un usager peut
toutefois eˆtre leve´e dans des circonstances exceptionnelles a` la demande d’un juge par
exemple ou bien en cas de fraude.
Nous avons e´galement propose´ un syste`me de billetterie e´lectronique pour les trans-
ports publics. Ce syste`me est fonde´ sur l’utilisation de carnet de tickets anonymes et
intrac¸ables. Pour ce faire, nous avons utilise´ notre nouvelle preuve d’appartenance a` un
ensemble et fourni plusieurs optimisations des signatures Boneh-Boyen. Notre syste`me
garantit un niveau d’anonymat e´leve´, meˆme l’indice d’un m-ticket n’est pas re´ve´le´ lors
de sa validation. Nous offrons e´galement une nouvelle fonctionnalite´ ine´dite pour ce type
de syste`mes: le post-paiement. Un utilisateur peut ainsi payer a` poste´riori l’utilisation
de ses m-tickets sans que cela ne remette en cause sa vie prive´e. En outre, nous avons
propose´ des contre-mesures contre le clonage de billets et les de´penses multiples.
Pour chacun de ces syste`mes (carte d’abonnement et m-ticketing), nous avons spe´cifie´
le mode`le de se´curite´ et formellement prouve´ leur se´curite´ dans le mode`le de l’oracle
ale´atoire.
Les services de transport imposent un cahier des charges tre`s contraignant, en partic-
ulier, le temps de validation d’un titre de transport doit eˆtre infe´rieur a` 300 ms. Nous
avons donc imple´mente´ nos protocoles sur une carte SIM NFC afin de ve´rifier que nos
124
Chapter 9. Conclusion et Perspectives 125
diffe´rentes propositions satisfont bien cette exigence fonctionnelle. Pour les deux cas, nos
prototypes confirment que nous respectons bien cette contrainte de temps. Nos proto-
types ont aussi un atout majeur: ils fonctionnent, avec une certaine de´gradation limite´e
des performances, meˆme lorsque le mobile est e´teint ou que sa batterie est de´charge´e.
Enfin, les protocoles pre´sente´s pre´ce´demment peuvent eˆtre aussi imple´mente´s sur le TEE.
Par conse´quent, nous nous sommes concentre´s sur la se´curite´ des secrets dans le TEE.
Nous avons pre´sente´ un nouvel e´cosyste`me du TEE et une nouvelle architecture interne
en plus d’une nouvelle approche pour le transfert se´curise´ de secrets d’un TEE a` un
autre. Nous avons organise´ a` cet effet le TEE en domaines de se´curite´ isole´s et introduit
un nouveau roˆle, a` savoir, un “TEE Admin” qui ge`re la se´curite´ du TEE notamment la
cre´ation et la suppression des domaines de la se´curite´, le te´le´chargement et l’installation
de paquets dans un domaine de se´curite´, et aussi la migration des domaines de se´curite´
d’un TEE a` un autre TEE. L’ide´e principale du protocole de migration re´side dans
l’utilisation d’un syste`me de proxy de re-chiffrement. Nous avons valide´ la se´curite´ de
notre protocole en utilisant un outil automatique de ve´rification de protocole de se´curite´.
D’autres questions inte´ressantes lie´es a` la se´curite´ du TEE ou bien au respect de la vie
prive´e dans les services mobiles sans contact se posent.
Nous pensons qu’il est important d’examiner les questions lie´es a` l’attestation des secrets
du TEE (interne / externe). En effet, comme mentionne´ pre´ce´demment les applications
de confiance du TEE offrent des services se´curise´s aux applications de l’environnement
mobile standard. Afin d’assurer leurs fonctions, les applications de confiance manipulent
des secrets et des donne´es prive´es. Si les secrets d’une application de confiance ont e´te´
compromis, le service offert n’est plus suˆr. Par conse´quent, il est important d’eˆtre en
mesure de prouver que les secrets utilise´s ont e´te´ ge´ne´re´s et conserve´s dans le TEE,
n’ont pas e´te´ re´voque´s, et que l’application de confiance qui les utilise est autorise´e a` le
faire, autrement dit, les secrets utilise´s n’appartiennent pas a` une autre application de
confiance.
En ce qui concerne le respect de la vie prive´e des utilisateurs, beaucoup d’outils cryp-
tographiques existent, comme les sche´mas de signature de groupe utilise´s dans cette
the`se. Il serait inte´ressant d’appliquer les optimisations introduites dans cette the`se
dans le contexte d’autres services comme le vote e´lectronique (e-vote). Cette applica-
tion a des exigences de se´curite´ et des contraintes similaires a` celles d’un service de
transport en commun. En effet, dans un syste`me de vote e´lectronique, les e´lecteurs
doivent eˆtre authentifie´s (pour ve´rifier qu’ils sont autorise´s a` voter) mais leur vote doit
rester secret. Ceci est tout a` fait semblable a` ce qui est requis dans un service de trans-
port, ou` les abonne´s doivent eˆtre authentifie´s, sans compromettre l’anonymat de leurs
titres de transport. Outre ces exigences de base, dans un syste`me de vote e´lectronique,
deux autres proprie´te´s de se´curite´ doivent eˆtre satisfaites: les e´lecteurs devraient eˆtre en
mesure de ve´rifier que non seulement leurs propres votes ont e´te´ pris en compte dans le
de´pouillement final, mais aussi ceux des autres e´lecteurs. En outre, ils ne devraient pas
eˆtre en mesure de prouver comment ils ont vote´ afin de de´jouer toute tentative de coerci-
tion ou de corruption. Bien que ces proprie´te´s n’aient pas d’e´quivalent dans le contexte
du transport, la dernie`re (la proprie´te´ de re´sistance a` la coercition) est ge´ne´ralement
obtenue en utilisant des “ accre´ditations anonymes ”, qui sont souvent base´es sur les
signatures de groupe. Nous pensons donc que nos optimisations sur les signatures de
groupe pourraient ame´liorer conside´rablement l’efficacite´ des syste`mes de vote proposant
des contre-mesures aux les tentatives de coercition ou de corruption.
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Appendix A
TEE Migration Protocol in
HLPSL
1 r o l e sdSrc ( SDsrc , SrcTEE , SDtgt ,SP : agent ,
2 PKSDsrc , Kproxy , PKSDtgt : pub l i c k e y ,
3 SND , RCV : channe l ( dy ) )
4
5 p l a y ed by SDsrc
6 de f=
7
8 l o c a l
9 Sta t e : nat ,
10 SDCred : t e x t
11 i n i t S ta t e :=0
12
13 t r a n s i t i o n
14 1 . Sta t e = 0 /\ RCV( s t a r t )
15 =|>
16 State ’ := 1
17 /\ SDCred ’ := new ( )
18 /\ SND({SDCred ’} PKSDsrc )
19 /\ s e c r e t (SDCred , sec SDCred ,{ SDsrc , SDtgt })
20 /\ equa l ({{SDCred} PKSDsrc} Kproxy , {SDCred} PKSDtgt )
21 end r o l e
22
23 r o l e s r c (SrcTEE , SDsrc , TgtTEE , TEEAdmin : agent ,
24 PKSDsrc , PKSrcTEE , PKTgtTEE , PKTEEAdmin : pub l i c k e y ,
25 SK : symmetr i c key ,
26 SND , RCV : channe l ( dy ) )
27
28 p l a y ed by SrcTEE
29 de f=
30
31 l o c a l
32 Sta t e : nat ,
33 TimeStamp , Ts , SDCred : t ex t ,
34 Ack , PERM : message ,
35 Kproxy : p u b l i c k e y
36 i n i t
37 Sta t e :=0
38
39 t r a n s i t i o n
40 1 . Sta t e = 0 /\ RCV({SDCred ’} PKSDsrc )
41 =|>
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42 State ’ := 1
43 /\ TimeStamp ’ := new ( )
44 /\ SND(PKSDsrc .PKSrcTEE .PKTgtTEE .{ PKSDsrc .PKSrcTEE .PKTgtTEE . TimeStamp
’} i n v (PKSrcTEE ) )
45
46 2 . Sta t e = 1 /\ RCV(Kproxy ’ .PERM’ . { Kproxy ’ .PERM ’ . Ts ’} i n v (PKTEEAdmin) )
47 =|>
48 State ’ := 2
49 /\ SND({{{SDCred} PKSDsrc} Kproxy } SK )
50
51 3 . Sta t e = 2 /\ RCV({Ack ’} SK )
52 =|>
53 State ’ := 3
54 end r o l e
55
56 r o l e teeAdmin (TEEAdmin , SrcTEE , TgtTEE , SP : agent ,
57 PKSDsrc , PKTEEAdmin , PKSrcTEE , PKTgtTEE : pub l i c k e y ,
58 SK : symmetr i c key ,
59 SND , RCV : channe l ( dy ) )
60
61 p l a y ed by TEEAdmin
62 de f=
63
64 l o c a l
65 Sta t e : nat ,
66 TimeStamp , Param : t ex t ,
67 PERM, SDCreate , Ack : message ,
68 Kproxy : p u b l i c k e y
69 i n i t
70 Sta t e :=0
71
72 t r a n s i t i o n
73 1 . Sta t e = 0 /\ RCV(PKSDsrc .PKSrcTEE .PKTgtTEE .{ PKSDsrc .PKSrcTEE .
PKTgtTEE . TimeStamp ’} i n v (PKSrcTEE ) )
74 =|>
75 State ’ := 1
76 /\ SND(PKSDsrc .PKSrcTEE .PKTgtTEE)
77
78 2 . Sta t e = 1 /\ RCV( SDCreate ’ )
79 =|>
80 State ’ := 2
81 /\ SND( SDCreate ’ . { SDCreate ’} i n v (PKTEEAdmin) )
82
83 3 . Sta t e = 2 /\ RCV(Ack ’ . Param ’ . { Ack ’ . Param ’} i n v (PKTgtTEE) )
84 =|>
85 State ’ := 3
86 /\ SND(Param ’ )
87
88 4 . Sta t e = 3 /\ RCV(Kproxy ’ .PERM’ )
89 =|>
90 State ’ := 4
91 /\ TimeStamp ’ := new ( )
92 /\ SND(Kproxy .PERM.{ Kproxy .PERM . TimeStamp ’} i n v (PKTEEAdmin) )
93 end r o l e
94
95 r o l e sp (SP , TEEAdmin : agent ,
96 PKSDsrc , PKSrcTEE , PKTgtTEE , Kproxy : pub l i c k e y ,
97 SND , RCV : channe l ( dy ) )
98
99 p l a y ed by SP
100 de f=
101
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102 l o c a l
103 Sta t e : nat ,
104 Param : t ex t ,
105 PERM, SDCreate : message
106
107 i n i t
108 Sta t e :=0
109
110 t r a n s i t i o n
111 1 . Sta t e = 0 /\ RCV(PKSDsrc .PKSrcTEE .PKTgtTEE)
112 =|>
113 State ’ := 1
114 /\ SND( SDCreate .PKTgtTEE)
115
116 2 . Sta t e = 1 /\ RCV(Param ’ )
117 =|>
118 State ’ := 2
119 /\ SND(Kproxy .PERM)
120 end r o l e
121
122 r o l e t g t (TgtTEE , SrcTEE , TEEAdmin : agent ,
123 PKSDsrc , PKTgtTEE , PKTEEAdmin : pub l i c k e y ,
124 SK : symmetr i c key ,
125 SND , RCV : channe l ( dy ) )
126
127 p l a y ed by TgtTEE
128 de f=
129
130 l o c a l
131 Sta t e : nat ,
132 SDCred , Param : t ex t ,
133 Ack , SDCreate : message ,
134 Kproxy : p u b l i c k e y
135 i n i t
136 Sta t e :=0
137 t r a n s i t i o n
138 1 . Sta t e = 0 /\ RCV( SDCreate ’ . { SDCreate ’} i n v (PKTEEAdmin) )
139 =|>
140 State ’ :=1
141 /\ Param ’ := new ( )
142 /\ SND(Ack . Param ’ . { Ack . Param ’} i n v (PKTgtTEE) )
143 2 . Sta t e = 1 /\ RCV({{{SDCred ’} PKSDsrc} Kproxy ’} SK )
144 =|>
145 State ’ := 2
146 /\ Ack ’ := new ( )
147 /\ SND({Ack ’} SK )
148 /\ SND({{SDCred ’} PKSDsrc} Kproxy )
149 end r o l e
150
151 r o l e sdTgt ( SDtgt ,TgtTEE : agent ,
152 PKSDsrc : pub l i c k e y ,
153 SND , RCV : channe l ( dy ) )
154
155 p l a y ed by SDtgt
156 de f=
157 l o c a l
158 Sta t e : nat ,
159 SDCred : t ex t ,
160 Kproxy : p u b l i c k e y
161 i n i t
162 Sta t e :=0
163 t r a n s i t i o n
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164 1 . Sta t e = 0 /\ RCV({{SDCred ’} PKSDsrc} Kproxy ’ )
165 =|>
166 State ’ := 1
167 end r o l e
168
169 r o l e s e s s i o n ( SDsrc , SrcTEE , TgtTEE , TEEAdmin , SP , SDtgt : agent ,
170 PKSDsrc , PKSrcTEE , PKTgtTEE , PKTEEAdmin , Kproxy , PKSDtgt :
pub l i c k e y ,
171 SK : s ymmet r i c key )
172
173 de f=
174
175 l o c a l
176 SND0 , SND1 , SND2 , SND3 , SND4 , SND5 , RCV0 , RCV1 , RCV2 , RCV3 , RCV4 ,
RCV5 : channe l ( dy )
177
178 compos i t i on
179 sdSrc ( SDsrc , SrcTEE , SDtgt ,SP , PKSDsrc , Kproxy , PKSDtgt ,SND0 ,RCV0)
180 /\ s r c (SrcTEE , SDsrc ,TgtTEE ,TEEAdmin , PKSDsrc ,PKSrcTEE ,PKTgtTEE ,
PKTEEAdmin ,SK ,SND1 ,RCV1)
181 /\ teeAdmin (TEEAdmin , SrcTEE ,TgtTEE ,SP , PKSDsrc ,PKTEEAdmin ,PKSrcTEE ,
PKTgtTEE ,SK ,SND3 ,RCV3)
182 /\ sp (SP ,TEEAdmin , PKSDsrc ,PKSrcTEE ,PKTgtTEE , Kproxy ,SND4 ,RCV4)
183 /\ t g t (TgtTEE , SrcTEE ,TEEAdmin , PKSDsrc ,PKTgtTEE ,PKTEEAdmin ,SK ,SND2 ,RCV2)
184 /\ sdTgt ( SDtgt ,TgtTEE , PKSDsrc ,SND5 ,RCV5)
185 end r o l e
186
187 r o l e env i ronment ( )
188 de f=
189 con s t sd s r c , s r c t e e , t g t t e e , teeadmin , spagent , s d t g t : agent ,
190 sec SDCred : p r o t o c o l i d ,
191 pksds rc , kproxy , pk s r c t e e , pk tg t t e e , pkteeadmin , pk sd tg t : pub l i c k e y
,
192 sk : s ymmet r i c key
193
194 i n t r u d e r k n ow l e d g e = { sd s r c , s r c t e e , t g t t e e , teeadmin , spagent , sd tg t , kproxy ,
pksds rc , pk s r c t e e , pk tg t t e e , pkteeadmin , pk sd tg t }
195
196 compos i t i on
197
198 s e s s i o n ( sd s r c , s r c t e e , t g t t e e , teeadmin , spagent , sd tg t , pksds rc , pk s r c t e e
, pk tg t t e e , pkteeadmin , kproxy , pksdtgt , sk )
199 end r o l e
200
201 goa l
202 s e c r e c y o f sec SDCred
203 end goa l
204
205 env i ronment ( )
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Ghada ARFAOUI 
 
Conception de protocoles cryptographiques préservant la vie privée pour les 
services mobiles sans contact 
 
Résumé :  
Avec l'émergence de nouvelles technologies telles que le NFC (Communication à champ proche) et l'accroissement du 
nombre de plates-formes mobiles,  les téléphones mobiles vont devenir de plus en plus indispensables dans notre vie 
quotidienne. Ce contexte introduit de nouveaux défis en termes de sécurité et de respect de la vie privée. Dans cette 
thèse, nous nous focalisons sur les problématiques liées  au respect de la vie privée dans les services NFC ainsi qu’à la 
protection des données privées et secrets des applications mobiles dans les environnements d'exécution de confiance 
(TEE).  
Nous fournissons deux solutions pour le transport public: une solution utilisant des cartes d'abonnement (m-pass) et une 
autre à base de tickets électroniques (m-ticketing). Nos solutions préservent la vie privée des utilisateurs tout en 
respectant les exigences fonctionnelles établies par les opérateurs de transport. À cette fin, nous proposons de nouvelles 
variantes de signatures de groupe ainsi que la première preuve pratique d’appartenance à un ensemble, à apport nul de 
connaissance, et qui ne nécessite pas de calculs de couplages du côté du prouveur. Ces améliorations permettent de 
réduire considérablement le temps d'exécution de ces schémas lorsqu’ils sont implémentés dans des environnements 
contraints par exemple sur carte à puce. Nous avons développé  les protocoles de m-passe et de m-ticketing dans une 
carte SIM standard : la validation d'un ticket ou d'un m-pass s'effectue en moins de 300ms et ce tout en utilisant des 
tailles de clés adéquates. Nos solutions fonctionnent également lorsque le mobile est éteint ou lorsque sa batterie est 
déchargée. Si les applications s'exécutent dans un TEE, nous introduisons un nouveau protocole de migration de 
données privées, d'un TEE à un autre, qui assure la confidentialité et l'intégrité de ces données. Notre protocole est 
fondé sur l’utilisation d’un schéma de proxy de rechiffrement ainsi que sur un nouveau modèle d’architecture du TEE. 
Enfin, nous prouvons formellement la sécurité de nos protocoles soit dans le modèle calculatoire pour les protocoles de 
m-pass et de ticketing soit dans le modèle symbolique pour le protocole de migration de données entre TEE. 
Mots clés : services mobiles, respect de la vie privée, signature de groupe, proxy de rechiffrement, TEE, migration de 
secrets 
 Design of privacy preserving cryptographic protocols for mobile contactless 
services 
 
Summary:  
The increasing number of worldwide mobile platforms and the emergence of new technologies such as the NFC (Near 
Field Communication) lead to a growing tendency to build a user's life depending on mobile phones. This context 
brings also new security and privacy challenges. In this thesis, we pay further attention to privacy issues in NFC 
services as well as the security of the mobile applications private data and credentials namely in Trusted Execution 
Environments (TEE).    
We first provide two solutions for public transport use case: an m-pass (transport subscription card) and a m-ticketing 
validation protocols. Our solutions ensure users' privacy while respecting functional requirements of transport 
operators. To this end, we propose new variants of group signatures and the first practical set-membership proof that do 
not require pairing computations at the prover's side. These novelties significantly reduce the execution time of such 
schemes when implemented in resource constrained environments. We implemented the m-pass and m-ticketing 
protocols in a standard SIM card: the validation phase occurs in less than 300ms whilst using strong security 
parameters. Our solutions also work even when the mobile is switched off or the battery is flat. When these applications 
are implemented in TEE, we introduce a new TEE migration protocol that ensures the privacy and integrity of the TEE 
credentials and user's private data. We construct our protocol based on a proxy re-encryption scheme and a new TEE 
model. Finally, we formally prove the security of our protocols using either game-based experiments in the random 
oracle model or automated model checker of security protocols. 
Keywords: mobile services, privacy, group signature, proxy re-encryption, TEE, credential migration 
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